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Abstract 
The Great War was a formative event for men who came of age between 1914 
and 1918. They believed the experience forged them into a distinct 
generation. This collective identification more than shaped a sense of self; it 
influenced understanding of the conflict’s meaning. Canadian historians, 
however, have overlooked the war’s generational impact, partly because they 
reject notions of a disillusioned Lost Generation. Unlike European or 
American youths, it is argued that Canadian veterans did not suffer postwar 
disillusionment. Rather, they embraced the war alongside a renewed 
Canadian nationalism. This generation was proud of their nation’s wartime 
achievements, notably those of the Canadian Corps, but the conflict’s 
meaning was rooted in more than battlefield history. Its validity was 
inseparable from the postwar life for which veterans believed they had fought 
for. Yet, despite hopes to return home to a ‘square deal’, economic and 
international instability marred life in interwar Canada, dashing the 
generation’s confidence in the future.  
This discontent is obscured by histories heavily focused on memory 
and a corresponding reliance on cultural sources, such as war books, to 
explain the conflict’s social history. While an important part of the war’s 
legacy, retrospective focus on commemoration is a poor guide to the lived 
realities of the postwar present. In the war’s aftermath many young veterans 
struggled to find work. Combined with the prospect of renewed war in 
Europe, their unemployment added to a growing list of postwar grievances, 
including failure to secure adequate assistance for wounded and traumatized 
veterans. These unresolved complaints about the pension system, the soldier 
  
 
settlement schemes, and the mishandling of postwar canteen funds 
(particularly in Ontario) more than undermined the war generation’s belief in 
the war, it left them deeply disillusioned with its meaning. 
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Introduction 
 
On 3 June 1916, private A.Y. Jackson huddled in a trench with shells 
exploding all around. He was a member of the 60th Battalion, Canadian 
Expeditionary Force (CEF). The future Group of Seven member was 
witnessing the battle of Mount Sorrel, near Ypres. The day before, the 
German army detonated four mines under the British lines and the result 
was chaos. By morning, a “hurricane of fire” erupted in the trenches that 
left the Canadians stunned, deaf, and unable to retaliate.1 Major-General 
Malcolm Mercer, commander of the newly formed Canadian 3rd Division, 
was killed, along with most who held the front lines. Reserve and 
communication trenches were in disarray.  There were conflicting messages 
about whether the battalion should proceed and the German shelling made 
it “impossible to get the men in position.”2 Jackson’s battalion formed part 
of the Canadian counter-attack. “They just simply plastered us,” he 
recalled, as the remaining troops were forced to advance among the 
                                                
1 Tim Cook, At the Sharp End: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1914-1916 
(Toronto: Viking, 2007), 350. 
2 Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG 9, III-D-3, Vol. 4942, 60th Battalion War 
Diary, 3 June 1916.  
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corpses. He further remembered how “You’d look down and see a little kid 
of about fifteen.”3  
The shellfire increased. Suddenly another barrage came crashing 
down, covering the troops with “dirt, dust, and pieces of brick.” A shell 
burst a few feet away with a “wicked sound,” followed by a “green yellow 
ball of smoke.” Next came the “cries and groans.” Jackson’s lieutenant 
turned pale and fell “in a huddled heap.” A comrade looked “in dismay at 
a great spurt of blood coming from his arm, which was only hanging by a 
few shreds of flesh.”4 By day’s end, Jackson was wounded with a shrapnel 
ball in his shoulder.  
The fighting left A.Y. Jackson disillusioned. With little desire to 
return to the front, he wrote his cousin, Florence Clement, telling her that 
he had lost all “illusions” about war. “I don't care how long I take to get 
ready for the trenches,” he confessed. He would do as ordered “but not 
much more.” In Jackson’s mind, the war had become mass slaughter. There 
was no place for individual distinction. “Glory and decorations are not for 
the private soldiers,” he wrote. He commented to Florence that individual 
men were less important than “a box of jam.”5 Ironically, the average 
                                                 
3 LAC, RG 41 [Hereafter Flanders’ Fields], Vol. 16, 85th Battalion (misfiled), A.Y. 
Jackson, tape 3/3. 
4 LAC, MG 30, D 111 [Hereafter MacDonald papers], Vol. 1, folder 2, Jackson to 
MacDonald, 10 September 1916. 
5 LAC, MG 30, D 351 [Hereafter Jackson papers], Vol. 95, folder 6, Jackson to 
Florence Clement, 26 August 1916. 
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soldier only stood out when he resisted. A “private is nothing, unless he 
disobeys orders.” Then a “big fuss” ensues and he “gets shot.”6  
Jackson rarely spoke about the war in the years that followed and his 
autobiography glosses over his time in the trenches.7 Despite this silence, 
however, his sense of the war’s futility lasted long after the conflict ended. 
In the early 1960s, he sat down with the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation (CBC) to record an interview as part of its First World War 
series, Flanders’ Fields.8 The program marked the fiftieth anniversary of the 
war and its producers interviewed hundreds of veterans about their 
experiences. Jackson explained that he considered the war “sheer murder.” 
                                                 
6 LAC, MacDonald papers, Vol. 1, folder 2, Jackson to MacDonald, 31 May 1916.  
7 The autobiography focuses almost exclusively on his time as a war artist. His 
experiences prior to this, including his enlistment and time spent in the 60th Battalion, are 
relegated to two brief paragraphs. These say nothing about how the war affected him and 
limit comment of the war to the weather, Jackson’s inability to paint in the trenches, and 
the “weird, ruined landscapes” of Ypres.  
He describes the experience as follows: “Our first day in France was not auspicious. 
We marched through Le Havre in snow and slush, with no one taking any notice of us. A 
five-mile march brought us to an empty camp in the dark; the flaps had not been tied up 
and the tents were full of wet snow. And, army fashion, our field kitchens had gone astray. 
We crawled into the tents and huddled together for warmth, having had nothing to eat 
since breakfast. 
But Flanders in early spring was beautiful, as we Ypres by moonlight and the 
weird ruined landscapes under the light of flares or rockets. Apart from a few diagrams, 
enlargements from maps and plans of the sectors we were in, I had no chance of doing any 
sketching.” See A.Y. Jackson, A Painter’s Country: The Autobiography of A.Y. Jackson 
(Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, & Co., 1967 [1958]), 36-37. 
8 See Teresa Iacobelli, “A Participant's History?: The CBC and the Manipulation of 
Oral History," Oral History Review 38.2 (Fall-Winter 2011): 331-348 for a discussion of this 
series. While Iacobelli points out that the interviewers asked leading questions to manage 
the answers they received, the interviews themselves, rather than the broadcast transcript, 
are more revealing about what veterans recalled during these interviews.  
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Passchendaele, for example, was a “perfectly useless” battle.9 The Group of 
Seven artist was in his early eighties at the time of the interview but it was 
clear that his wartime disillusion remained. And yet, he did not regret 
serving. Jackson was proud of his experiences, both because of what they 
taught him about humanity and for what he and his comrades experienced 
overseas. Together, they built “a wonderful army” that was “Canadian and 
independent.”10 He was thankful that his experiences had given him a 
“great respect for human beings.”11  
Greg Clark was another veteran to the Great War. As a young 
journalist, he enlisted with the Canadian Mounted Rifles in 1916 and served 
more than two years overseas. At Vimy Ridge, he took command of his unit 
when the battalion’s officers were killed, an action that earned the young 
lieutenant the Military Cross. Clark diaried some of these experiences in 
1919 and 1920. Combat, he wrote, was an experience “too vast, too 
unknown for conception,” filled with “terror” and a “paralyzing, terrific 
tumult.”12 Other recollections were more graphic. During one artillery 
barrage, Clark was struck by his friend’s leg, which was “severed at the 
hip” and hurled through the air. Seconds later, Clark wrote, “over our 
                                                 
9 LAC, Flanders’ Fields, Vol. 16, 85th Battalion, A.Y. Jackson, 2/3.  
10 LAC, MacDonald papers, Vol. 1, folder 2, Jackson to MacDonald, 6 April 1918.   
11 LAC, Flanders’ Fields, Vol. 16, 85th Battalion, A.Y. Jackson, 1/3.  
12 LAC, R8258 [Hereafter Clark papers], Vol 2, Diary and Memoir (Dec 1919-1920). 
5 
 
 
 
heads sailed the rest of Johnson, landing 40 yards from where he was first 
hit.”13  
Such experiences inevitably affected Clark’s psyche: “Two years [of] 
continuous service with the [Battalion], with no relaxation whatever, just 
endless indolence fringed with a petty fussing activity, did something 
serious to my mind and spirit.”14 Yet whatever horrors he endured, Clark 
maintained that he had “a decent time … compared with so many others.” 
Decades later, in the 1960s, he took solace that his experiences had shaped 
him as a man. “I was a bookworm, a quiet little bookworm when I went [off 
to war],” Clark explained, “and I came home a rather tough character.” 
Clark’s experience as a journalist, combined with his memories of his 
service, made him an ideal subject for the CBC’s Flanders’ Fields, the same 
program that interviewed A.Y. Jackson in the 1960s. Clark’s memories of 
the conflict, however, did not conform to the program’s preconceived 
narrative that portrayed the war as futile. While some veterans (including 
A.Y. Jackson) held this view, Clark did not.15 He believed the war 
experience had matured him as a man and he bristled at suggestions to the 
contrary. Nonetheless, his sense of the conflict’s wider meaning was less 
certain. Many veterans struggled in the aftermath of the war and Clark 
                                                 
13 LAC, Clark papers, Vol. 2, Diary and Memoir (Dec 1919-1920). 
14 LAC, Clark papers, Vol. 2, Diary and Memoir (Dec 1919-1920). 
15 French veterans held similar views to Canadians. See Leonard V. Smith, The 
Embattled Self: French Soldiers’ Testimony of the Great War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2007), 201. 
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believed their plight was as much a part of the conflict’s legacy as his 
maturation.16 
The war that these men endured was a tragedy. It exposed them to 
unimaginable horrors, often with little discernible sense of purpose, either 
on the battlefield or at the diplomatic tables. When it finally ended, the 
armistice and resulting peace proved a pyrrhic victory, achieving little 
except halting the war’s slaughter. Peacetime proved an even greater 
disappointment. In place of the ideal world they had hoped for, veterans 
returned to economic uncertainty, declining health, and the prospect of 
another war. As Lester Pearson, future Prime Minister and Great War 
veteran, recalled, war’s end “saved … my generation and gave the world, 
not peace, but a reprieve.”17  
By 1919, it was already clear that the war transformed the lives of 
those who lived it. The conflict was a shocking experience and many men, 
including A.Y. Jackson and Greg Clark, considered it the formative event in 
their lives. The war remolded Jackson’s views of Canada; it recast his 
approach to art; it reshaped his identity.18 So important was the experience 
that he, like countless men of his generation, considered it the central 
dividing line for the rest of their lives. As Jackson explained, the war’s 
                                                 
16 LAC, RG41, Vol. 17, 4th C.M.R., Flanders’ Fields: Greg Clark, tape 2/3, n.d. 
17 Lester B. Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. Person, Vol. 1 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 38. 
18 Laura Brandon, Transformations: A.Y. Jackson & Otto Dix (Ottawa: Canadian 
Museum of History, 2014).  See too Brandon, “Shattered Landscape: The Great War and 
the Art of the Group of Seven,” Canadian Military History, 10:1 (Winter 2001): 58-66. 
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impact was such that “before the war” and “after the war” became a 
chronological divide, as important as “B.C. and A.D.”19 His experience was 
not unique. Countless veterans considered the war a defining moment. It 
demarcated their lives into distinct periods: “before the war, during the 
war, and after the war.”20  These men came of age during the conflict and 
the fact that they could be intensely proud and at the same time deeply 
disillusioned by the experience reflects a central paradox of the generation’s 
understanding of the Great War. 
This dissertation attempts to explain this paradox. But how powerful 
and influential was this sense of disillusionment? How did it manifest in 
the generation that fought the war as this group of men struggled to find 
meaning in the postwar world? What role did it play in shaping the 
interwar period in Canada? The unique approach offered in this study rests 
on Lester Pearson’s reference to “my generation.” Men who joined up to 
serve between 1914 and 1918 were predominantly young. With survival 
came a sense of transformation that reshaped their collective sense of self. 
While postwar life in the 1920s and 1930s was difficult for most people in 
Canada, the war generation maintained that it was uniquely affected, 
indeed shaped, by this tragic conflict. Those who went to war grappled 
with haunting memories and restlessness, as well as the physical, 
psychological, and emotional traumas that clearly set them apart. They 
                                                 
19 LAC, Flanders’ Fields, Vol. 16, 85th Battalion, A.Y Jackson, 1/3.  
20 Dan Vernon’s interview with the War and Canadian Society Project’s oral 
history is found in Daphne Read, ed., The Great War and Canadian Society: An Oral History 
(New Hogtown Press, 1978), 215. Dan Vernon is a pseudonym.  
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came to identify ‘generationally’, an identification that bound them 
together for the rest of their lives.  
Canadians at home lived a very different war. It was every bit as real 
but, being more distant and abstract than life in the trenches, the experience 
did not forge a comparable collective identity. Even those who lost loved 
ones could never understand what their sons, brothers, or fathers, went 
through. These ‘different wars’ in turn shaped reactions to the conflict’s 
aftermath.21 When the war ended, commemoration of the conflict was 
widely embraced and Canadians celebrated their victory while mourning 
the nation’s fallen. These public displays of grief helped the nation come to 
terms with its staggering losses and bridged divisions that spanned the 
frontlines and the home front. Few veterans disagreed with a desire to 
enshrine remembrance at the forefront of public discourse. But, for the war 
generation, the conflict’s meaning amounted to more than its memory. 
Postwar life was a world for which they had fought and sacrificed. Its 
challenges also influenced their understanding of the conflict and, as they 
endured countless setbacks in the years and decades that followed, men’s 
criticisms of the war and life in Canada increased.  
Between 1914 and 1918, men ‘joined up’ for different reasons. While 
these motivations varied, by the time the war ended, they shared common 
expectations for the future. Often, these remained little more than vague 
notions of a better life, what many described simply as a ‘square deal’. As 
time passed, however, veterans’ struggle to create this future fell on deaf 
                                                 
21 Janet K. Watson, Fighting Different Wars: Experience, Memory, and the First World 
War in Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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ears. Canadians, veterans complained, were more concerned with 
remembering the dead than embracing the plight of the living. Faced with 
rising unemployment, beset by war-related injuries, and denied their 
pensions, support, and life they believed they had earned, men started to 
question the meaning and value of their sacrifices.  
This wave of postwar disillusionment was not unique to Canada. It 
swept through Germany, Britain, and the United States. Veterans identified 
as a Lost Generation. Yet, despite the widespread nature of their discontent, 
a disillusioned war generation does not fit the general interpretation of 
postwar Canada. Histories of the era highlight the growth of nationalism, 
not the existence of a Canadian lost generation. Disillusionment did not fit 
the national narrative. Accounts of the war’s memory are dismissive of 
disillusioned veterans, a group also ignored in examinations of postwar 
economic discord. Even histories of the veterans’ movement manage to shy 
away from discussion of the war’s wider meaning or how it was shaped by 
life in postwar Canada.  
Public commemoration was a sacred cow, which men found difficult 
to critique without risking rebuke. A lack of postwar debate about veterans’ 
grievances does not, however, mean that debate did not exist. Rather it 
occurred in a different context to public commemoration. Such criticisms 
were often private and deeply rooted in the war experience. To these 
veterans, their position honoured, rather than insulted, the war’s memory. 
If anything, it was postwar Canada that failed to ensure that the nation’s 
sacrifices were properly valued.  
10 
 
 
 
Outside of Canada, veterans from other nations reacted bitterly to 
the war. German Dadaists, such George Grosz and Otto Dix, produced 
grotesque artwork that critiqued the worst of the war’s horrors. Others 
found a voice for their discontent in the written word. This international 
literature, which included novels such as Ernst Maria Remarque’s All Quiet 
on the Western Front, was highly personal, reflecting the transformative 
power the conflict had on young men. It took many forms, from poetry and 
novels to memoirs, as well as political, social, and cultural critiques. 
Collectively, it was identified as the work of a lost generation—a term that 
encompassed postwar disappointment and the importance youth played in 
shaping these veterans’ place in postwar society. 
Canadians, however, did not produce war books in comparable 
numbers to British, American, or German writers. These works are perhaps 
the most important cultural record of this generation’s discontent, but 
without a tradition of ‘lost’ dissent, Canadians have looked elsewhere to 
study the war’s aftermath. Historians turned their attention to the war’s 
public commemoration to argue that Canada did not experience postwar 
discontent. As a result, Canada’s lost generation remains overlooked. While 
many of the nation’s veterans—including Greg Clark—were proud of their 
part in the war, they could not divorce its experience from the challenges 
veterans faced. To these men, its legacy was inseparable from its aftermath. 
Continued focus on the public’s reaction to the war, however, overlooks the 
relationship between its meaning and men’s wartime and postwar lives. It 
does not explain how the nation’s veterans responded generationally; it 
11 
 
 
 
does not indicate that they were as critical of postwar life as veterans from 
other nations.  
Canada’s war generation was young. It came of age with the war but 
despite identifying generationally with the conflict, it did not openly 
discuss its private views of this formative event. Nonetheless, the men’s 
efforts to shape their postwar future demonstrate how the war’s aftermath 
influenced their understanding of the conflict. This generational response 
also highlights how disparate groups willingly identified with each other 
and makes the link between the war’s aftermath and postwar disillusion. 
Yet, the understanding of men’s war experience was never static. It began 
during the war and continued to evolve as their lives moved forward. The 
events men experienced during the conflict took on new and often altered 
meanings in light of the challenges and opportunities of the 1920s, 1930s, 
and beyond. And, while each veteran’s recollection of his wartime 
experience was legitimate, this dissertation privileges the private 
discussions men shared with each other and with the organizations that 
made up the expanding veterans health and financial bureaucracies 
emerging during and after the war. The letters and statements made in 
these contexts were rarely concerned with how the war was publicly 
remembered. Instead, they focused on the central questions of this 
dissertation: what were the war’s consequences and how did they affect 
men’s understanding of the conflict in its aftermath?  
 What follows is not an exhaustive history of a Canadian generation 
or of Canada’s Great War. Rather, it is a study of the consequences of war, 
12 
 
 
 
revealed by a group of men who identified generationally.22 The concept of 
a generation appealed to them because it captured their sense of shared 
experience and collective difference. Although often reluctant to speak 
publicly, collectively they did do so in ways that cut across a spectrum of 
sources. These range from art to poetry, to writings on economics, politics, 
and the war itself. Their understanding of the conflict was, nonetheless, 
unique to each man and cannot be told chronologically. Despite this 
understanding, their sense of the war’s meaning shared common themes, 
including an embrace of a generational identity, empathy with other 
returned men, a desire to ensure veterans received a fair postwar deal, and 
the importance of the war’s memory.  
Chapter One introduces the relationship between age and different 
understandings of the war’s meaning. It makes a demographic case for re-
considering the existence of a Canadian war generation. It further argues 
that Canadians did identify generationally and that analysis of their 
collective identity helps us to better understand how veterans made sense 
of their Great War experience. In addition, the chapter contextualizes the 
history of the lost generation to explain why Canadian historians have 
shied away from generational analyses of the war and its impact.  
                                                 
22 Women, as Grace Morris Craig pointed out, could take ownership of the war 
experience as much as men. Over 3,000 nursing sisters took part in the First World War 
and women at home unquestionably experienced the war’s impact. Nonetheless, this study 
focuses on the male response. Experience was a critical part of the war generation’s self-
identity, particularly for veterans. Women were not in the trenches, their experiences were 
different, and so they could not understand what the men suffered. Despite this, the focus 
on men does not mean that female sources or perspectives are ignored. Indeed, the letters 
from women to provincial aid agencies, often written on behalf of their husbands (and 
sometimes without their husband’s knowledge), are revealing. See Grace Morris Craig, But 
This Is Our War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982).   
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Chapter Two argues that a focus on the war’s literary legacy has 
overshadowed the war’s generational impact. Canadians knew what the 
war cost but there were stark divisions between generations over how to 
understand these costs. To those who came of age with the conflict, it 
seemed as if their elders did not appreciate the transformative aspect of the 
war. Such differences played out in the era’s literature, but the distinctions 
between Canada’s literary market and those in England and the U.S. 
obscure how formative an event the Great War was for Canada’s young 
men and reflect the disillusionment of the war generation.  
Canada’s interwar fiction may not have addressed the generational 
disillusionment but some writers certainly did. Although disparate, their 
critiques of postwar life demonstrate how men’s youth, rather than politics 
or profession, defined their understanding of the conflict. Chapter Three 
examines how the men who came of age with the war discussed its 
aftermath in Canada. The generation’s leading voices were varied. They 
included conservative politicians, such as George Drew and Robert 
Manion, historians such as Frank Underhill, book reviewers such as Bill 
Deacon, and writers such as Will Bird and Frank Parker Day. The papers of 
Bird and Deacon also include correspondence from ‘average’ Canadians 
whose views aligned closely to these more public men. Collectively, this 
diverse group analyzed the war’s memory, the direction of postwar 
Canada, and the state of international affairs. Their concerns over another 
European conflict were also echoed in the halls of power, but bureaucrats 
such as Clifford Clark and O.D. Skelton limited their criticisms to private 
memoranda and ministerial advice. The debate Canadians were having 
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outside the halls of power reveals the levels of disenchantment of the war 
generation with postwar society.  
Although maintaining peace remained an overarching goal for the 
war generation throughout the interwar period, an inability to prevent 
another war was not the leading cause of disillusionment. Rather, the most 
disheartened of veterans were disillusioned because postwar Canada failed 
to live up to wartime ideals. Returned men fought the war for a ‘square 
deal’, but recession and then depression crippled efforts at economic re-
integration. Canadian officials continued to promise support for veterans 
but, despite such commitments, the veterans felt let down. 
Notwithstanding this ongoing political engagement, commitments to 
address the problem of the returned man remained vague. These solutions 
also failed to address the challenge of postwar unemployment, a leading 
cause of the generation’s disenchantment.  
Chapter Four discusses how the difficulties in finding jobs impacted 
veterans. While any examination of returned men and their failure to find 
work during the 1920s and 1930s is hampered by a lack of statistical data, 
the available records, particularly those from provincial Soldiers’ Aid 
Commissions, reveal that veterans faced a more dire employment situation 
than is generally acknowledged. The tendency to cast the interwar era as a 
period of boom and bust, framed by the Roaring Twenties and the Dirty 
Thirties has masked how unemployment proved an ongoing issue. Yet, for 
countless veterans the struggle to find work was real and, by the time of the 
Depression, it had systematically undermined belief in the war’s meaning.  
15 
 
 
 
An inability to find work was only one contributing factor to the war 
generation’s postwar disillusionment. The system of veterans’ assistance 
also challenged men’s sense of the war’s purpose. Chapter Five considers 
the relationship between the economic challenges veterans faced and their 
relationship to wider problems of demobilization and re-establishment. 
Between 1914 and 1918, Canada’s leaders made sweeping promises of 
support to the country’s soldiers —including a commitment to provide 
viable postwar employment. Apart from a rehabilitative program for 
invalided soldiers, however, a pension was often the extent of available aid. 
Yet, during the 1920s and early 1930s, the vast majority of returned men did 
not qualify for a federal pension. For these ‘able-bodied’ men, the only 
option for employment assistance was the soldier settlement plans in the 
Canadian West and at Kapuskasing, in northern Ontario. While support for 
these farming schemes remained strong, they proved ill suited to the needs 
of veterans. Their failure was made worse by the veterans’ sense that they 
had become lost and abandoned amidst the maze-like layers of the postwar 
re-establishment system. 
When historians in Canada have considered the ‘problem of the 
returned man’, they often focus on the role of the federal government. 
Ottawa’s soldier settlement schemes, the pension system, and the 
government’s relationship with organized veterans’ associations are all 
important parts of this history. Yet, the provinces were just as involved in 
programs of re-integration and rehabilitation. Provincial control over health 
and education meant that the majority of able-bodied men interacted as 
readily with their respective province as they did with Ottawa. Ontario’s 
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academic and provincial archives provide critical sources for this 
dissertation. Nearly one-third of all soldiers hailed from Ontario and the 
sheer size of this contribution forced Queen’s Park to take an active role in 
the lives of returned soldiers. It was one of only two provinces that 
established a soldier settlement plan (the other was in B.C.), and the only 
one to call a royal commission to investigate why a settlement scheme 
failed. Ontario’s Soldiers’ Aid Commission was also at the forefront of the 
country’s response to re-establishing returned men. The scope of records 
that survive from these institutions is second only to those created by the 
federal government. In the case of the provincial canteen funds, the records 
for Ontario exceed anything surviving in Ottawa or the rest of Canada.  
The Ontario source base complements the federal records and those 
from individual veterans. The inter-relationship between the federal 
government, the provinces, and returned men is further demonstrated by 
the case of Canada’s canteen funds. Chapters Six and Seven present a case 
study of Ontario’s fund in particular to illustrate how the problem of the 
returned man, veterans’ organizations, and failed efforts by federal and 
provincial governments were inextricably linked.   
The canteen funds comprised the profits of soldiers’ canteen 
purchases while overseas. After the war, they were divided between the 
provinces and used to supplement the federal pension system. Chapter Six 
traces the history of the fund from its wartime inception to its eventual 
disbursement in the late 1920s. Chapter Seven picks up the story in Ontario 
specifically and focuses on how men used the fund in the subsequent 
decades. The province contributed the largest number of men to the war 
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effort and, as a result, received the lion’s share of the fund’s profits. The 
surviving records from its canteen files contain thousands of letters written 
by returned men and their families which detail how failure to address 
veterans’ economic and health challenges affected the family economy, 
men’s belief in their position as breadwinner, and their broader 
understanding of their generation’s place in society and its relation to the 
war’s meaning. Their letters indicate how this generation did not limit its 
postwar engagement with the war to commemoration and remembrance. 
The war was intimately related to their postwar world and their 
correspondence with the canteen fund trustees demonstrates their anger at 
its failure to meet their expectations. 
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Chapter 1 
A Generation of Men 
 
“I knew those at home would never understand … [and we], of the 
brotherhood, could understand the soldier but never explain him. All 
of us would remain a separate, definite people, as if branded by a 
monstrous despotism.”1 
- Will Bird, And We Go On (1930)  
 
“Age and differences of age,” the sociologist S.N. Eisenstadt wrote, “are 
among the most basic and crucial aspects of human life and determinants of 
human destiny.”2 This was the case for those who came of age with the Great 
War. The war generation was profoundly shaped by this cataclysmic event. 
The experience set it apart from society and influenced its understanding of 
the conflict well into old age.  
The Lost Generation and its postwar disillusionment is one description 
of this generational reaction. Others include the ‘generation of 1914’ and the 
                                                 
1 Will R. Bird, And We Go On: A Memoir of the Great War (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2014), 231. 
2 S.N. Eisenstadt, From Generation to Generation: Age Groups and Social Structure (New 
Jersey: Transaction, 2009), 21. 
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‘front generation.’3 Whatever the term, the conflict’s transformative power 
was widely recognized during and after the war, so much so that British 
journalist Philip Gibbs believed the idea influenced “millions of men” across 
the Western world. This notion that the Great War forged a distinct 
generation took fullest form shortly after the conflict ended, particularly in 
the era’s literature and sociological study. It was then that theorists such as 
Karl Manheim, who authored a pioneering essay on the formation of 
generations in 1923, began to investigate generation as a social category. 
Authors, including Ernest Hemingway and Erich Maria Remarque, also 
employed the concept in their work, much of which analyzed the war and its 
aftermath.4 In the 1920s and 1930s veterans were increasingly troubled by the 
                                                 
3 See for example Robert Wohl, The Generation of 1914 (Cambride: Harvard 
University Press, 1979) and Richard Bessell, “The ‘Front Generation’ and the Politics of 
Weimar Germany,” in Mark Roseman, ed., Generations in Conflict: Youth Revolt and Generation 
Formation in Germany, 1770-1968 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).   
4 Karl Manheim, “The Problem of Generations,” in Paul Kecskemeti, ed., Karl 
Manheim: Essays (London: Routledge, 1952), 276-322. Manheim, along with others such as 
José Ortega y Gasset, devoted considerable study to this new interest in generations, helping 
to popularize it as a concept. He combined generation with class to demonstrate that 
generational groups were framed by more than birth years. Such groupings were formed by 
common life-stages as well as historical events. When combined, these two categories were 
recognized as critical to the formation of the individual. Such theories appealed to the war 
generation because it acknowledged that historic events, such as war, could shape a 
generation’s outlook. Manheim’s work gave voice to what this group already sensed: they 
were different because of their war experience. The popularity of generation increased as a 
result of the war. In the postwar era, generation was understood as more than an historical 
force. According to Cynthia Comaccio, it was a “theory of social change as well as a means of 
identification.” See Cynthia Comacchio, The Dominion of Youth: Adolescence and the Making of 
Modern Canada, 1920 to 1950 (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2006), 7. 
Hemingway opened his breakthrough novel, The Sun Also Rises, with the epitaph “You are all 
a lost generation,” which he attributed to Gertrude Stein. See Hemingway, The Sun Also Rises 
(New York: Scribner, 2006 [1926]). He discussed the conversation that led to this comment in 
greater detail in A Moveable Feast (New York: Scribner’s, 1964), 25-31. Robert Graves, Goodbye 
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absence of a “clear line of thought or conviction” that explained why the 
conflict had been fought or what its effects would be. They found themselves 
“thinking hard” over the conflict’s meaning, especially since the war’s 
outcome lacked the certainty of purpose that originally led them to arms. 
And, as their expected postwar lives failed to materialize, they became ever 
more critical of its outcome.5   
Disillusionment set in, a legacy now embodied in the notion of a Lost 
Generation. Whether in Germany, Britain, the U.S., or Canada, after the war 
disaffected youths struggled to make sense of the conflict. The British officer 
T.E. Lawrence, best known as Lawrence of Arabia, tried for years to distance 
himself from his wartime experience. He complained that he could not “get 
away” from the war. There was no escape. His friend—the poet and classicist 
Robert Graves—suffered similar postwar distress. Lawrence realized that 
Graves was “riddled” like an “old table-leg with worms.” Their 
contemporary—the writer and poet Siegfried Sassoon—was also troubled 
and seemed to Lawrence to be “yawing about like a ship ablack.” He posed a 
germane question: “What’s the matter with us all?” Lawrence lamented that 
the war infected his generation with a malarial-like disease, which kept 
“coming out months and years after in recurrent attacks.”6  
                                                                                                                                           
to All That (London: Penguin, 1960 [1929]). Erich Maria Remarque, All Quiet on the Western 
Front (New York: Ballantyne, 1982 [1929]).   
5 Philip Gibbs, Now It Can Be Told (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1920), 513, 519. 
6 T.E. Lawrence to Robert Graves, n.d. [possibly 1924], David Garnett, ed., The Letters 
of T.E. Lawrence of Arabia (London: Jonathan Cape, 1938), 463. 
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In his war novel, All Quiet on the Western Front, perhaps the most 
famous piece of war literature written by an ex-combatant, Remarque 
grappled with a similar sense of disenchantment. He linked the war and the 
idea of generation directly. As the epitaph explained, his book intended to 
“tell of a generation of men who, even though they may have escaped shells, 
were destroyed by the war.”7 This sense that even the survivors were 
destroyed by the war resonated deeply for those reeling from loss. 
Individuals, families, and communities had all suffered. A lost generation, 
whatever its individual definition, served as an all-encompassing idea that 
helped society share in the trauma of the war. 
For years after the conflict ended, the war generation found itself 
haunted by memories. Strive as they might, these men struggled to give their 
recollections meaningful shape. Lawrence remained troubled by how the 
memory of the Great War dwarfed those of all “other wars, so that they seem 
trivial, half-amusing incidents.” By 1923, he admitted that his war experience 
was a “nightmare.” He tried in vain to exorcize the demons by writing a 
memoir, The Seven Pillars of Wisdom (1922), but the process led him to go “off 
[his] head.” As he explained to Graves, he failed to find “peace of mind.”8  
While Lawrence never succeeded in coming to terms with his war 
experience, other writers, including Robert Graves, had more success. His 
memoir, Goodbye to All That, resonated with his peers because it said 
“something that all our generation is trying to say.” Even Lawrence was able 
                                                 
7 Remarque, All Quiet on the Western Front (New York: Ballantine, 1987), n.p. 
8 Lawrence to Graves, 8 September 1923, Letters of T.E. Lawrence, 430-431. 
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to identify with Graves’ book.9 But, while some writers produced work that 
spoke to the war generation, most published material which presented a 
distorted view of the conflict. The desire for explanations of the war increased 
after 1918 and publishing houses attempted to feed demand with accounts 
and depictions of all types. The resulting histories and overviews, however, 
added little clarity. They tried to explain the conflict’s causes, conduct, and 
strategy, but offered little about what the war was like as a human 
experience. These accounts lacked the sense of personal perspective required 
to understand its impact on the men who lived it.  
The novels and memoirs of the war generation provided an antidote to 
strategic histories. But they were about more than an individual’s war 
experience. They personalized the conflict at the expense of discussion of the 
war’s wider context or causes. Remarque’s All Quiet, for example, is not a 
novel about Germany at war. Rather, it begins and ends with the life of its 
main character, Paul Bäumer. The same is true of Edmund Blunden’s 
Undertones of War. It opens with Blunden joining the war and ends not with 
11 November, but when he returns to England in March 1918.10 Canadian 
works followed a similar pattern. James Pedley’s memoir, Only This (1927), 
begins in France and ends with the Hundred Days, after Pedley is wounded.11 
Charles Yale Harrison’s Generals Die in Bed (1930) starts with its main 
character’s enlistment in Montreal and ends with his wounding in 1918. Will 
                                                 
9 Lawrence to Graves, 5 May 1929, Letters of T.E. Lawrence, 658. 
10 Samuel  Hynes, A War Imagined: The First World War and English Culture (London: 
Random House, 1990),  426. 
11 James Pedley, Only This: A War Retrospect (Ottawa: Graphic, 1927). 
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Bird’s memoir, And We Go On (1930), is similarly focused on his war 
experience. It opens with Bird’s attempt to enlist and ends aboard a troop 
ship as he returns to Canada.12 These books did not explain what the war was 
about. They described what it was like to experience. 
This literary exploration of the war highlighted the importance of 
youth to veterans’ understanding of the conflict. Harrison dedicated his book 
to “the bewildered youths—British, Australian, Canadian, and German—who 
were killed in that wood a few miles beyond Amiens on August 8, 1918.”13 
His intentions were similar to those of Remarque, who felt critics 
misunderstood All Quiet by mistakenly interpreting the book as a study of the 
war rather than its intended purpose—an examination of the war’s impact on 
the young men who lived it. In Germany, Remarque was so riled by this 
misinterpretation that he wrote a sequel, The Road Back, which clarified his 
original intention: “I merely wanted to awaken understanding for a 
generation that more than all others had found it difficult to make its way 
back from four years of death, struggle, and terror, to the peaceful fields of 
work and progress.”14 
The driving force behind this generational identity was an 
interconnected relationship that hinged on age, memory, and experience. The 
majority of men who went to war between 1914 and 1918 were young and 
                                                 
12 Harrison, Generals Die in Bed (London: Noel Douglas, 1930). 
13 Harrison, Generals Die in Bed, n.p. 
14 Remarque, quoted in Modris Eksteins, The Rites of Spring: The Great War and the 
Birth of the Modern Age (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1989), 283. 
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their youth was integral to their future self-identification as the generation of 
1914. In Canada, most men who enlisted were under thirty, and the majority 
of these (nearly fifty percent) were between eighteen and twenty-four years of 
age.15 These are critical ages in the development of an adult’s sense of self 
because, as Howard Schuman and Amy Coring argue, they constitute a key 
period for the “formation of long-term memories.”16 They also coincide with 
the peak reference points for collective memories. For these men, the war 
experience had a unique and powerful impact on their development.17 It 
primed them to understand the war’s importance differently than those older 
or younger. While young men were not the only group to draw lessons from 
the experience, their age meant that the war retained a unique position as a 
remembered event in their adult lives. This shared experience simultaneously 
united and separated the war generation from the rest of society.  
                                                 
15 See Figure 1. Data derived from the LAC CEF Service File open data set and 
figures from the Canadian Great War Project. See www.canadiangreatwarproject.com 
16 Howard Schuman and Amy Coring, “Collective Memory and Autobiographical 
Memory: Similar But Not the Same,” Memory Studies 7:2 (2014): 146. See too Schuman’s 
earlier work with Jacqueline Scott, “Generations and Collective Memory,” American 
Sociological Review 54 (June 1989): 359-81. 
17 Schuman and Coring, “Collective Memory and Autobiographical Memory,” 151. 
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Figure 1. Canadian Soldiers by age at enlistment, aged 18-49 
The relationship between early adulthood and the formation of an 
individual’s identity was not exclusive to the war generation. What set it 
apart, however, was a collective inability to explain the war to the rest of 
society. From the time they returned home, veterans argued that those who 
were not there could “never understand” the conflict.18 “You in Canada with 
your reading of the war,” Canadian Group of Seven painter F.H. Varley 
maintained, “cannot realize at all what war is like.” Varley only reached 
France in the latter stages of 1918, but he was a keen observer and his 
accounts make it clear that he was not spared the conflict’s horrors.19 The 
                                                 
18 Will R. Bird, And We Go On (Toronto: Hunter-Rose, 1930), 342. 
19 His letters home contain vivid descriptions of ghastly scenes. Some of the most 
disturbing describe “turned up graves,” with “freakishly mutilated” dead, some “[h]eadless, 
legless, [or] stomachless,” and others a “perfect body and a passive face,” save for a “broken 
empty skull.” See LAC, MG 30 D401 [Hereafter Varley papers], Vol. 1, folder D, Varley to 
Maud, n.d. These observations date from Varley’s time as an official war artist. His baptism 
of fire came during the carnage of the Last Hundred Days, which were witness to some of the 
most difficult fighting of the entire conflict. During that period the Canadian Corps suffered 
42,600 casualties, most of which, Tim Cook points out, would have been sustained by the 
infantry “at the sharp end,” who numbered 50,000 men. See Tim Cook, Shock Troops: 
Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1917-1918 (Toronto: Viking, 2008), 552. Jack Granatstein cites 
similar figures, noting that the Corps suffered 45,83 killed, wounded, or missing between 8 
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sights he witnessed convinced him of the relationship between direct 
experience and a detached understanding of the war. Anybody wishing to 
make sense of the experience, he told his wife Maud, had to both “see it & 
live it.” Otherwise, “you cannot know.”20 Varley’s descriptions of the brutal 
realities of trench warfare were as detailed as any personal account, but even 
vivid details were incapable of conveying what the war was truly like.21  
Veterans brought this belief in an experiential gulf home with them.22 
It was not only painful to relive and attempt to relay to others; it was also 
futile. “[He] talked about the experience of those four years to nobody,” John 
Berger recalled about his father’s postwar silence.23 Will Bird’s daughter 
remembered her father refusing to talk about the war. Instead, he dealt with it 
                                                                                                                                           
August 1918 and 11 November. See J.L. Granatstein, The Greatest Victory: Canada’s One 
Hundred Days, 1918 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2014), 174. See too Shane Schreiber, 
Shock Army of the British Empire: The Canadian Corps in the Last 100 Days of the Great War (St. 
Catharine’s: Vanwell, 2004). 
20 LAC, Varley papers, Vol. 1, folder D, Varley to Maud, n.d. Such observations were 
not limited to Canadians, or to the ground war. In his well regarded memoir, V.M. Yeates 
wrote about the air war that “‘It’s no use telling the truth … They won’t believe it. They have 
to find it out for themselves.’” Yeates, Winged Victory (London: Grub Street, 2005 [1934]), 13. 
21 Varley’s literary descriptions carry special weight during this period because, 
although officially in France as a war artist, he was seriously considering writing as a new 
career. See his letters to Maud for 1918 for multiple examples of his belief in his literary 
prospects, LAC, Varley papers, Vol. 1, letters to Maud, 1918.  
22 Will Bird described how men worried about talking to their families on his boat 
ride home. “I had been trying to imagine how I would express my feelings when I got home,” 
he wrote, “and now I knew I never could, none of us could.” See Bird, And We Go On, (Rose), 
342. 
23 John Berger, “Preface” to Gabriel Chevalier, Fear: A Novel of World War I (New 
York: New York Review Books, 2011), xiv. 
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internally and “sometimes shouted in his sleep.”24 Charles Yale Harrison 
suffered “depression, alcohol and drug abuse, and writer’s block in later 
life.”25 Varley told Maud that he felt “handicapped” when it came to telling 
her about the war.26 Bird, who was perhaps the most prolific of Canada’s war 
writers, summed up his generation’s inability to describe its experiences 
when he explained that returned men were doomed to live “in a world apart, 
prisoners, in chains that would never loosen.”27  
Each veteran’s isolation was different. Some distanced themselves 
when writing letters home from the front. Others did so once they returned to 
Canada. But no matter when their alienation occurred, it became an accepted 
and common trait that the veterans refused to talk about their war 
experiences.28 This reluctance was interpreted as a product of a generation 
                                                 
24 David Williams, “Introduction” to Bird, And We Go On (MQUP), xviii.  
25 Peter Webb, “Occupants of Memory: War in Twentieth-Century Canadian Fiction” 
(Ph.D. diss., Ottawa, 2007), 89. 
26 LAC, Varley papers, Vol. 1, Varley to Maud, n.d., “Usual address in London.” 
Canadians were not alone in their inability to describe the war. British writer Richard 
Aldington wrote about a similar inability to write about the war: “Those who have attempted 
to convey any real war experience … must have felt the torturing sense of something 
incommunicable.” Aldington quoted in Hynes, A War Imagined, 424. 
27 Bird, And We Go On (Rose), 342. 
28 A.Y. Jackson is an example of the many men who began to self-censor as soon as 
they began corresponding with their families. His letters to his family are long and often 
detailed aspects of life overseas, but they omit the worst of his experiences in favour of 
recycled stories and assurances that he was doing well. In reality, however, the war was 
taking a serious toll, both physically and psychologically. He admitted as much to his friend 
and mentor J.E.H Macdonald in 1916, telling him how “You feel at times so very insignificant” 
and that trench warfare was “exasperating, it rouses no martial ardour within you. You may 
get blown to bits five miles back from the trenches, and be quite safe in the trenches, a 
hundred yards from the Hun. I don’t know what effect it is having on me. My emotions are 
28 
 
 
 
and era in which men did not communicate their feelings. For others, it was 
viewed as a coping mechanism. According to Ted Barris, men could “never 
tell the rough stories, the remembrances of destruction,” or “revisit the 
moments of death and dying” which risked bringing back the horrors. They 
needed to remain stoic and “under no circumstances” could they let loved 
ones see them “break down and cry.” Men protected their families “from the 
truth” by recalling only the war’s antics, quirky tales, or “the odd near 
miss.”29 ⁠  
 The silence of the war generation made it easier to bury the “fear, 
hardship and suffering.” According to General E.M.L. Burns, nobody 
“want[ed] to remember that he was afraid; to remember the death of 
comrades, the man beside one cut off from life in a second by a rifle or 
machine-gun bullet, an exploding shell’s conversion of the human body from 
the image of God to offal.” It was a “merciful dispensation,” Burns explained 
in his memoir, General Mud, that humans were capable of remembering the 
good in place of the bad.30 Manipulating memories helped men dwell on 
                                                                                                                                           
not stirred very much by it. I don’t feel heroic in the least. … It’s all so complicated and far 
away as it is. We have not heroes, and we don’t know nothing except what we see in the 
newspapers, and we know that’s not true.” See LAC, MacDonald papers, Vol 1, folder 2, 
Jackson to MacDonald, 31 May 1916.  
29 Ted Barris, Breaking the Silence: Veterans’ Untold Stories from the Great War to 
Afghanistan (Toronto: Thomas Allen, 2009), 11. 
30 Lt-Gen. E.M.L. Burns, General Mud: Memoirs of Two World Wars (Toronto: Clarke, 
Irwin & Co., 1970), 7. During his distinguished career, Burns served as a signal officer and 
staff captain in the First World War, as Commander of the 1st Canadian Corps in Italy during 
the Second World War, and finally as Commander of the United Nations forces during the 
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) mission to the Suez in 1957. Leslie Frost had 
similar recollections and described men’s ability to suppress the war’s worst memories as 
follows: “It is a normal human reaction to avoid the painful descriptions and concentrate on 
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happier, “funny incidents” and recollections of “better times.” These coping 
strategies, however, further obscured the links between experience and 
understanding.  
Attempts to understand this generation and its sense of 
disillusionment have produced considerable scholarship.31 Much of this work, 
including Samuel Hynes’ A War Imagined (1990), argued that the war’s 
survivors were “shocked, disillusioned and embittered by their war 
experiences.” In an earlier book, Stanley Cooperman argued that the impact 
of the war was “unparalleled” because it “shattered a cultural universe and 
… shaped the literature of a generation.”32 John W. Aldridge believed that 
authors such as Hemingway wrote under the influence “of the climate of 
war” and that his generation was both “lost” and “profoundly affected by 
                                                                                                                                           
the light and humourous side of the conflict.” See Frost, Fighting Men (Toronto: Clarke & 
Irwin, 1967), 151. Robert Taylor also notes this trend, observing that Victoria’s veterans 
“prefer[ed] to recall service incidents that were amusing—probably a universal phenomenon.” 
See Robert Ratcliffe Taylor, The Ones Who Have to Pay: The Soldier-Poets of Victoria BC in the 
Great War 1914-1918 (Bloomington: Trafford Publishing, 2013), 70. 
31 In addition to the cited work by Bond, Bourke, Eksteins, Fussell, Hynes, Meyer, 
Watson, and Winter, see too for example Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, 
1914-1918: Understanding the Great War (London: Profile Books, 2012); Jean-Jacque Becker, The 
Great War and the French People (Oxford: Berg, 1993); Douglas Mackaman and Michael Mays, 
eds., World War I and the Cultures of Modernity (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2000); 
Gary Sheffield, Forgotten Victory: The First World War: Myths and Realities (London: Review, 
2002); Daniel Sherman, The Construction of Memory in Interwar France (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1999); Dan Todman, The Great War: Myth and Memory (London: Hambledon 
and London, 2005); Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European 
Cultural History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 
32 Stanley Cooperman, World War I and the American Novel (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 
1967), vii. 
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[the war] as well as by the literary movements they stimulated.”33 According 
to Hynes, the war generation’s critical portrayal of the conflict rejected the 
values of prewar society and “separated their own generation from the past 
and from their cultural inheritance.” This particular version of history took 
form as a “Myth of the War” and resulted in a constructed tale that confirmed 
“what the war was and what it meant.”34 The generation was disillusioned 
because its war had “shattered the possibility of pursuing what society would 
consider a normal existence.” And, as Modris Eksteins argued, their literary 
efforts to deal with this disenchantment explored how the war “destroyed the 
ties, psychological, moral, and real, between the generation at the front and 
society at home.”35 
Recognition of the generation’s disillusionment was immediate. In 
1922 the English journalist C.E. Montague published Disenchantment, one of 
the earliest critiques of the war’s conduct. Reviewers of the war books also 
noted the generation’s disaffection. Towards the end of the 1930s David 
Garnett, the English writer and publisher, summed up how this literature was 
received: it was the product of “the disgust and bitterness of the generation 
which had fought and won the war and which found all it had fought for was 
betrayed.”36 By the 1960s, the war generation’s disillusionment was widely 
                                                 
33 John W. Aldridge, After the Lost Generation: A Critical Study of the Writers of Two 
World Wars (New York: Noonday Press, 1959), x.  
34 Hynes, A War imagined, xi-xii. 
35 Eksteins, Rites of Spring, 282. 
36 David Garnett, ed., “Introduction to Part Three,” Letters of T.E. Lawrence, 262. 
Garnett’s reference to the generation’s disillusionment, their ‘disgust and bitterness’ is an 
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accepted. As Barbara Tuchman argued in The Guns of August (1962), “the war 
had many diverse results and one dominant one transcending all others: 
disillusion.”37  
In the 1970s, acceptance of disillusionment became so entrenched that 
it was cited as explanation for wider social and political events. Paul Fussell’s 
highly influential evaluation of the war’s cultural impact, The Great War and 
Modern Memory (1976), linked the generation’s sense of disillusion to its 
literary embrace of irony, which he believed was central to the cultural 
memory of the war.38 Modris Eksteins expanded this argument for the war’s 
influence on modern memory in The Rites of Spring, which argued that the 
generation’s disenchantment was integral to the development of twentieth- 
century modernism.39 The idea of a lost, or disillusioned generation, however, 
is not without its critics.  
Some of the most pointed critiques of postwar disillusionment argue 
that the literary output of the so-called ‘lost generation’ was not 
representative of its era. The average soldier did not possess the same levels 
of education as a T.E. Lawrence, Robert Graves, or Siegfried Sassoon. These 
‘elite’ literary accounts, however insightful, are dismissed by scholars such as 
Rosa Maria Bracco for being “highbrow” and disconnected from the general 
                                                                                                                                           
important reminder that such references preceded their popularity in the decades following 
1950. 
37 Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York: Ballantine, 1994 [1962]), 440.  
38 Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1977), 28-31.  
39 Eksteins, Rites of Spring. 
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sentiments of readers in the 1920s and 1930s. In place of an educated lost 
generation, Bracco calls for an examination of middlebrow authors, who, she 
argues, were more representative of how the general public understood the 
war. Their works, which continued to employ traditional concepts of honour 
and heroism, were more conventional and less critical of the conflict.40 The 
middlebrow version of the war, Janet K. Watson argues, reflected the 
existence of “different wars” which, if not dismissed by historians, can add 
new voices to the history of the war’s aftermath. The focus on a specific group 
of war writers, she claims, has unduly “narrowed” historical perceptions of 
the “culturally legitimate experience” of the war. In response, Watson calls 
for more emphasis on experiences outside the front-line trenches. The efforts 
of these non-combatant roles, including nursing and munitions work, were 
valuable. Too often, however, these efforts are viewed as secondary to front-
line experience, resulting in the marginalization of “alternative views,” 
especially the roles of women, labourers, and others not clearly defined as 
“the soldier in the trenches.”41  
The use of literary sources and personal accounts to make sense of the 
war’s meaning has also been criticized for distorting the postwar handling of 
the conflict. Brian Bond criticizes the focus on war books as a study of 
“individuals.” His research considers how men in the British army understood 
the war while it was being waged. Bond concedes that “numerous” 
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individual accounts exist to support the disenchantment thesis, but argues 
that concentrating on them exclusively obscures the fact that the military was 
composed of “groups” and that collective morale remained high throughout 
the war.42 David Reynolds is equally dismissive of the value of personal 
accounts. “Reducing the war conflict to personal tragedies,” he argues, has 
resulted in a loss of “the big picture.” The war’s history has been “distilled 
into poetry.” Reynolds also takes issue with the focus on commemoration and 
mourning, which has further obscured the “direct” impacts of the war. The 
dead may well have seemed ever-present in the aftermath of the conflict but 
“life went on after 1918.”43 
Such criticisms hinge on the argument that these disillusioned works 
are poor guides to the war’s history. Personal experiences offered vivid 
descriptions of the horrors of war, but they “largely evaded the crucial issues 
of what the war was ‘about’ – both on the political and strategic levels.” In 
Bond’s view, historians who rely too heavily on these accounts fail to 
acknowledge the limits of their sources. Their subsequent evaluations present 
a skewed appraisal of the war’s history that assumes the “anti-war” writers 
were synonymous with those of wider society.44     
Ironically, the war generation would have likely agreed with this 
assessment. These ‘lost’ writers never intended to produce explanations of the 
                                                 
42 Brian Bond, The Unquiet Western Front: Britain’s Role in Literature and History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 14. Emphasis original.  
43 David Reynolds, The Long Shadow: The Great War and the Twentieth Century (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 2013), xv-xvi. 
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war that resonated with society writ large. Although read by the wider 
public, their books were written with a more limited goal: to explain how the 
war personally impacted them. In short, their books, novels, and diaries 
helped shape their memories.45 The need to bear witness to their time at war 
reflected a strong desire to record, or testify, to the experience.46 Some, like 
Canadian artilleryman Wilfrid Kerr, wished to record his generation’s 
“thoughts, mental attitudes, [and] reactions” for posterity. Kerr hoped that if 
he shared his knowledge of the war, then it would ensure that the “coming 
generation” might better understand what his had gone through.47 Others 
focused directly on their own experience, including Robert Graves, whose 
intention for his memoir was to present “the fate of a generation of young 
men who, at the critical age when they were just beginning to feel the pulse of 
life, were set face to face with death.”48  
In addition to disillusionment, these writers were also united by a 
belief in a collective generational identity.49 As Robert Wohl argued, the idea 
that the war forged a “generation of 1914” resonated in the two decades that 
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he does not address their wider generational identification. See Bond, The Unquiet Western 
Front, 33-34. 
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followed. His examination emphasized the elite status of the lost generation 
authors whom he concluded were never more than a “minority within the 
elite of the European educated classes.” But he went on to note that their 
status “in no way annuls the importance that this idea had in the history and 
consciousness of Europeans,” especially for those who came of age during the 
war. The popularity of generational thinking, or “generationalism,” remained 
one of their “most widespread and deeply enrooted convictions.” The 
postwar emergence of a transnational ‘generation of 1914’ coincided with a 
“wave of generational thinking.” As a concept, Wohl argues, generation came 
into its own in tandem with the Great War and he identifies three of the most 
prominent generational theorists from the period: François Mentré, Karl 
Mannheim, and José Ortega y Gasset. Wohl claims that their appeal was 
rooted in an “ideology of youth,” which operated on the premise that “youth 
was a superior stage of life, beyond which lay degeneration.” For Wohl, the 
youth of the generation of 1914 was central to its collective identity. Those 
who survived could more easily divide their lives into pre and post-war, 
categories that equated with life stages: “youth, young manhood, and 
maturity.”50  
More recent scholarship supports Wohl’s conclusions. Joanna Bourke 
is critical of ideas of disillusion, but she also recognizes that British men who 
came of age with the war developed a strong generational consciousness. 
Bourke outlines how men’s bodies were endowed with signs of “age, 
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generation, class and ethnicity.”51 She argues that the war provoked a “major 
crisis” in British men, which was the result of a need to “reassert manliness” 
in a society “undergoing rapid change.”52 Many were bitter about such 
changes, but their “bitterness was only one response to wartime experience.” 
Her work challenges romanticized portrayals of the importance of wartime 
comradeship and she finds that servicemen were often alienated from each 
other. Nonetheless, she contends that a generation of men “were 
transformed” by the experience and that their “aesthetics of the body” 
reflected these changes.53   
Jessica Meyer’s work locates similar links between generation and 
masculinity. Her study clarifies the relationship between crisis and 
disillusionment. According to Meyer, men used their experiences in the Great 
War to “define themselves as men.”54 While the conflict raged, they viewed 
their experiences as transformative, creating “healthy, broad-minded men.” 
More negative views of the war were only expressed after it ended.55 Disabled 
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veterans, for example, found that their wounds undermined ideals of heroic 
service and domestic and financial independence. Similarly, Meyer argues 
that many of the ambivalent sentiments found in wartime sources were re-
conceptualized after the war as postwar disillusion. Despite the varying 
nature of men's recollections, the conflict “remained a seminal moment.” 
Although she does not address the existence of a lost generation, Meyer 
concludes that the “war changed men.” Whether through death, physical 
injury, a developing sense of maturity, or the broadening of horizons, men 
saw themselves as different, the recognition of which caused them to 
“construct themselves as a separate generation.”56  
Australian and New Zealand historians have reached similar 
conclusions about the importance of youth, experience, and a generational 
understanding of the war’s meaning. Bill Gammage argued that “war and 
youth had bound men closely.”57 Having bonded while overseas, this 
generation struggled to come to terms with the war’s aftermath. According to 
Gammage, what these men achieved during the war  
did not immediately concern most soldiers. They confronted 
their return to civilian life, and the war and their own 
expectations had ill equipped them for this. … Some soldiers, at 
a disadvantage beside those who had never sailed to defend 
their country, feared to become civilians again. They felt lost in 
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a community that could not use the skilled trades of war, and 
they dreaded a new fight for a livelihood.58  
Australia and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) veterans believed their 
wartime ideals were part of their common experience. When the rest of 
society failed to see this, the generation “stood apart” until it seemed “to 
some that the war in Europe had created ‘a nation within a nation’” to which 
only veterans were admitted. “They had become men apart” whose isolation 
was as much a matter of pride as a burden. 59  
 Despite criticism of the disillusionment thesis, historical consensus is 
emerging that age influenced how “people experienced and responded to the 
war.” These different understandings were generational, with each cohort 
interpreting the conflict “through the prism of its own preoccupations.” 60 In 
Canada, however, debate about the lost generation, and indeed the crucial 
link between war and generation, has been largely ignored. Canadian 
historians have never made the case for the war’s generational impact. 
Instead, they have embraced a nation-building narrative which argues that 
the Great War was a painful but important step forward in Canada’s 
inexorable march from colony to nation. These nationalistic blinders have 
resulted in the privileging of certain voices over others. One result is an 
assumption that English Canada’s view of the war was largely homogenous. 
Indeed, with the possible exception of some voices of opposition in rural 
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farming communities, left-wing radicals, and pacifists,61 it is generally argued 
that Canadians’ postwar understanding of the war was positive and cut 
across the boundaries of “region, class, religion, and generation.”62 As a 
result, the idea of a war generation has never taken hold in Canada. Instead, 
historians continued to revisit an entrenched narrative that casts Canada’s 
soldiers as heroes, charting the nation’s path up and down Vimy Ridge.63  
The claim that Canada ‘matured’ during wartime is not new. Early 
iterations of the thesis date to the Boer War when Colonel George T. Denison, 
a leader of the Canada First movement, suggested that Canada had a duty to 
send troops in aid of Britain because Canadians had “been children long 
enough” and it was time “to show the empire that we have grown to 
manhood.”64 By the time of the Great War, Max Aitken’s Canada in Flanders 
expanded the argument by associating the quality of Canada’s “manhood” 
with its battlefield successes, especially during the defense of Ypres in 1915.65 
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Subsequent postwar histories, such as George Drew’s Canada’s Fighting 
Airmen, extended the thesis beyond the battlefield. The country’s airmen, 
Drew noted proudly, performed “out of all proportion to her population” 
and their deeds were requisite in “building the character of the nation.”66 This 
“unfortunate identification” of the Canadian people with the Canadian state 
continued well into the 1970s, when Russell Hann recognized that the 
conflation of individual Canadians and their country’s nationhood remained 
a “popular view of the meaning of the war.”67 
Arthur Lower pioneered the “colony to nation” thesis in the 1940s and 
1950s. He saw the war as the catalyst for Canada’s postwar nationalism. But 
the picture he painted did not present Canada as emerging fully formed from 
the war. Rather, the trenches of France and Flanders only gave birth to the 
“spirit of Canadian nationalism.”  Despite being dated, Lower’s work 
remains one of the most valuable contributions to the historiography of 
Canada’s veterans. His account of postwar nationalism was not blind to the 
challenges and disenchantment following 1918, which he linked in early 
evaluations of the war and its national impact. According to Lower, the war 
generation was the most affected by this spiritual awakening. These men 
were exposed to European culture, an experience that ultimately killed the 
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nation’s “old parochialism,” and which, “for better or worse,” led Canadians 
to tear themselves “loose from [the] simplicity” of an earlier era.68  
The ‘spirit’ Lower identified still had to mature after the war and he 
did not hesitate discussing how veterans were forced to struggle in the years 
that followed. These men did not seem to fit into society. Instead of re-
integrating they “began to prove ‘difficult.’” Lower believed they were 
struggling because they had “outgrown the stuffiness of the lower-middle-
class society that marked most of Canada.” Their distemper “accelerated” 
postwar change. Lower explained the anger and disenchantment of veterans 
in postwar society by arguing that domestic Canada failed to understand how 
the war changed their outlook and expectations. While the war touched 
households across the country, those who stayed home missed a “deep 
spiritual experience” and they remained comparatively untouched by the 
spirit of reform. As a result, “much of the generous gain that might have 
come out of World War I, from a sense of duty done, and gratuitously done, 
was frittered away.” 69 
Lower lived through this ‘frittering’. He served in the navy during the 
war and believed himself too close to the events in question to offer a 
“complete assessment” of its history.70 His account of the war’s aftermath 
nonetheless presented an early discussion of disenchantment. Lower pointed 
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out that at least a third of those who served overseas were wounded and that 
“the broken soldier became a familiar sight.” Their wounds were physical, as 
well as psychological and spiritual, and Lower believed the latter could be as 
“serious as the physical.” He also noted that returned men were restless and 
“burned out.” During the late 1920s and early 1930’s, he wrote, “the deaths of 
ex-service men in their forties were reported with inescapable frequency.”71 
By linking disenchantment with the suffering of veterans in the war’s 
aftermath, Lower presented one of the earliest descriptions of Canada’s war 
generation.72 Few of his peers followed suit, however, and work by his 
immediate contemporaries ignored veterans and their reactions to the 
conflict. In the 1960s, when critics in Britain and the US devoted considerable 
attention to the war’s generational legacy, Canadian historians, such as W.L. 
Morton, rejected these same links among the war, disillusion, and 
generational identity. Morton’s The Kingdom of Canada (1963), which 
completely ignored veterans, moved from an analysis of the war years and 
the immediate aftermath to labour unrest, Canada’s push for representation 
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on the Imperial War Cabinet, and a position at the Paris Peace Conference 
and in the League of Nations.73 His study of the 1920s was even more 
dismissive of the war’s generational impact. It concluded that Canadians 
were not disillusioned and asserted that the war did not create a collective 
generational identity. Instead of producing a disillusioned “Anthem for 
Doomed Youth,” Canada’s literary output failed to account for the war.74 
Canadians in the 1920s were “backwards in mind,” and their literature was 
incapable of accounting for the country’s “fierce transition” from the 
Victorian to the modern era. Critically, Morton’s explanation for this failure 
rested on the assumption that the country had escaped the “psychological 
impact of the Great War.”75 Yet, in spite of the certainty of his conclusion, 
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Morton provided little evidence for his assertions. He declared that there was 
an absence of disillusionment in Canada and claimed that this explained the 
differences between Canada and its allies’ postwar experiences. He did not 
cite Canadian war literature or authors critical of postwar Canada. The only 
novelist referenced by Morton was Morley Callaghan, who was born in 1903, 
and not old enough to take part in the war. By equating disillusionment with 
generation, and then by offhandedly rejecting both, Morton’s analysis 
separated Canada’s experience from other Western nations. The ensuing 
historiography has continued to support Morton’s reading and there has been 
almost no consideration of generation in Canada’s Great War experience.  
In their contribution to the Centenary Series, Canada, 1922-1939: 
Decades of Discord (1985), Allen Seager and John Thompson echoed Morton in 
equating generation with disillusionment. They argued that Canadians 
escaped the “bitter cynicism” of the lost generation so characteristic of 
Western Europe and the US. In its place Canadians “celebrate[d] their native 
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land” in a wave of postwar nationalism.76 In another book, Thompson argued 
that the war was a catalyst for regional nationalism. “Western Canada,” he 
wrote “‘came of age’ within the Dominion in the same way that Canada itself 
matured within the Empire and the international community.”77  
Craig Brown and Ramsay Cook’s A Nation Transformed also overlooked 
how returned men understood the war. These historians concluded that “the 
patriotism and idealism let loose by the war centered on the idea of building 
a better Canadian nation. Only in this fashion could the great sacrifices of the 
war be repaid.” Despite noting that the war unleashed underlying tensions in 
terms of race, class, region, and ethnicity, Brown and Cook shrugged off 
veterans’ grievances as mere “problems of demobilization.”78 The generations 
in other countries—including Britain and the U.S.—may have been 
disillusioned, but the “predominant Canadian view,” Christopher Moore 
notes, “vehemently denied the war had been meaningless.”79  
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More recent work makes the same connection. Jonathan Vance argues 
that Canadians were not disillusioned by the war. Instead, they continued to 
believe in its “transformative power,” especially its “curative” properties 
which helped elevate men to “saviour status.”80 According to Jeff Keshen, 
civilians resisted disillusionment because, in public, the war “still constituted 
causes for celebration.”81 C.P. Champion also rejects disillusionment, 
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believing that it did not take hold until “decades” after the war.82 For Mark 
Sheftall, Canada’s postwar nationalism proved “impervious to the contagion 
of disenchantment,” in part because no Canadian writers “shared the sense of 
post-war disenchantment” present across the Atlantic.83  
Canadian historians have touched on the war generation’s 
disenchantment in discussions of veterans’ organizations.84 These groups, 
which included the Great War Veterans’ Association (GWVA), the Army and 
Navy League (ANL), the United Veterans League (UVL), and, later, the 
Canadian Legion, struggled throughout the 1920s to mobilize as effective 
advocates for veterans. With few exceptions, however, their campaigns, 
including the ‘bonus’ campaign and calls for more generous pensions, failed. 
Historians have focused on the divisions between the veterans’ movement 
and the federal government’s plan to assist men with rehabilitation and re-
establishment. In one of the earliest examinations of the veterans’ movement, 
James Eayrs criticized the treatment returned men received after 1918. 
“What,” he asked “had been bought by all those lives and limbs, seemingly so 
recklessly squandered?” He blamed the failure to secure a better postwar life 
on the division between veterans’ groups which “unnecessarily retarded the 
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formation” of the Canadian Legion. Although he did not push his analysis 
further, Eayrs implied that had veterans united sooner, they could have done 
more. In place of such advocacy, however, all these men could do was “vent 
their anger” at government.85  
Desmond Morton and Glenn Wright added to the understanding of 
the veterans’ movement with a series of articles that culminated with the 
book Winning the Second Battle (1987). It was path-breaking work which 
presented the first overview of the GWVA’s formation and its fight with the 
federal government to secure more generous assistance for veterans. But it 
remains one of the few considerations of Canada’s veterans.86 In fact, with the 
exception of Peter Neary’s and Serge Durflinger’s work, few historians have 
broached the topic.87 Some historians have devoted additional study to the 
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pension question,88 as well as examining the role of veterans in the labour 
movements of the interwar period, but these works do not consider the views 
of individual men.89   
Morton and Wright highlight the importance of the veteran 
organizations and their relationships with all levels of government but the 
positions of these associations should not be considered synonymous with 
those of returned men more generally. The organizations had their own 
politics (a fact Lower recognized as early as the 1940s) and their interests did 
not always align with those of individual veterans.90 Moreover, the vast 
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majority of returned men did not join a veterans’ organization or the Legion 
during the first two decades after war’s end.  
Continued focus on the war as the central nation-building event of the 
twentieth century has ensured that the personal experiences of men like A.Y. 
Jackson have been silenced.91 This situation started to change to an extent in 
the 1980s when Canadians began to recognize that the generation’s personal 
accounts offered a “distinctly human and personal point of view.”92 
Examinations of these testimonies, however, are less concerned with how 
these men understood the war and focus instead on how their experiences 
support the colony-to-nation thesis. Instead of investigating their relationship 
to a generational identity, historians highlight how these experiences 
contributed to Canada’s national development. As a result, the war is 
presented as more than a formative experience for the country’s young men; 
it also acts as a coming-of-age site for the nation.  
Nationalist interpretations of the war’s history continue to hold 
powerful sway in Canada. Pierre Berton’s popular and influential book Vimy 
(1986) directly linked the experiences of Canadians on the battlefield with the 
nation’s development. Berton claimed that the war’s battles turned men “into 
Canadians.”93 Based on personal interviews with veterans, the book opens 
with the onset of battle of Vimy Ridge before examining the Canadian Corps’ 
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planning and execution of its attack in April 1917.94 The final chapter, 
“Aftermath,” broadens the focus to ask if Vimy, and by extension the wider 
war, was “worth it.”95 Berton did not think so but he softened this conclusion 
by explaining that the war generation would have disagreed. To those who 
lived it, he contended, the war remained defensible because it had to be. The 
death and devastation required the war have meaning. Otherwise, there was 
only disillusionment. When this proved a false hope, Canadians could cling 
to notions that the conflict had built their nation: “Because of Vimy, Canada 
came of age; because of Vimy, [their] country found its manhood.”96 
Recent Canadian scholarship still echoes Berton’s conclusions. Tim 
Cook’s two-volume Canadians Fighting the Great War 1914-1918 (2007, 2008), 
uses men’s accounts of their experiences to emphasize Canada’s maturation. 
He argues that these sources shed light on the “full experience” of the war, 
including “what it meant” to the men themselves.97 Cook’s work is less 
deterministic than earlier nationalist scholarship and admits that the war’s 
sacrifices nearly “destroyed the country.” But his conclusion that battlefield 
successes helped ensure Canada was “forged during the Great War” 
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continues the link between the study of men’s experiences and the colony-to-
nation thesis.98  
J.L. Granatstein’s The Greatest Victory (2014) seeks to debunk the Vimy 
myth by arguing that the Canadian Corps’ victories in 1918— breaking the 
Drocourt-Quéant Line, crossing the Canal du Nord, and taking Cambrai, 
Valenciennes, and Mons—were more impressive than Canada’s role in April 
1917. But while he tries to move Canadians beyond Vimy, Granatstein ends 
up linking the wartime prowess of the Corps with the birth of Canadian 
nationalism and echoes Berton when he replaces Vimy with the exploits of 
the Last Hundred Days to argue that these successes “made Canada anew.”99  
The war generation and its importance to Canada’s coming of age are 
now so closely integrated into the colony-to-nation thesis that historians have 
described the pairing as the historiography’s “core focus.”100 Yet, as important 
as individual experiences are to these arguments, the context in which they 
are cited remains limited to arguments about the development of the 
Canadian state and its military commitments overseas.101 The views of the 
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war generation have not undergone critical analysis and, despite a heavy 
emphasis and interest in the Great War among Canadian historians, there has 
not been a corresponding interest in how these men privately understood the 
war’s meaning.  
The entrenchment of the colony-to-nation thesis became evident in the 
reaction of historians David Bercuson and Jonathan Vance had to Robert 
Fulford’s review of Niall Ferguson’s The Pity of War in 2000. Ferguson’s book 
stirred up controversy for its claim that Britain’s declaration of war was a 
colossal mistake, a decision the author called “nothing less than the greatest 
error of modern history.” Fulford praised Ferguson’s work and was 
impressed that the historian was willing to “judge” the war. His review then 
posed a controversial question for Canadians: had their country really come 
of age between 1914 and 1918?102 The journalist was well aware of the potency 
of Canada’s colony-to-nation narrative and its place in “conventional 
wisdom.”103 Fulford admitted, however, that the notion that his country 
“became a nation on the battlefields of France,” always struck him as rather 
“dubious.” He praised Ferguson’s work for its willingness to ask new 
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questions of old history. Canadian historians, by contrast, did not seem 
interested in a similar project. The war may have been a formative event, but 
“dealing with it in a fresh and honest way isn't even on our agenda.” Instead, 
Canadians appeared content to “stick with the clichés of the past.”104  
Both Bercuson and Vance, two leading Canadian historians, 
challenged Fulford’s position. They argued that Ferguson’s work was not a 
model to emulate. It engaged in counterfactual history and its thesis was 
supported by little more than “science fiction.”105 There was no need to 
question the war’s role as a “catalyst that transformed Canada into a nation,” 
because it was “true.”106 To make their case, the historians laid out a two-
pronged defense of the colony-to-nation thesis. Bercuson defended it by 
pointing to the “leverage” Canada’s participation gave Prime Minister Robert 
Borden in his push for constitutional equality within the British Empire.107 
Vance took a different approach, citing Canadians’ use of the war to create an 
independent culture and identity. He also highlighted changes in Canada’s 
relationship with Britain, particularly how Canadian authors pushed back 
against the wider British cultural influence. “The great Canadian novelists of 
the 1920s—Durkin, Ostenso, Grove—,” Vance wrote in defense of an 
emergent postwar Canadian nationalism, “came into their own because 
Canadian readers were no longer satisfied with Ralph Connor’s anglophile 
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brand of Victorian muscular Christianity.”108 The country, they argued, had 
no choice but to join the war. In 1914, Canada was not yet independent and 
when Britain was at war Canada was at war. “To suggest today that [the 
country] might realistically have chosen another course,” Bercuson wrote, 
was “to pretend that Canada was something other than what it was.”109 By 
questioning the judgment and reactions of Canadians during and after the 
war, Fulford was guilty of using hindsight to frame the past. His critique was 
unfair history, offered from the “lofty heights of the present” rather than with 
the “eyes, … minds, [and] … hearts” of the generation who lived the war. If 
the reactions of Canadians to the war are understood historically, Vance 
argued, then “there is nothing mysterious about the persistence of this 
cliché.” The war made Canadians “feel distinct from Britain” and to “suggest 
otherwise simply because it also produced discord [was] to employ a crude 
reductionism.”110 It was incorrect to assume, Vance pointed out, that Canada’s 
Great War generation would react to the horror of war as we do today. Rather 
than dwell on their losses, the war generation coped by looking to its 
positives, which they found “in a new sense of Canadian nationality.”111  
Fulford, however, was not asking how Canadian historians already 
understood the conflict. He wanted to know how it might be understood 
differently. Neither historian offered a new interpretation of the colony-to-
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nation thesis because they believed there was no need. The existing thesis 
seemed to explain the history sufficiently. The professional historians 
rebuffed the journalist, but Fulford raised an important question about the 
experience of the veterans. He felt strongly that their experiences justified his 
continued skepticism of Canada’s colony-to-nation mythology. The veterans 
he knew would never have agreed with either historian. If presented with 
this debate, he argued, they “would have snorted with disgust at the idea that 
the calamity in which they took part was an act of nation-building.”112  
Jonathan Vance explained his interpretation of the war’s meaning in 
Death So Noble (1997), the first serious consideration of the subject in 
Canada.113 Vance examines the construction of the public memory of the war 
during the interwar period, particularly how Canadians “conceived of the 
war, how they represented it, and how they accommodated it into their 
collective consciousness.” His work rejects notions of postwar disillusionment 
and argues that during the 1920s and 1930s, Canadians constructed a 
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mythical history of the war, which ensured its legacy was one of “promise, 
certainty, and goodness.” Vance’s study changed how historians consider the 
war’s legacy in Canada. In place of veterans and fights over federal pensions, 
he focused on collective memory and public understanding of the war’s 
meaning. The war may have been awful, but the myth Canadians constructed 
“crafted a memory … that [also] recognized the gifts it conferred on those 
who took part.”114  
Vance engages the generation’s war writers, its artists, and its veterans, 
as well as Canadian society at large. He agrees with critics such as Bracco, 
who argue against overemphasizing the writing of elites, by concentrating on 
how Canadian society commemorated the war. Vance rejects ideas of a lost 
generation, arguing that the disillusioned were unrepresentative of Canada’s 
wider collective memory. Elites might have been disenchanted but average 
Canadians embraced the war myth.  The strong critiques of literary and 
academic leaders, such as O.D. Skelton, paled in comparison to the positive 
response of the general public. Thus, the “impassioned pleas” of Arthur 
Lower, Escott Reid, or O.D. Skelton, Vance writes, “against repeating the folly 
of 1914-18” may have “impressed generations of historians” but it is 
“unwise” to give “such people undue weight.” To examine the views of the 
“Canadian mosaic,” Vance ventures beyond the “narrow band of traditional 
sources,” using cultural artifacts such as remembrance programs, church 
windows, and “deplorable verse,” to bare witness to a more “representative 
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range of interpretation.”115 He identifies key sites of memory and 
remembrance to demonstrate how this public mythology emerged. 
Canadians’ sense of a just war created a ‘legitimate’ memory of the conflict. 
The result is a single, unifying mythology, which proved a fountainhead for 
an emergent Canadian nationalism.  
Vance argues that Remembrance Day serves as a poignant example of 
Canadians embracing the positive war mythology constructed during the 
interwar era.116 But he also recognizes that there were limits to the day’s 
utility, especially for returned men, who were increasingly unhappy with the 
direction of postwar life. For these Canadians, the mere paying of “tribute” 
on 11 November was insufficient insurance that the war’s legacy was being 
respected. They understood that the only way to ensure the war’s meaning 
was to “complete the task” begun in France and Flanders. Postwar Canada 
had to ensure that the war “was indeed the progenitor of good.” Otherwise, 
Canadians’ sacrifices would be “meaninglessness.”117 To ensure this was not 
the case, Vance contends that Canadians used the war myth to build a better, 
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postwar version of the nation. He acknowledges that many Canadians were 
not living up to the ideal established in wartime, but despite recognizing that 
ex-soldiers were disenchanted, disillusion did not take hold.  
Ian McKay has challenged Vance’s reading of this history. McKay 
concedes that mythic, romanticized ideas remained “part of the core 
explanation” of the war’s meaning, but argues that Canadians did not 
generally accept this interpretation.118 Veterans such as Tommy Burns and 
Will Bird wrote critically about the war. Burns’ writing in the 1920s, for 
example, “cut through the cant of patriotism to get at the war’s futile 
tragedy.”119 Will Bird also “resisted” the war myth.120 Instead of seeing Bird as 
a singular example of the myth, McKay argues that his writing is open to 
“multiple readings.”121 According to McKay, Vance reads Bird as part of a 
traditional High Tory view of the war. McKay, however, argues that he is 
better read as an example of interwar liberalism, which remembered the war 
differently. In place of a conservative mythology that “confirmed the justice 
of the preexisting social hierarchy,” people like Bird shaped the postwar 
world by “focusing on the future … [and] by firmly insisting that strong 
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people should get over it.” Vance focuses on how Canadians created a social 
memory of the war experience, regardless of the resulting myth’s accuracy. 
McKay, on the other hand, is less concerned with the war’s memory. Instead 
he critiques how the conflict should be studied. To do otherwise, he argues, 
risks “not troubling to analyze and understand” a war that cost millions of 
lives. In this reading, the postwar impact cannot be understood before 
“conclusively resolving … the underlying political issues” over which the 
war was fought. McKay argues that the conflict was not a nation-building 
experience, at least not in so far as the Vimy myth suggests: “This was never a 
war for democracy, freedom, or ‘Canada,’ but a war fought between empires.” 
In place of “individual acts of valour and selfless nation-building,” the war 
should instead be understood as the outcome of the world’s “socio-economic 
order.”122 
The writing of Will Bird serves as a revealing example of these varying 
approaches. Both historians agree that Bird’s writing re-constructed his war 
experience and they acknowledge that he was highly critical of “realism.” 
Vance interprets this criticism as an example of how Canadians constructed a 
positive postwar mythology. Bird’s war was thus “balanced,” “credible,” and 
“optimistic.”123 McKay argues that Bird created an imagined Great War that 
confirmed the “innocence” of his liberal worldview.124 This innocence was a 
conscious choice that “rejected analytic reasoning” to ensure the war 
                                                 
122 McKay and Swift, Warrior Nation, 68-69. 
123 Vance, Death So Noble, 196.  
124 McKay and Swift, Warrior Nation, 68 
61 
 
 
 
reinforced the “primacy of the individual.”125 Both readings suggest that Will 
Bird was uncomfortable rejecting the war as futile. In Vance’s case, Bird’s 
positive outlook is explained by his finding solace in the brotherhood of the 
trenches. While Bird could be critical of the conflict, he always balanced his 
observations by stressing the “inherent good in his Flanders adventure.” For 
McKay, Bird’s version of the war was less benign. Instead of reflecting the 
purposefulness of the conflict, he agues that Bird’s positivism was the 
product of the war’s psychological horrors. The burden of trench warfare, 
McKay writes, “permanently changed the mentality” of the men who lived it. 
Men like Bird refused to reflect critically on the war because their 
psychological survival depended on it.126  
Vance does not deny that some men experienced “psychological 
problems” after the war. He argues, however, that they were the exceptions 
that confirmed the validity of the war myth. While some men may have 
struggled, veterans could not be turned into “an animal or an empty shell” 
because their cause was “righteous.”127 The few who are identified as 
disillusioned, moreover, are pushed aside in favour of a discussion of 
Canadians’ efforts to make sure the country’s youth, immigrants, First 
Nations, and French Canadians were all adhering to the proper meaning of 
the war.128 
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In the war’s aftermath the average Canadian veteran had larger 
concerns than debating how the war was portrayed in novels and poetry. The 
failed bonus campaign, inadequate access to pensions, rampant 
unemployment, health struggles, and denial of access to assistance programs 
influenced the generation’s understanding of the conflict. None of these 
issues are discussed in the debates over imagined wars and war myths. 
Nevertheless, they were the practical, everyday causes of postwar 
disillusionment. Despite not being considered part of the public dialogue 
about the war’s memory, they influenced the meaning of the conflict. In these 
cases, however, the war experience was not employed in relation to 
remembrance or commemoration. Rather, it was the day-to-day challenges, 
including the economy, men’s health, and the ever-increasing prospect of 
another European conflict that ended up shaping the generation’s 
understanding of the war’s meaning.  
The differences between the war generation’s personal experiences and 
public commemoration of the war also illustrate how private and collective 
memories can coexist simultaneously. Collective memory is defined by an 
“interaction between public and private memory.”129 Public memories are 
also informed by collective experience, but studies have determined that 
traumatic events remembered as part of collective memory need not be the 
same as an individual’s private memories. According to Anita Shapira, an 
individual’s experiences can be all but ignored in public commemoration, 
with “collective memory” acting as a “blanket” that hides “all vestige of 
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private memory, of personal experience.”130 Historian Jay Winter, who also 
distinguishes between private and collective memory, cites Maurice 
Halbwach to argue that private or passive memory is composed largely of an 
individual’s “personal recollections.” Collective memory, however, is 
constructed “through the action of groups and individuals in the light of day” 
and is created when people “enter the public domain, and comment about or 
commemorate the past.” Although related, the two are not interchangeable 
and private memories differ from collective memory.131  
Despite such distinctions, little effort has been made to distinguish 
between Canadians’ private and collective reactions to the war. Even histories 
of local responses have focused on a community’s “popular and public 
experiences.”132 Private memories remain so understudied that collective 
memory risks being mistaken as the singular explanation for how Canadians 
responded to the war. Outside of Canada, however, historians and literary 
critics have critiqued the dominance of this collective response. Stéphane 
Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, for example, argue that we need to 
“cast doubt” on the “‘effectiveness’ of commemoration” because the very 
public nature of collective mourning did little to diminish “individual 
                                                 
130 Anita Shapira, “The Holocaust: Private Memories, Public Memory,” Jewish Social 
Studies, New Series, 4:2 (Winter 1998), 50.  
131 Jay Winter, Remembering War: The Great War Between Memory and History in the 
Twentieth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 22.  
132 Robert Rutherdale, Hometown Horizons: Local Responses to Canada’s Great War 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2004), xiii.  
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bereavement.”133 Janet Watson’s argument for the differences between 
experience and memory also suggests that we should consider different 
reactions to the war as readily as we now recognize existence of “different 
wars.”134 Peter Webb, one of the few Canadian literary critics to address the 
subject, supports the idea of collective reactions to the war. He argues for 
shared memories rather than collective memories. “There are many myths, 
many experiences,” Webb writes, and the idea of shared memories 
emphasizes “how a given war experience may be common to a particular 
social group … without assuming that the experience is universal to all 
members of a nation, gender, or culture.”135 
As an example of shared memories, Webb cites the war writing of 
Ralph Connor (the pen name of Rev. Charles Gordon) and Charles Yale 
Harrison. They witnessed the war firsthand, yet their respective works are 
“polar opposites in terms of ideology, diction, and political outlook.” In The 
Sky Pilot in No Man’s Land (1919), Gordon describes self-sacrificing wartime 
deaths that were “splendid” and “Perfectly glorious!”136 Harrison’s Generals 
Die in Bed rejects Gordon’s romanticism entirely. His characters are killed 
without glory. They fall “clumsily” after being shot; they are heard 
                                                 
133 Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 1914-1918, 220-221.  
134 Watson, Fighting Different Wars, 4-5. Smith finds that Watson’s distinction 
between memory and experience is too “severe” and argues instead that we need to 
recognize that soldier-authors’ texts used narrative to construct identities both during and 
after the war and that memory and experience cannot be constructed along wartime and 
postwar lines. See Smith, The Embattled Self, 13. 
135 Webb, “Occupants of Memory,” 17. 
136 Ralph Connor, The Sky Pilot in No Man’s Land (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 
1919), 256.   
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“shrieking;” some are so badly mutilated that what remains of their bodies 
“convulse and jerk spasmodically.”137 Webb sees the differences between 
these two authors as a clash between romance and realism, a dichotomy 
which he considers fundamental to the makeup of early twentieth-century 
Canadian fiction.138 But there is another overlooked explanation for why these 
two authors differed so markedly in their treatment of the First World War: 
their age and place within the war generation.  
Gordon was born in 1860, while Harrison was born in 1898. When the 
war broke out, the former was fifty-four years old; the latter was sixteen. In 
Connor’s case, the war “reinforced” his existing worldview. He portrayed it 
as a “temporary aberration on the path of human progress.”139 For Harrison, 
however, like so many young men who enlisted as teenagers, the war shaped 
how he would come to understand his world. This difference in experience is 
why the study of men’s ages is so critical to understanding how the war 
generation made sense of the event. Rather than using collective concepts of 
representativeness to paint either Gordon or Harrison as a poor reflection of 
how Canadians’ thought collectively about the war, studying generational 
reactions clarifies how opposing views of the war need not be mutually 
exclusive.  
                                                 
137 For the deaths of Brown, Karl’s brother, and Cleary see Harrison, Generals Die in 
Bed, 65, 110, 125. 
138 Webb, “Occupants of Memory,” 2-4. 
139 Webb, “Occupants of Memory,” 3.  
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Until recently, however, few histories recognized age or generation as 
a category of analysis. The first in Canada to employ either was Neil 
Sutherland, whose studies of childhood in English Canada established 
important foundations for inquiries into life stages.140 Doug Owram’s The 
Government Generation (1986) also used the concept loosely to study a select 
group of Canadian intellectuals and their influence on the growth of the 
Canadian welfare state. Owram defined the government generation as a 
“community” of “activist intellectuals,” with a “shared outlook toward 
problem solving and analysis, common social values, and close personal 
connections.” For men like Frank Underhill, Harold Innis, Lester Pearson, 
and Brooke Claxton, Owram recognized that the war was their “most 
important common experience.” They were disillusioned by the conflict and 
disturbed by Canada’s “martial enthusiasm and militarism.”141 The book 
hints at both the importance and influence of the war, but its focus does not 
consider how the conflict was understood or why it shaped a generation.  
Owram’s Born at the Right Time (1996) devotes more consideration to 
why and how groups identified generationally. It examines the baby 
boomers, their ability to shape their surrounding culture and society, and the 
                                                 
140 See Neil Sutherland, Children in English-Canadian Society: Framing the Twentieth-
Century Consensus (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976), and Growing Up: Childhood in 
English Canada from the Great War to the Age of Television (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1997). 
141 Doug Owram, The Government Generation: Canadian Intellectuals and the State, 
1900-1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), x-xii, 141-142. 
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group’s tendency to think in generational terms.142 Cynthia Comacchio, 
whose The Dominion of Youth (2006) examines adolescence and coming of age 
in Canada, also emphasizes the importance of age as a critical part of our 
understanding of generational history. Both see generation as a life stage. 
Comacchio’s work studies adolescence over a thirty-year period. Owram is 
concerned with a specific group—the boomers—and studies them by 
examining their “life cycle,” starting first with childhood and then moving on 
to adolescence and early adulthood.143 Comacchio does not follow one group 
as they age, exploring instead the process of aging by considering the 
maturation of youth and their role in shaping a young nation. She situates her 
study within a broader literature on generation that engages with sociological 
and historiographical debates over its definition. In recognizing the problems 
posed by generation’s multiple meanings, Comacchio observes that it is “a 
decidedly loose category.” Hers is not a study concerned with sociological 
predictions, preferring to ground its use of generation in historical context. 
She argues that generation emphasizes “historical location more than specific 
cohort dates.” Comacchio believes that generation remains an effective tool to 
study “changes and continuities” in adolescence, especially as they pertain to 
“broader socio-cultural change over a fairly limited period.”144 
                                                 
142 See Owram, The Government Generation and Born at the Right Time: A History of the 
Baby Boom Generation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996; 2007), xi. Granatstein’s The 
Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935-1957 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1982) 
examines a similar group to Owram’s Government Generation.  
143 Owram, Born at the Right Time, xii. 
144 Comacchio, The Dominion of Youth, 4, 5. 
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A critical aspect of this interpretation is the recognition that the war 
generation was “constituted by a traumatic event.” As June Edmonds and 
Bryan Turner note, having lived through the trauma of the war, men were 
seen to be different. The public accepted this difference, recognizing that the 
war experience forged a form of collective response. It did so by uniting “a 
particular cohort of individuals into a self-conscious age stratum” that cut the 
war generation off “from its past and [separated] it from the future.” In so 
doing, the war became “the basis of a collective ideology and a set of 
integrating rituals” that acted as a “conduit” for understanding the conflict.145 
For those who came of age at this time, the changes that accompanied 1914-18 
were immense, so much so that their societies came to see the post-1918 
world as a new era.146 In the case of the war generation, the shifting social, 
economic, cultural, and political world also coincided with their maturation, 
making these changes a potent marker for their generational identity.147  
Age was therefore a critical part of an emerging generational identity 
that was adopted by society and by men themselves.  As young boys, this 
generation was “exposed to enthusiastic support for war and war culture.”148 
The dominant political ideology of their youth was imperialism and, as Mark 
Moss argues, it was complemented by period support for militarism, 
                                                 
145 June Edmonds and Bryan Turner, Generations, Culture and Society (Buckingham: 
Open University Press, 2002), 7. 
146 J.O. Miller, ed., The New Era in Canada: Essays Dealing with the Upbuilding of the 
Canadian Commonwealth (Toronto: J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1917).    
147 Wohl, The Generation of 1914. 
148 Mark Moss, Manliness and Militarism: Educating Young Boys in Ontario for War 
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001), 6. 
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manliness, patriotism, and nationalism.149 In the decades before the war, 
industrialization, urbanization and modernization were believed to be 
threatening men’s role in society. At their most extreme, fears over the decline 
of physical labour risked making men “superfluous.” In response, men took 
refuge in manly pursuits like sporting and camping in hopes of “reviving” 
their supposedly vulnerable position in society. The “ultimate form for the 
exercise of masculinity” was war.150 With the brief exception of a few 
thousand who joined the South African War, however, Canadian men faced a 
martial problem: Canada was not at war. In place of actual warfare, therefore, 
they embraced “suitable substitutes” that would hopefully prepare them for 
combat when the time came. This was the atmosphere in which the war 
generation was raised. As boys, their entire society was built on the idea that 
the warrior “was the ultimate masculine ideal.”151 As men, they came of age 
with the most destructive war in living memory.  
                                                 
149 Moss, Manliness and Militarism, 13-14. 
150 Moss, Manliness and Militarism, 15. 
151 Moss, Manliness and Militarism, 20. 
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Chapter 2 
A silent generation?  
 
“I fear for them, these silent men” 1 
- Evadne Price 
 
The men of the war generation rarely spoke about the war.2 Despite their 
“conspiracy of silence,” some did feel compelled to write the conflict “out of 
their system.”3 This need to record their experience indicated an attempt to 
“bear witness to the trauma of war” and make sense of its consequences.4 
Much of the resulting literature attests to the war’s undermining of notions of 
progress. It was a disillusioning experience. In Canada, however, cultural 
nationalism checked expressions of literary discontent. Postwar fiction shied 
away from challenging the meaning of the conflict, even in its aftermath. As a 
                                                 
1 Evadne Price quoted in Jonathan Atkin, A War of Individuals: Bloomsbury Attitudes to 
the Great War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), 143. An Australian-British 
journalist, actress, and writer, Price wrote a female response to Eric Maria Remarque’s All 
Quiet on the Western Front entitled Not So Quiet.   
2 George Parfitt, Fiction of the First World War (London: Faber and Faber, 1988), 4. For 
contemporary recognition of this silence, see R.H. Mottram, Ten Years Ago, in which W.E. 
Bates writes as preface that these men’s silence has been “significant.” Bates cited in Parfitt, 4.  
3 Dagmar Novak, “The Canadian Novel and the Two World Wars: The English-
Canadian Literary Sensibility,” (PhD diss., Toronto, 1985), 67; Cook, At the Sharp End, 6.  
4 Trudi Tate, Modernism, History and the First World War (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1998), 1.   
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result, Canadian war fiction failed to portray the personal impact of the war. 
Despite this fact, historians use these novels to argue that Canada somehow 
escaped the same postwar disillusionment that haunted the U.S. and Europe.  
Between 1914 and 1919, Canada’s war authors embraced notions of 
romance and chivalry, much like their international counterparts.5 After war’s 
end, however, authors outside Canada began questioning the conflict and its 
ultimate meaning. They struggled to understand such killing on an industrial 
scale; prewar notions of romantic and chivalric warfare were shattered.6 
Debates raged, which critics now define as a “conflict between generations 
over the war’s significance.”7 For the first time, combatants in a war also 
became its literary authors.8 Their need to record experience, to bear witness 
to the slaughter, and to highlight their own role in the narrative reflects 
Clifford Geertz’s belief that refashioning one’s past helps give it meaning. By 
making “sense out of experience,” the war stamped a deep imprint on this 
                                                 
5 See Crawford Killlian, “The Great War and the Canadian Novel, 1915-1926,” (MA 
Thesis, Simon Fraser University, 1972) and Keshen, Propaganda and Censorship. 
6 L. Moore Cosgrave, Afterthoughts of Armageddon: The Gamut of Emotions Produced by 
the War, Pointing a Moral that is Not Too Obvious (Toronto: Hunter Rose, 1919), 13-14.  
7 David Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (New York: 
Oxford, 2004), 221; see too, for example, Holger Klein, ed., The First World War in Fiction: A 
Collection of Critical Essays (London: Macmillan, 1976) and Partick Quinn and Steven Trout, 
eds., The Literature of the Great War Reconsidered: Beyond Modern Memory (London: Palgrave 
2001). In his study of French soldiers’ use of literature as a way to testify to their war 
experience Leonard Smith argues that it is “unsurprising that the novel should have the final 
say on the experience of the combatant of the Great War.” See Smith, Embattled Self, 149.  
8 Parfitt argues that “no earlier war … gave rise to an equivalent body of writing and, 
for the first time, … there was the possibility of a substantial literature produced by 
combatants, for the armies of the Great War were the first literate … armies.” See Parfitt, 
Fiction of the First World War, 135. 
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generation in a heightened version of their otherwise “normal individual 
development.” 9 This “generational imprinting,” as Howard Schumann and 
Jacqueline Scott argue, was dependent upon the war as an unprecedented 
historical event occurring at a particularly influential time in their lives.  
For the youths of the war generation, the conflict was not just a major 
world event; it was their introduction to the world.10 According to historian 
Eric Leed, there was “no debate over whether [the war caused] a deep and 
profound alteration of identity.” Belief in the conflict’s transformational 
power led to hopes that peace would bring about a new age, an era 
dominated by youth.11 After 1918, there was a sense that the old order had 
been swept away and replaced by a new, modern society, represented by 
youth and youth culture. Works such as The Revolt of Modern Youth by Ben 
Lindsey and The New Generation by V.F. Calverton and S.D. Schmalhausen 
focused attention on the “new form” that generational identity (and conflict) 
was taking.12 Academics, particularly in the emerging social sciences, joined 
                                                 
9 Clifford Geertz, “Ethos, World View, and the Analysis of Sacred Symbols,” in 
Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic, 1973), 140. See too 
Robert Fulford, The Triumph of Narrative: Storytelling in the Age of Mass Culture (Toronto: 
Anansi, 1999), 15 for a discussion of the relationship between Geertz’s work and the 
importance of narrative.  
10 Howard Schumann and Jacqueline Scott, “Generations and Collective Memories,” 
American Sociological Review 53:3 (Jun., 1989): 378. 
11 Eric Leed, No Man’s Land: Combat & Identity in World War I (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979), 1. 
12 V.F. Calverton and Samuel D. Schmalhausen, eds., The New Generation: The 
Intimate Problems of Modern Parents and Children (London: George Allen Unwin Ltd., 1930), 8. 
See too Ben B. Lindsey and Wainwright Evans, The Revolt of Modern Youth (New York: Boni & 
Liverlight, 1925).  
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the chorus of theorists, such as Karl Manheim and José Ortega y Gasset, who 
devoted considerable study to this new interest. Their work helped to 
popularize generation as a concept and Manheim’s combining of generation 
with class (to demonstrate that generational groups were framed by more 
than birth years) proved particularly influential, leading to widespread 
acceptance that such groupings were formed by common life-stages as well as 
historical events.13  
It was in literature, however, that the war’s generational impact was 
most evident. Many of the most enduring of this generation’s voices came 
from the ranks of men born in the decade and a half before 1900.14 Having 
come of age with the conflict, these writers looked for new ways to 
understand it. They rejected notions of a ‘good war’ and the literary 
conventions that accompanied it. In their place, these authors embraced new 
narrative tools, such as realistic descriptions of combat that tried to lend 
structure to “otherwise inchoate fragments of experience.” In Europe, Britain, 
and the United States, authors subjected the war and its aftermath to serious 
critical analysis. France’s postwar writing, for example, framed the conflict as 
                                                 
13 See especially “The Problem of Generations,” in Karl Manheim, Essays in the 
Sociology of Knowledge (London Routledge, 1952), 276-322. 
14 Ernest Hemingway, for instance, was born in 1899. Charles Yale Harrison was a 
year earlier, in 1898. John Dos Passos was born in 1896, the same year as Edmund Blunden. 
Robert Graves was born in 1895, as was Gabriel Chevalier. Canadians James Pedley, Will 
Bird, and George Godwin were born respectively in 1892, 1891 and 1889. Ernest Raymond 
and Siegfried Sassoon were slightly older, being born respectively in 1888 and 1886, but both 
were more than two decades younger than men such as Rudyard Kipling. There were 
exceptions, such as Henri Barbusse and Ford Maddox Ford (both born in 1873), but the 
postwar literary landscape was largely filled with young men.  
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a tragedy.15 Many British writers, by contrast, were more concerned by irony 
and ideas of futility.16 While the war inevitably consisted of “several hundred 
thousand individually experienced wars,” the generation’s writing also had 
much in common.17 It was trying to make sense of the experience, to define it, 
and to find closure.18  
This broad body of work is described as disillusioned. Although rarely 
defined, postwar disillusionment generally refers to the “loss of illusions in 
the norms and values of the pre-war world.”19 While the extent of this 
disenchantment is contested, by the 1920s doubts were creeping into Western 
societies as to “the status and authority of Western civilization.” These 
                                                 
15 Smith, Embattled Self, 185, 196.  
16 Jay Winter and Antoine Prost, The Great War in History: Debates and Controversies, 
1914 to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 196.  For a comparison of 
French and British writing see Frank Field, British and French Writers of the First World War: 
Comparative Studies in Cultural History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
17 Cook, At the Sharp End, 5. 
18 According to Marlene Briggs, neither the Armistice nor its commemoration 
“imposed closure on the war” and, in Britain, efforts at postwar reconstruction left much of 
the conflict’s impact unresolved. See Marlene Briggs, “Haunted Armistice: The Great War, 
Modern British Literature and the Mourning of Historical Trauma,” (PhD diss., University of 
Ottawa, 2000), xii. The French had similar difficulty finding meaning amidst the failed 
postwar “utopia” so many had hoped for. Like their wartime allies, therefore, France’s 
authors were also searching for closure. Their literature evolved from a postwar “rejection of 
the war” to a reconstruction of the conflict as a traumatic experience. See Smith, Embattled Self, 
especially chapter 4, “The Novel and the Search for Closure,” 148-194.   
19 Furedi, First World War, 16. John Keegan makes a similar observation. See Keegan, 
The First World War (London: Hutchinson, 1998), 321, where he states “The Somme marked 
the end of an age of vital optimism in British life that has never been recovered.” 
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sentiments were felt “most forcefully … by artists and imaginative writers.”20 
American writers, such as John Dos Passos, claimed that the war “brought 
death … to everything that mattered.”21 Richard Aldington, author of the 
British war novel Death of a Hero, asked why the war happened and 
demanded to know who was responsible for its atrocities.22 Arnold Bennett 
added to postwar critiques, writing of younger men who returned home from 
war as “old, damaged, [and] disillusioned.”23 These works framed the war as 
a harbinger of individual transformation. Men such as Aldridge believed that 
few lives “remained unaffected by the war” and that most “[adult] lives were 
cut sharply into three sections – pre-war, war, and post-war.”24  
Examples of the war’s negative impact cut across literary genres. While 
the Lost Generation writers produced the most famous expression of 
disillusionment, popular, middlebrow authors, such as Britain’s Gilbert 
Frankau, also wrote of damaged men. Frankau’s character Francis Gordon, 
for example, went to war a “smooth-faced boy.” Once invalided, however, he 
became a “middle-aged man.” Gordon’s hair greyed and “his eyes had lost 
                                                 
20 Furedi, First World War, 16, 18, 25. Canadians had similar doubts. After the war, 
for instance, science and technology no longer equated to progress and it was “no longer 
possible to have an implicit faith that technology would always be used to create a better, 
more peaceful world.” See R. Douglas Francis, The Technological Imperative in Canada: An 
Intellectual History (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2009), 91. 
21 Dos Passos, cited in Claudia Matherly Stolz, “Dos Passos’ Three Soldiers: A Case 
Study,” West Virginia University Philological Papers 50 (Fall 2004), 77. 
22 Richard Aldington, Death of a Hero (Dundurn, 1998), 157. 
23 Bennett, cited in George Parfitt, Fiction of the First World War: A Study (London: 
Faber & Faber, 1988), 73. 
24 Aldington, Death of a Hero, 157-58.  
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their laughter.” Now, he “no longer held himself upright, his shoulders 
drooped as though he carried a burden on them.”25 According to James 
Powell, American writers shared this postwar disillusionment. The war “was 
not only psychologically transforming,” it altered how these writers “looked 
at both life and literature.”26 Sarah Trott makes a similar case that “hardboiled” 
detective fiction, such as that of Raymond Chandler, should also be read as 
part of this “literature of traumatic experience.”27  
Despite similarities to American and British fiction before and during 
the war, Canadians did not follow the disillusioned path laid out by writers 
such as Hemingway, Dos Passos, or others in the Lost Generation. Instead, 
Canadian novelists produced staid, middlebrow fiction because “that is what 
sold.”28 Their novels rarely questioned the conflict or its impact. They relied 
heavily on romantic styles buttressed by strong morals and inspirational 
                                                 
25 Gilbert Frankau, Peter Jackson, Cigar Merchant: A Romance of Married Life (London: 
Hutchinson, 1920), 322. For additional discussion of British literary reactions to the war, 
including critiques of its postwar aftermath, see Parfitt, Fiction of the First World War and 
James Powell, “A Humble Protest: A Literary Generation’s Quest for the Heroic Self, 1917-
1930” (PhD diss., Ohio State, 2008).  
26 Powell, “A Humble Protest,” 27.  
27 Sarah Trott, “The Detective as Veteran: Re-casting American Hard-Boiled Writing 
as a Literature of Traumatic War Experience,” in Stephen McVeigh and Nicola Cooper, eds., 
Men After War (London: Routledge, 2013), 130. 
28 Amy Tector, “Wounded Warriors: Representations of disabled soldiers in 
Canadian Fiction of the First World War,” (PhD diss., Université Libre de Bruxelles 2000), 14. 
Dr. Tector was kind enough to send me proofs of her dissertation. This material is broken up 
by chapter and the pagination provided reflects only the pages per chapter, not the 
dissertation in total.   
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endings.29 As Gilbert Parker, one of the era’s leading authors, explained: “I 
make my characters a little better, a little more adventurous, a little more 
superlative in all their qualities than they would be possibly in real life.”30 As 
a result, Canadian war fiction was recognized for its mediocrity and it 
escaped critical attention for much of the twentieth century.31 Indeed, until 
the 1980s, literary critics and historians agreed that this body of work was 
“conventional and undistinguished.”32 Historian W.L. Morton claimed that 
these books lacked “a single memorable character” and that their only virtue 
was that they could be read without the reader “ever being disturbed.”33 
Others described Canada’s literature as filled with “clichéd romances by 
authors more interested in jingoistic patriotism than honest portrayal of life at 
the front.”34 It is not surprising, then, that in the wake of such criticism, many 
of Canada’s war novels were ignored and that the idea of a canon of 
Canadian war fiction rarely merited an afterthought.35  
                                                 
29 Amy Tector, “Wounded Warriors,” 14, 16. 
30 Parker cited in Tector, “Wounded Warriors,” 16.  
31 Colin Hill, “Generic Experiment and Confusion in Early Canadian Novels of the 
Great War,” Studies in Canadian Literature 34:2 (2009), 2. Hill writes that “Canada’s literary 
histories almost univocally consider war fiction of the period to be insignificant.” 
32 Frank K. Stanzel, “‘In Flanders Fields the Poppies Blow’: Canada and the Great 
War,” in Peter Easingwood, Konrad Gross and Lynette Hunter, eds., Difference and 
Community: Canadian and European Cultural Perspectives (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1996), 213–14. 
33 See Morton, “1920s,” 225. 
34 Eric Thompson, “Canadian Fiction of the Great War,” Canadian Literature 91 
(Winter 1981): 84. 
35 Donna Coates describes the novels from the early 1920s as “light reading.” See 
Coates, “War,” in William New, ed., Encyclopedia of Literature in Canada (Toronto: University 
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Since the 1980s, however, the reputation of Canada’s war writing has 
been rehabilitated. In his 1981 article “Canadian Fiction of the Great War,” 
Eric Thompson argued that although many of the period’s novels were 
forgettable, there were also notable exceptions, including Peregrine Acland’s 
All Else is Folly, Charles Yale Harrison’s Generals Die in Bed, and Philip Child’s 
God’s Sparrows. These texts were sufficiently noteworthy to form a 
“significant genre of Canadian fiction.” With themes that mirrored the 
disillusionment of writers in the U.S. and overseas, Thompson praised these 
novels for their accuracy. Because the authors were veterans, he privileged 
their views. They knew about the war “first hand.”36  
Scholars such as Dagmar Novak, Dominique Dumontet, and Amy 
Tector have also attempted to recuperate the canon.37 Canada’s middlebrow 
fiction, they argue, tells as “valid side of the story of the war” as more avant-
garde work.38 Whereas Thompson rejected novels written before 1929 as 
overly romantic, Novak argues that all books published between 1915 and 
1939 need to be considered. She concedes that “a younger school,” led by 
Acland and Harrison, came to prominence in the late 1920s, but argues that 
the earlier fiction, as part of a “romance tradition,” was equally legitimate. 
                                                                                                                                           
of Toronto Press, 2002), 1189. According to Tector, others who rejected the era’s writing 
included E.K. Brown, Desmond Pacey, and Northrup Frye. See Tector, “Wounded Warriors,” 
13-21. She argues that scholarly “neglect” of Canada’s war literature “cannot be entirely 
explained” by Canada’s colonial status, because in Australia, an otherwise similar case to 
Canada, “war fiction … has enjoyed sustained analysis and criticism for decades.”  
36 Eric Thompson, “Canadian Fiction of the Great War,” 81, 83. 
37 Tector, “Wounded Warriors;” Novak, Dubious Glory; Dumontet, “‘Lest We Forget’;” 
also important is Coates, “The Best Soldiers of All: Unsung Heroines in Canadian Women’s 
Great War Fiction,” Canadian Literature, 151 (1996).  
38 Tector, “Wounded Warriors,” 32.  
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Novels by Charles Gordon or J. Murray Gibbon may have been romantic but 
they nonetheless reflected “the beliefs and values” of Canadians at the time.39 
Tector agrees. She argues that Canada’s middlebrow war fiction has been 
“unjustly neglected” and remains a window onto what “Canadians thought 
of events shortly after having lived through them.”40 Yet, unlike Thompson 
and Novak, Tector does not see a firm break between romantic and modernist 
literature. She argues that the most significant shift in Canada’s war writing 
was in tone, resulting from a “slow transformation” from romanticism to 
realism.41 Dumontet, who also seeks to recuperate “under-valued texts,” 
supports the idea of a literary evolution. She argues that pigeonholing 
romantic and modernist war literature into set categories of “jingoistic 
romances and cynical anti-war texts” misses the “social inclusivity and 
balance” that many of Canada’s war writers attempted to convey.42 
The major difference between these schools of thought is their position 
on the objective “truth” of Canadian war fiction. Thompson and Novak both 
claim that realist novels were more accurate, and thus more powerful, than 
romantic work.43 But as Tector points out, equating “bad” romantic literature 
of early novels with a belief that it is a “false” version of the war “conflates 
the supposed realism of the soldier authors with their adoption of the realist 
                                                 
39 Novak, Dubious Glory, 7. 
40 Tector, “Wounded Warriors,” 444-445.  
41 Tector, “Wounded Warriors,” 39.  
42 Dumontet, “‘Lest We Forget,’” ii.  
43 See Thompson, “Canadian Fiction of the Great War,” and Novak, Dubious Glory.  
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style.”44 More recent analysis rejects the privileging of realist fiction and 
argues that the belief of romantic authors in “the Honour of battle and the 
Glory of Patriotism” was an equally legitimate response to the war. In such 
cases, the conflict described by romantic authors was “not only steeped in 
horror and bogged down in mud, but also offered soldiers comradeship, a 
sense of purpose, and new experiences that were not always negative.”45 
Those defending this literature argue that critics have misrepresented 
the importance of realist, anti-war books. Jonathan Vance and Maria Bracco 
reject notions of postwar disillusionment. Bracco’s study of middlebrow 
novels shifts focus away from the anti-war canon and on to authors whose 
postwar popularity demonstrates that a more conservative, traditional 
version of the war continued to appeal to readers after 1918.46 Like Vance, 
Bracco dismisses the views of highbrow modernists as unrepresentative of 
public opinion.47 Middlebrow fiction is interpreted as a conservative bulwark 
against the modernism of the anti-war writers and, in the context of war 
fiction, it helped “soften the [conflict’s] impact … by reasserting links with the 
past” and reinforcing middle class standards and values.48 In place of a stark 
break between the pre-war and post-war world, middlebrow authors offered 
readers a cushion to help fashion meaning out of the changes wrought by the 
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war. Their values reaffirmed “the strength and importance of links with the 
past. Morality, religion, tradition: such words made up a litany of appeals for 
post-war regeneration.”49 The pre- and postwar continuity of societal values 
is a central tenet of these positive readings, which argues that the “idea of 
rupture” has been “exaggerated.”50  
Historians and literary critics point to middlebrow fiction as a “fairly 
accurate barometer of the Canadian perception of war.”51 It is assumed that 
the work of Canada’s authors followed “the same structural patterns as their 
German and British counterparts.”52 Nevertheless, while middlebrow novels 
were popular on both sides of the Atlantic, Canada’s literary market was 
sufficiently distinct to weaken direct comparison between its middlebrow 
authors and those in the U.S. or Britain. One major difference was the relative 
size of Canada’s book market. Bracco’s discussion of British novels considers 
books that sold in the hundreds of thousands. But Canadian authors and their 
readership never approached comparable figures, even relatively. Moreover, 
conclusions drawn from Canadian book sales are questionable due to a lack 
of sales figures, which, as Mary Vipond has revealed, are absent for much of 
the 1920s. While Vipond’s study says much about early twentieth century 
reading habits, it says little about the popularity of war books because she 
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ends her analysis in 1928, a year before the flood of war texts that included 
Peregrine Acland’s All Else is Folly, Robert Graves’ Goodbye to All That, and 
Remarque’s All Quiet.53  
Distinguishing between highbrow and middlebrow literature is also 
difficult in Canada because few authors broke out of the middlebrow mold, 
ensuring the absence of highbrow war literature. Canadian readers, as Tector 
points out, were suspicious of realism in general and their conservative 
reading habits had a direct impact on book sales: “the dispute between 
romantic versions of the war and realistic ones was not simply about how the 
conflict was portrayed.” It was also at “the heart” of a literary argument “that 
had dominated Canadian criticism since the nineteenth century.” Debates 
over the war fit into this romantic-realist struggle and middlebrow authors 
proved reluctant to criticize the conflict out of fear that “if it was found to be 
‘all for nothing’ the resulting societal despair would be crippling.” The 
middlebrow mindset had “good reason,” therefore, “to avoid questioning the 
conflict’s meaning too rigorously.” 54  
The uncritical stance of much of Canadian war fiction divides 
historians and critics. While novels such as Ralph Connor’s The Major and 
Charles Yale Harrison’s Generals Die in Bed stand at either end of a romantic-
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modernist spectrum, other works are less easily classified.55 Both Eric 
Thompson and Jeff Keshen argue that Acland, Child, and Harrison wrote 
disillusioned “anti-war novels.”56 Tim Cook makes a similar case, while 
adding the memoirists Will Bird, James Pedley, and Wilfrid Kerr to the list of 
“disillusionment writers.” Jonathan Vance, however, sees Bird and Child as 
examples of a more positive, balanced interpretation of the war. Vance also 
uses Kerr’s writing to dismiss anti-war novels such as that of Harrison. Amy 
Tector agrees with Vance about Child and argues that the author refused to 
portray his war experience as “entirely negative.”57 Dumontet’s reading of 
Child is similarly focused on the author’s balanced writing, while Colin Hill 
and Peter Webb see Acland’s All Else is Folly as a work in tension between 
romanticism and realism.58  
These conflicting interpretations are a result of middlebrow 
sensibilities. Several novels, including All Else is Folly and Show Me Death!, 
cannot be described as anti-war fiction because they combine wartime 
disillusionment with “sentimentality” and “hackneyed” love-plots.59 Dent’s 
Show Me Death! contains harsh descriptions of combat, death, and loss of 
                                                 
55 According to Hill, the “standard definitions” of Canada’s various genres of 
literature: realism, romanticisms, naturalism, and modernism, “do not easily apply in the 
Canadian context.” See Hill, “Early Novels of the Great War,” 60.  
56 Keshen, “The Great War Soldiers as Nation Builder,” 14.  
57 Tector, “Wounded Warriors,” 77.  
58 Hill, “Early Novels of the Great War,” 67; Webb, “Occupants of Memory,” 114.  
59 Thompson, “Canadian Fiction of the Great War,” 86.  
84 
 
 
 
faith; its characters emerge from combat “broken, sobbing wrecks of men.”60 
Yet, while the book continues in similar fashion until its conclusion, it shifts 
its tone to a romantic ending. In place of the novel’s earlier critiques of the 
war, Dent’s protagonist falls—literally—into the arms of his beloved: “The 
door reopened. ‘Oh, thank God, Luella! Luella!’ I tried to run toward her, but 
you see I had only one leg. I had forgotten that. I fell—fell into her arms. Her 
lips brushed my cheeks.”61 These final romantic pages contrast oddly with the 
novel’s earlier bitterness and disillusionment. But they are symptomatic of 
how Canadian war fiction included criticism of the war within a broader 
romantic structure, concessions to the middlebrow format that reflect these 
authors’ embrace of “inspirational endings.”62 Indeed, with the notable 
exception of Generals Die in Bed, almost every example of Canadian war 
fiction ends on a positive note.63  
Canadian fiction about the war’s aftermath also favours happy endings. 
Douglas Durkin’s The Magpie (1923), Hubert Evans’ The New Front Line (1927), 
and Harwood Steele’s I Shall Arise (1926) all deal with the postwar problems 
of returned veterans. Each book offers a stinging critique of interwar Canada 
and its failure to live up to wartime ideals. Unlike war fiction outside of 
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Canada, however, they too end happily. In The Magpie a returned man 
bitterly explains that veterans wasted “the best part of their lives fighting for 
the big fellows.”64 Hugh Henderson in The New Front Line is similarly 
disillusioned by postwar life. He proves unable to find meaning in postwar 
capitalism and is bothered by how it “seemed that the less useful work a 
person did the more money he made.”65 Chris Maynard, whose spirit is 
nearly strangled in I Shall Arise by his “incessant disillusionment,” shares 
these postwar struggles.66 Yet, despite such themes, none of these novels 
carries its discussion of discontent through to the conclusion. In contrast to 
disillusioned texts published outside of Canada, each ends with its characters 
finding love and meaning after the war.67 It is not surprising, therefore, that 
W.L. Morton concluded that Canada’s postwar fiction escaped the 
“smoldering disillusionment” of the Lost Generation.68  
Morton was correct about Canada’s war fiction but for the wrong 
reasons. Age mattered to how this generation understood the conflict. Their 
books, while limited in number, presented the conflict differently than those 
of older Canadians. The romantic-realist spectrum so often identified by 
literary critics was also a generational spectrum. The focus on middlebrow 
literature, combined with an incessant preoccupation with studying 
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representative books, marginalized the generation’s voices. Canadian 
middlebrow fiction shied away from critical interpretations of the war’s 
aftermath. But this did not mean that the war generation did as well. Nor did 
it mean that this group failed to identify generationally. Rather, Canada’s war 
fiction demonstrated that middlebrow fiction did not address the trials faced 
by returned men. The conflict’s economic impact is almost uniformly ignored, 
as is postwar hardship, battles for promised medical and social assistance, 
and difficulties re-integrating into civilian life. Even texts that do attempt 
discussion of the war’s economic aftermath, such as Durkin’s The Magpie and 
Steele’s I Shall Arise, never resolve the issues their characters face. Instead, 
these novels fall back on the twin middlebrow tropes of romantic love and 
the agrarian myth as an answer for men’s postwar problems.69 Historians 
have added to the critical silencing of this generation’s views by ignoring 
what returned men thought about these novels. In the process, they overlook 
how age and generation influences interpretations of Canadian war fiction. 
When both are examined, it is clear that the so-called representative literature 
is a poor gauge to the thinking of returned men which historians mistakenly 
use to measure the war’s aftermath and generational impact.  
The youth of the war generation is rarely considered a factor when 
analyzing interwar fiction. Novak, for example, describes a “new generation” 
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of authors who emerged onto Canada’s literary scene in the late 1920s, but 
her analysis of age goes no further.70 Peter Buitenhuis also notes the 
importance of generational context in Canadian war literature, however he is 
concerned with authors born decades before.71 In place of age, critics focus on 
war. While they have helped craft a canon of Canadian war fiction, they have 
masked how younger men wrote about the conflict. Tector defends Ralph 
Connor and Basil King’s war fiction, for example, on the basis that their 
choice “to write in the romantic style rather than adopting a realist tone or a 
cynical attitude” should not disqualify their books from Canadian war fiction. 
Both men were highly successful middlebrow authors, but however 
important their work is to the genre, there is little evidence to suggest the war 
generation shared Connor or King’s understanding of the conflict. Indeed, no 
member of the younger generation authored a war novel comparable to the 
positive, romantic vision embraced by Connor and King. Moreover, younger 
critics, such as Bill Deacon, were not fans of their work. Deacon, perhaps the 
most influential and important book reviewer in the 1920s and 1930s, 
dismissed Connor’s novels as “weak,” “pious tales,” filled with little more 
than “half-truths.” His Canada “presented a … radically false view of 
Canadian life” and, in Deacon’s opinion, the author’s “evangelical zeal” never 
equaled his “artistic conscience.”72 Such generational divisions are masked, 
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however, by claims that younger men like Deacon were elites and that the 
fiction most representative of Canadian opinion was the canon’s balanced 
and inclusive war texts.  
Unlike disillusioned anti-war novels, such as Harrison’s Generals Die in 
Bed, “balanced” war books were more “inclusive.”73 These novels were 
middlebrow fiction at best and, while they did not deny the war’s “more 
negative aspects,” they championed the belief that the war “was necessary.”74 
According to Vance, Canadians continued to believe in the war and, although 
few denied its toll, accounts too critical of the conflict risked being rejected as 
unbalanced. The “right way” to tell the story of the war was to infuse it with 
beauty, sentiment, and “noble ideas.”75 Any other approach, including that of 
disillusioned anti-war fiction, was “invalid,” because it cast Canadian soldiers 
“in a bad light.” As a result, postwar accounts seeking legitimacy with 
Canada’s readers had to portray “both the positive and the negative” sides of 
the war.76  
John Murray Gibbon’s books are considered representative of these 
balanced texts. Gibbon, born in 1875, was a Scottish-Canadian who served as 
the first president and founding member of the Canadian Authors 
Association (CAA). He was also an historian of the Canadian Pacific Railway 
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(CPR) and author of two novels inspired by the Great War: Drums Afar: An 
International Romance (1918) and The Conquering Hero (1920). The latter was set 
during the immediate post-war era. Keshen describes the novel as “typical” 
of those in the immediate postwar era.77 Tector agrees and praises Gibbon as a 
popular writer. She uses his book as an example of Canadian writers who 
failed to adopt realism out of “pure” economic reasons and cites his stories as 
“typical” of Canadian postwar bestsellers, which featured “a courageous and 
morally upstanding hero, a virtuous, if victimized heroine, sentimentalized 
deaths and happy endings.”78  
The Conquering Hero is a melodramatic romance-adventure story. The 
plot shifts from New Brunswick to New York to British Columbia. It begins in 
1918 in a New Brunswick hunting camp, where Donald Macdonald, a 
returned man, works with his uncle as a guide. During the war Donald 
served with the 42nd Canadian Highlanders. He distinguished himself in 
battle, winning the Distinguished Conduct Medal (DCM) for raiding a 
machine gun nest, after which he was “wounded, gassed and honourably 
discharged.”79 In addition to his status as a war hero, Donald is an 
outdoorsman and a farmer, making him the embodiment of at least three 
stereotypes of Canadian manliness. 
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Like most Canadian novels of this type, The Conquering Hero is not a 
war story and the conflict exists only in the background.80 Gibbon does not 
deny that Donald was affected by the conflict and the veteran finds that after 
returning home his “morbid imagination” runs “riot.” Gibbon blames 
Donald’s bad dreams on his nerves. He can control himself by day but once 
asleep, he returns to the war: 
now on parade, now doing fatigue duty, now creeping out at 
night on a wire-cutting expedition, now shivering in the 
trenches with fierce excitement at the minute before zero, now 
in a wild swirl of hand to hand bayonet fighting or choking 
with the fumes of gas.”81 
Such passages are reminders that the war is not easily forgotten. These 
moments are fleeting, however, and do not affect the rest of the story. In fact, 
the novel unfolds as though Donald is mentally and physically fit, despite his 
wounds. These injuries never trouble him and he reintegrates into civilian life 
with relative ease. In Gibbon’s fictional world, it is Donald’s pride in his 
battalion that dominates his feeling about the war, not its consequences.   
While authors such as Gibbon may have hesitated criticizing the war, 
the emphasis placed on these more balanced books marginalizes the fiction of 
Canada’s war generation. Their accounts were the most critical of all of 
Canada’s war fiction. Yet, because they published so little, their opinions are 
often drowned out by the emphasis on middlebrow books. In their place, the 
novels of Ralph Connor are cited as the best example of the Canadian 
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rejection of disillusionment. Connor’s works, along with those of L.M. 
Montgomery, F.G. Scott, Stephen Leacock, Theodore Roberts, and J. Murray 
Gibbon, are used as examples of how Canadians thought about the war. The 
focus on their views is justified because they reflected “the average Canadian 
reader”82 and the “persistence of conventional habits and attitudes” in 
Canada’s nascent postwar publishing industry.83 A select group of best-
selling authors thus dominated Canada’s literary landscape, ensuring that the 
literary market was a place where the “new generation” failed to “take the 
lead.”84 After the war ended, the literary preferences of Canadians “remained 
consistently traditional” and readers held to their “prewar favourites.” As the 
critic Leo Kennedy lamented, “the Canadian literary scene is dominated by 
the Frank L. Packards, the Howard Angus Kennedys, the Ralph Connors; the 
Robertses and the Campbells.”85  
Despite their popularity, however, novels by authors such as Ralph 
Connor differed from those of younger writers.86 Connor, like Hemingway, 
Dos Passos, and Charles Yale Harrison, served in the war, in his case as a 
chaplain. But unlike these younger writers, Connor was fifty-four years old 
when war broke out. His age shaped his experience, just as the war 
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generation’s youth shaped theirs. The younger generation generally rejected 
traditional, romanticized portrayals of conflict in ways that older men, such 
as Connor, did not. In The Sun Also Rises, Hemingway declared that the war 
was “a calamity for civilization and perhaps would have been better 
avoided.”87 Connor’s fictional response to the war was the exact opposite. In 
place of disillusioned rejection, his books re-affirmed the war’s purpose in 
prose and style “reminiscent” of writers such as Rudyard Kipling.88 No 
Canadian authors rejected the war to the extent of Hemingway. But this does 
not mean that the war generation disagreed with his approach. Their books 
could also be critical of the conflict, despite ending positively, which reflected 
more than a search for a silver lining in their war experience. Connor’s 
generation viewed the war as a redemptive force for good, a theme that he 
continued to support as late as 1925.89 The fiction of younger men was 
different. It found meaning in the war (and its aftermath) despite the 
calamity, not because war was a redeeming force.  
The differences in the generational version of the postwar world are 
evident in Harwood Steele’s I Shall Arise (1926).90 Steele’s book (now largely 
forgotten) tells the story of a returned man. It begins with Chris Maynard 
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returning home from France. In place of a fiancée, job, and life that he 
expected, Chris finds a changed Canada that shatters his wartime ideals. 
After a failed suicide attempt, Maynard recuperates, falls in love, and builds a 
new life on a soldier farm in British Columbia. The novel’s structure is similar 
to other postwar fiction about veterans, such as Durkin’s The Magpie and 
Evans’ The New Front Line. It combines sharp criticisms of Canada’s postwar 
economy with a veteran’s struggles to reintegrate into society. As with other 
middlebrow fiction from this period, it ends on a positive note and, like Craig 
Forrester in The Magpie and Hugh Henderson in The New Front Line, Maynard 
finds solace moving out of the city and onto the land.   
What sets Steele’s book apart from other novels about the difficulties 
faced by returned soldiers in postwar Canada is that the main character is the 
most deeply affected. In Durkin’s book, Craig Forrester does not face serious 
personal hurdles. He has a job waiting for him and his health is not an issue. 
Rather, it is his friend, the secondary character Jimmy Dyer, who embodies 
the struggles of returned soldiers. In I Shall Arise, however, Chris Maynard 
experiences extreme hardship. Indeed, within the first few pages of the novel 
his life spirals out of control. His prewar love marries another man, he loses 
his job, and his former comrades abandon him. Everywhere he turns, 
Maynard is let down. The government will not help him with his health, 
veterans’ associations do not want him as a member (because he was an 
officer), and even the Church proves unable to provide the necessary support. 
Maynard finds himself completely alone. Canada has failed him and he is 
consumed with disillusionment. His “bitterness” swells up “like a rising 
flood, dark and deep and awful.” As the flood rises, “it quenched the 
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gleaming fire that once had burnt there—Faith. His faith in himself was gone; 
his faith in mankind going; his faith in God going too.” Maynard’s trust is 
fundamentally shaken, “trust in the women he knew, his trust in his friends, 
his confidence in the sincerity of those who promised Justice to the ex-soldier, 
his confidence in the future.” The veteran is despondent and the arrival of 
Armistice Day proves the final straw. Having witnessed how poorly veterans 
are being treated, Maynard cannot stand that Canadians are celebrating their 
‘glorious dead’ while forgetting the plight of the living. The postwar world 
ushered in a “second war,” a “War of Peace.” Unlike 1914-18, this new war 
would have “no victory.” Without a family or a job, and with his health 
failing, Maynard decides his only solution is suicide. He retrieves his service 
revolver and attempts to shoot himself at the base of Winnipeg’s cenotaph. In 
a final act of irony, the cold proves too much for his damaged body and he is 
overtaken by sleep before he can pull the trigger.91  
Had Steele’s book been written later in the decade, or outside of 
Canada, the novel would likely have ended with Maynard’s suicide, a 
damning indictment of the plight of the returned man.92 But it did not and the 
book quickly returns to its middlebrow sensibilities when a Winnipeg nurse, 
Daphne Hargraves, saves Chris from hypothermia. The two eventually fall in 
love and settle on Vancouver Island at the fictional soldier farm of 
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Pinehurst.93 There, Chris meets Toby, another veteran, whose life motto—“I 
Shall Arise”—inspires Maynard to reconsider his sense of disillusion. Chris’ 
postwar renewal becomes complete in November while listening to Colonel 
Kent’s Armistice Day address. The speech addresses the postwar trials of 
returned men: “We see the world rolling along … as before. And we ask 
ourselves, was it worth it?” His answer is a resounding yes, because of the 
‘gifts’ the war gave the soldiers. Even though veterans had to do without 
“riches and prosperity,” the war gave them something much more valuable: 
“happiness and self-respect.” In the end, these were the qualities that 
mattered, along with their memories. Kent calls on the crowd to forget the 
“rough side” of the war by remembering only its “good side.”94 
Steele’s defense of the war’s memory is typical of Canada’s 
middlebrow war fiction. What is surprising, however, is his scathing portrait 
of both life overseas and in postwar Canada. Chris Maynard’s experience on 
the battlefields is described in gruesome detail and Steele’s willingness to 
discuss the horrors and its postwar traumatic aftermath is what sets his 
generation’s accounts of the conflict apart from earlier fiction by older 
authors such as Connor and Gibbon. The destruction of Flanders that Steele 
recounts, with its “corpses, stiff, mud-covered, blood-stained, gazing with 
glassy eyes,” is anything but romantic. Descriptions of Maynard’s return to 
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Canada are equally critical and Steele states explicitly that the 
disappointments Chris experiences crush his spirit, draining him of “every 
ounce of strength he had.” Although he eventually comes to embrace his war 
memories, Steele makes it clear that they will haunt him for the rest of his life 
and Chris realizes “what the War had cost him.” The conflict “could not be 
thrown aside, like a closed book, as soon as peace was signed,” because “its 
consequences … were to meet him and those of his generation everywhere, as 
long as they lived.” 95 
The most revealing difference between the war generation’s version of 
the war and that of older Canadians is in their descriptions of the dead. In The 
Sky Pilot in No Man’s Land, Connor ends his novel with the death of his main 
character, Barry Dunbar. It is a death of redemption and it plays a critical part 
in the novel’s plot. Having proved himself in battle, his last words recall the 
glory of God and war, reaffirming the reason for fighting and the importance 
of faith: 
“Now—that’s—all—major,” he whispered. “Tell—her—
I—thank—God—for—her—and—for—the—other. Major—
tell—the—boys—that—God—is good—. Never—to be—
afraid—but to—carry on-” 
It was his last word, and there could be no better. “God is 
good. Never be afraid but carry on.”96  
By comparison, Will Bird, who authored several books about the war, 
stripped battlefield death of all sentimentality. He opened his memoir, And 
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We Go On, with the killing of a young recruit. The man, new to the trenches, 
asks a veteran sergeant, “Where is the war—what is it?” A chance bullet kills 
the recruit midway through his sentence: “Ping! We buried him before it was 
light.” The young man’s death is devoid of meaning, glory, or romance. It is a 
sad, brutal fact that merits no further description. What is war? Bird’s answer 
is simple and straightforward: dead men, reduced to little more than a 
“shriveled corpse,” so “rotted” that no one could say whether he was “friend 
or foe.”97 
Charles Yale Harrison’s descriptions of death in Generals Die in Bed are 
just as jarring. Wounded men are described as running with “gushing 
stumps.” In a scene describing the bayoneting of a German soldier, Harrison 
details just how awkward and unclean the act of killing actually was:  
My tugging and pulling works the blade in his insides. 
Again those horrible shrieks! 
I place the butt of the rifle under my arm and turn 
away, trying to drag the blade out. It will not come. 
I think: I can get it out if I unfasten the bayonet from 
the rifle. But I cannot go through with the plan, for the blade 
is in up to the hilt and the wound which I have been clumsily 
mauling is now a gaping hole. I cannot put my hand there. 
Suddenly I remember what I must do. 
I turn around and pull my breech-lock back. The click 
sounds sharp and clear. 
He stops his screaming. He looks at me, silently now. 
He knows what I am going to do. 
A white Very light soars over our heads. His helmet 
has fallen from his head. I see his boyish face. He looks like a 
Saxon; he is fair and under the light I see white down against 
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green cheeks. 
I pull my trigger. There is a loud report. The blade at 
the end of my rifle snaps in two. He falls into the corner of 
the bay and rolls over. He lies still. 
I am free.98 
Ralph Connor was capable of writing critically of the war’s impact, 
but, like other older authors, he chose not to.99 In To Him That Hath, his novel 
about the postwar era, Connor produces as sympathetic and nuanced a 
critique of veterans’ issues as any war generation writer. The war, he wrote, 
was a “soul-devastating experience,” which forced men to return home to a 
life “desolate and maimed in all that gave it value.” Yet, in spite of such 
prose, what sets Connor apart from younger writers is that he tempered the 
harsh realities his characters faced. In place of disillusionment, his veterans 
find meaning and purpose in their postwar lives. After meeting the future 
love of his life, Captain Jack feels his sense of purpose return and he is 
thankful that the “dreary weeks” that followed his return home are finally 
ended.100  
                                                 
98 Harrison, Generals Die in Bed, 112-113. 
99 Stephen Leacock, for example, produced a brilliant satire of the younger 
generation’s war writing in his collected My Remarkable Uncle. In an essay, “War and 
Humour,” he lampooned the realistic staccato of much of the war generation’s writing: “As 
the first roar of grape shot zoomed past us, my stomach suddenly sank. I walked to the edge 
of the mound and vomited. My stomach turned. I was sick. I threw up. “Did you vomit?” 
asked Lord Kitchener. I said I had. “Well, I’m going to,” he said. He went and vomited. He 
was sick. “Did you vomit, Kitchener,” said Roberts. “Yes.” “Well, move aside and let 
me.”Such prose set “newer,” “realist writers” apart from an earlier literary tradition, 
including the works of Ralph Connor. See Leacock, “War and Humour,” in My Remarkable 
Uncle (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2010 [1942]), 129. 
100 Ralph Connor, To Him That Hath (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1921), 27. 
99 
 
 
 
The war generation writers rebelled against these tame, romantic 
descriptions. They did not praise war. They rejected it and some did so by 
explicitly taking aim at romanticized accounts. In Generals Die in Bed, a 
moralizing, “middle-aged” lay preacher symbolizes the older generation. He 
does not fit in with the younger men and has trouble relating to them. The 
recruits reject the preacher’s attempts to sermonize, telling him bluntly (in a 
thinly veiled reference to Ralph Connor), “Shut up, sky pilot.”101 Steele’s I 
Shall Arise is similarly critical of the war and it frames its critiques 
generationally by criticizing how men younger and older than the war 
generation were profiting at their expense: “The War has played hell with the 
careers of our generation.” The conflict was not “catching” the “youngsters” 
or the “senior chaps,” but rather “the fellows in between like you and me, 
who were just old enough to be starting but too young to have got fairly 
going. We’re the birds that have to pay. We’ve had to sacrifice our dreams, 
our life-work.”102 
Steele’s book demonstrates that these authors did not just write 
differently about the war, they also framed their work generationally. Hubert 
Evans’ The New Front Line and Douglas Durkin’s The Magpie, for instance, 
were very much about the postwar era. Neither sees anything positive about 
the war’s outcome. Generational conflict is central to each. In Evans’ case, 
division exists between the novel’s main character, a returned soldier, and his 
father, a middle-class businessman. In Durkin’s book, the main character 
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clashes with the established interests in Winnipeg, all men older than himself. 
Both novels are highly critical of postwar Canada and they blame the older 
generation for not understanding the overwhelming expectation of postwar 
change or their resulting disillusionment. Gibbon’s postwar novel, by 
comparison, ignores Donald’s age. There is no inter-generational conflict in 
the story and Donald gets along with those older than himself, particularly 
his uncle Hector. Moreover, none of the challenges Donald faces relate to the 
war. Instead, they are rooted in traditional points of middlebrow interest: 
romance. 
Beaumont Cornell’s realist novel, Lantern Marsh (1923), about a young 
historian in Toronto, is another novel that explored generational division and 
its roots in the war. In Cornell’s book, those men older than the war 
generation simply do not understand the conflict. In a key passage two 
university students ridicule a new history of the war by an older, established 
member of the department: “He’s got the whole war so definitely sized up 
that you don’t feel any surprise at anything that happened.” The historian 
tries to make the war feel “as natural as taking your coffee into the drawing 
room after dinner.”  
You feel that the strategic movements in the battles cost nobody 
a moment’s thought. The soldiers just emerge from the west 
salient and the east flank like so many automatic chess-pieces 
headed for their preordained positions. There’s no smoke or 
explosions or blood in his battles at all. Just 3,000 casualties, 500 
prisoners, and a dent in the Allied line or the German line.103 
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Cornell was critical of more than the official histories of the Great War. It was 
generational. For the war generation, the conflict did not need to be explained. 
It was felt.  
The importance of getting the feeling of the war right may explain why 
so few members of the war generation wrote novels about the conflict. 
Regardless of the reason, however, there was no boom in Canadian war 
fiction and this fact was noticed. In 1933, the historian and veteran Wilfrid 
Kerr was bothered by the absence of his generation’s writing about the war, a 
fact he lamented because the Canadian Corps had a particularly “high 
standard of literacy and intelligence.”104 Four years later Frederick Noyes, 
another veteran and author of a battalion history, also remarked on how few 
novels his generation had produced. “Let us hope,” he wrote in 1937, “that 
before it is too late a Zola or a Hugo may appear and place the case for [our 
story] before the general public in a manner befitting the terribly tragic 
subject.”105 Such a book was never written. The literary silence is even more 
surprising given the publishing frenzy that accompanied the conflict. No full 
account by scholars of the number of Canadian war books exists. That said, at 
                                                                                                                                           
generals and kings. Little was heard of the common people; and even in telling of the armies 
we did not hear how many meals the soldier had, nor what he ate.” See Thomas Fisher Rare 
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least fifty novels set during the war were published between 1914 and 1939.106 
Despite the desire for a postwar canon, however, critics fail to acknowledge 
how few of these books were written by the war generation. Indeed, when 
compared to the output in Britain, Canada’s output was meager. According 
to Stephen Cullen, British ex-combatants published 146 novels between 1919 
and 1939.107 During the same period fewer than ten were produced in 
Canada,108 a discrepancy that cannot be explained by relative differences in 
population size.109  
This low literary output in Canada should give historians pause, 
especially when judging the historical representativeness of these texts. 
Nonetheless, many of the books by the war generation are dismissed for 
being unrepresentative, often in favour of works by older, more established 
authors; this despite the fact that younger authors published more war books 
than older authors (see Figures 2 and 3).  
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Figure 2. Visual representation of data in Appendix II 
 
 
Figure 3. Visual representation of data in Appendix II 
Critiques of Generals Die in Bed are a case in point. The book is 
dismissed as an inaccurate gauge of Canadians’ view of the war, despite the 
fact that Harrison was one of the war generation. Neta Gordon, for instance, 
argues that the book did not appeal to interwar Canadians.110 Jeff Keshen is 
similarly dismissive. Canadians, he argues, disliked Harrison’s portrayal of 
the “dehumanizing nature of war” and instead continued to believe the 
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conflict had been fought for “noble causes … and that the stupendous 
performance in combat had created a new, strong, and internationally 
respected nation.”111 Tim Cook also concludes that disillusioned writing “did 
not resonate with most readers.” Harrison’s book may have been the “most 
aggressive” of Canada’s war writing, but it was also “vigorously attacked” 
for being “unrepresentative.”112  
Jonathan Vance makes the strongest case for dismissing Harrison’s 
novel. He cites its critical reception in the press, parliament, and amongst 
military commanders as evidence for its widespread rejection. According to 
Vance, the book left Generals Arthur Currie and Archibald Macdonell 
fuming. Currie considered it “a mass of filth, lies and appeals to everything 
base and mean and nasty.” The former commander of the Canadian Corps 
continued his tirade, telling Macdonell that Harrison’s book “is full of vile 
and misrepresentation, and cannot have any lasting influence.” Macdonell 
agreed. He consoled Currie, telling him that he wanted nothing more than “to 
live long enough to have the opportunity of shoving my fist into that s— of a 
b— Harrison's tummy until his guts hang out of his mouth!!!”113 Critics, 
according to Vance, were equally offended. Saturday Night’s Nathaniel 
Benson believed that “fully half the incidents described in the book never 
occurred.”114 It was “a book of very dubious literary merit” and made “very 
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ugly reading indeed.”115 The Ottawa Citizen also ran stories criticizing what it 
interpreted as slandering of Canadians and the federal MP Tommy Church 
called for its ban in parliament.  
Aside from not critically examining the nationalist response to a 
critical description of the war and the military, historians such as Vance, 
Keshen, and Cook have only told part of the story. A closer look at reaction to 
the book reveals a more complicated picture. It is not surprising that 
Canadian officers (and generals in particular) reacted so negatively to the 
critical portrayal.116 The reaction of enlisted men, however, was more positive 
and many reviewers were also generous in their praise. Far from dismissing 
the book as slanderous, they were grateful that somebody was finally 
describing the war in a way that resonated with the experiences of those who 
actually fought it in the trenches.  
The book was intended to be controversial. But historians have 
ignored how this controversy was largely the product of a skillful advertising 
campaign by Harrison’s publisher. During the novel’s British and North 
American tours, this publicity campaign fuelled critical fires by distributing 
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sensational extracts from the book. These excerpts were presented out of 
context and highlighted only the most controversial parts of the novel. While 
this material undoubtedly drummed up publicity and headlines, it obscured 
the larger narrative and message.117  
Once past the initial controversy, reviewers gained more appreciation 
for the novel.118 The Montreal Gazette lamented that many recent war books 
were so negative, but its reviewer noted that veterans, like Harrison, had 
every right to produce their own accounts, even if they caused “annoyance in 
high quarters.” In stark contrast to early reviews, the Gazette praised 
Harrison’s style for its “compelling narrative,” and admitted that the book 
spoke to “the feelings of a private in the various trials of war.”119 The Ottawa 
Citizen was even more praiseworthy. Its review claimed that talk of banning 
the novel was “simply childish.” The book was a “realistic and outspoken 
story of one man’s experiences and reactions to the war.” It was a modernist 
novel, written in the “prevailing fashion” which emphasized the “brutality, 
stupidity, dirt and degradation of war.” The resulting picture was “revolting.” 
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But this was Harrison’s intent. Efforts “to uphold war and object to its literal 
description,” the paper argued, were “a species of hypocrisy.120 
There was no appeasing some critics, usually because they disliked the 
new modernist style or disagreed with assaults on the romanticized versions 
of the war. Nathaniel Benson was one of Harrison’s most vociferous 
detractors. He hated anything that smacked of modernism. Not long after 
panning the book, Benson told reviewer Bill Deacon that he was deeply 
skeptical of literary modernism. “What do [these works] bring to us,” he 
asked. “Just a little less cheer than the gloomy horrors of Dostoievski. I think 
that the world is a bit sick of the modern debunking intellectual and his poor 
creations. What we really need is some force or movement to restore our old 
belief in things heroic and perhaps incredible.”121  
Many veterans felt differently. They did not object to Harrison’s style 
or its message. On the contrary, they embraced it and the author received 
“many letters from Canadian veterans who expressed pleasure at the 
publication of the book.”122 James Lott was ecstatic about the novel. He had 
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served with the 14th Battalion—as did Harrison—and wrote the author to tell 
him that his book brought back “the old days, names, and places.” Lott was 
especially keen to relive moments of his old unit and he pointed out that it 
was the “first time I have had an opportunity of reading anything about the 
14th R.M.R!” He certainly had his own personal reasons to begrudge Harrison. 
As Lott reminded him, Harrison had put a pick through Lott’s hand when 
they both served on a working party during the war.123 Laban Hill also served 
in the 14th Battalion and he was even more laudatory of Harrison’s novel, 
which he considered “wonderful.” Hill was not an avid reader but picked up 
the book because of its title. “At once,” he wrote Harrison, he “became 
interested.” The veteran was impressed with Harrison’s realistic portrayal of 
the war and thankful that somebody had finally written a war story who 
“knows what he is writing about.” In Hill’s opinion, most war books and war 
films were a “joke,” which anyone who saw “active service in France” 
realized. Harrison’s book, by contrast, was “vivid and real.”124 Reviewers and 
ex-combatants gave Harrison’s book a warmer reception than previously 
acknowledged.  
Disillusioned war writers in Canada were joined by intellectuals in 
criticizing the war. Yet Canadian historians deem their voices as 
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unrepresentative. Critics such as Frank Underhill and F.R. Scott were highly 
skeptical of the war’s value. But for every Underhill, it is argued, there were 
“countless Canadians who aired conflicting views.”125 The case of F.R. Scott 
and his father, Canon F.G. Scott, is particularly illustrative of this sentiment in 
Canada and the importance of age in shaping understanding of the war. 
Frederick George Scott was a leading Confederation-era poet, who later 
served as archdeacon of Quebec. His son, Frank, was also a poet, as well as a 
constitutional and political scholar. During the 1920s, the two generations of 
this family represented very different understandings of the war.126 F.R. Scott 
was critical and therefore has been dismissed by historians. Canon’s Scott’s 
work, on the other hand, remains “one of the most cited war testimonies 
among Canadian scholars of the Great War.”127  
The elder Scott was a contemporary of Ralph Connor and his war 
memoir, The Great War As I Saw It, typified how many of his generation 
wanted the war remembered: as a tragic but heroic struggle. Scott witnessed 
many of the war’s worst horrors. Yet even the loss of a son did not alter his 
overall perspective: “Nothing overseas … prompted [Scott] to question the 
settled conviction that the war had been a crusade that offered Canadians a 
providential opportunity to realize a higher level of national 
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righteousness.”128 The younger Scott did not serve in the war but his views 
reflected his generation’s sense of disillusioned skepticism. His criticisms 
were based on a reading of modernism that led him to reconsider the war’s 
effect on his generation, their ideas about masculinity, and a sense of 
hopelessness with the state of the postwar world. This morass seeped into 
Frank Scott’s re-evaluation of postwar literature, religion, nationalism, and 
science. By Armistice Day in 1926, he summed up the effects of his changing 
worldview, revealing in his diary that his beliefs were now “all topsy-
turvy.”129 
When the war first broke out, Frank tried to enlist five times before a 
fireworks accident nearly blinded him. At the time he held similar views 
about the conflict to his father and he was frustrated by his inability to serve. 
In 1919 he confided in his diary that he would have given “10 years of my life 
to have been able to get to the front.”130 A trip to the Western Front, in 1922, to 
visit his brother’s grave changed his mind: “Scott lost much of his enthusiasm 
for war” and he wrote in his diary that he would spend his life “fighting 
those things that make war possible.”131 Frank learned that his brother was 
suffering a nervous breakdown before he was killed. This revelation 
coincided with increased questioning of the “causes and conduct” of the war 
                                                 
128 Duff Crerar, Padres in No Man’s Land, 213.  
129 Sandra Djwa, The Politics of Imagination: A Life of F.R. Scott (Toronto: Douglas & 
McIntyre, 1989), 112. 
130 F.R. Scott, cited in Djwa, The Politics of Imagination, 42. 
131 Sherrill Grace, “Canadian Poets on War,” in Sherrill Grace, Patrick Imbert, Tiffan 
Johnstone, eds., Bearing Witness: Perspectives on War and Peace from the Arts and Humanities 
(Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012), 45. 
111 
 
 
 
and how it was framed in its aftermath.132 Scott read widely about the conflict, 
steeping himself in the war literature emerging out of Britain and the United 
States. By the end of the 1920s, the younger Scott developed a decidedly 
different understanding of the war than his father.  
The works of Robert Graves and Erich Maria Remarque, both leading 
voices of disillusionment, had a profound impact on Frank Scott.133 He found 
them more relevant than traditional interpretations articulated by poets such 
as Rupert Brooke, who was killed in 1915. As a pre-war poet, Brooke may 
well have “typified the willing self-sacrifice of youth on the altar of 
patriotism,” but he died before the end of the war. Those who had seen the 
conflict to its conclusion, however, dismissed Brooke’s patriotic and romantic 
ideals as naïve. Scott concluded that society had learned its lesson from the 
war and that poets who had lived to the end saw its “truth.” Frank compared 
Brooke’s chivalric “galahadism” to the writing of Siegfried Sassoon and 
Wilfred Owen. Sassoon wrote of “martyred youth” and “manhood 
overthrown.” Owen described the war’s dead as “cattle” that had been 
slaughtered by the “monstrous anger of the guns.”134 In addition to 
illustrating the lasting impact this literature had on Scott’s understanding of 
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the Great War, such comparisons also demonstrate that Canada was by no 
means an island isolated from the currents of criticism emerging in the U.S. 
and Britain.135  
The realist writing of the war generation did not sit well with “average 
Canadians.” Indeed, it was not meant to. They found its modernism coarse 
and vulgar. While this may have been the case with modernist literature like 
Generals Die in Bed, it was not necessarily true of more middlebrow fiction, 
such as Lantern Marsh or I Shall Arise. Although these novels were more 
traditional in style, they also criticized romantic depictions of warfare. In 
terms of postwar representations, therefore, elite and middlebrow authors 
who counted themselves part of the war generation did not have radically 
different understandings of the conflict and they agreed that the war could 
not be treated as it was by Ralph Connor, Canon Scott, or other older and 
established authors. This position was more critical in message and tone than 
the work of many of Canada’s most popular authors.  
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Chapter 3 
The postwar disillusioning of Canada’s war generation 
 
“What we did for them never was enough. We cross-questioned them, 
we checked them narrowly as to their disabilities, as to what happened 
to their characters, ‘why don’t you get a job’ [they were asked]. How 
could he get a job when the poor fellow was mentally crippled as the 
result of living in a monstrous atmosphere and under conditions that 
did something to his spirit.”1  
- Greg Clark, interview with the CBC 
 
At the outbreak of the Great War, Canadian youth were optimistic about the 
future. Their fight would end war, put a stop to German tyranny, and save 
European civilization. As the war progressed they also became increasingly 
nationalistic in their desire for postwar change. Although naïve in retrospect, 
during the war’s darkest hours, such hopes helped the war generation find 
meaning in the conflict. Peacetime challenges, however, including economic 
hardship and international instability, undermined their certainty in the war’s 
purpose. The future these men fought for did not materialize, leaving many 
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angry and disillusioned with the direction of peacetime Canada. For these 
veterans, their disenchantment remained a personal affair, in part because it 
did not fit with how the war was commemorated in public.  
Few Canadians objected to the importance of remembering the 
nation’s sacrifices. The war generation knew first-hand what the conflict cost 
and, while uncomfortable discussing its personal experiences, it agreed with 
the public’s desire to commemorate the conflict.2 This commemorative 
impulse, combined with period literature and other “cultural products,” 
remains a popular way to study the war and its aftermath. In Canada, many 
of these sources focused on what the war achieved, not what was lost, and the 
resulting narratives explaining the conflict’s meaning argue that unlike 
Europe “disillusion was successfully marginalized.”3  
An idealized history of the Canadian Corps and its achievements in 
Europe helped buttress this public memory of the war. After 1918, most of the 
combatant nations began to compile official histories. Canada did so as well 
but the official historian failed to produce a volume until 1938. Several 
veterans, including Will Bird and the historian Wilfrid Kerr, hoped to fill the 
gap with detailed memoirs. Their initial efforts were stymied, however, 
because they were denied access to critical records until the official project 
was completed.4 American war stories faced no such hurdle. These flooded 
                                                 
2 Vance, Death So Noble, 213. 
3 Sheftall, Altered Memories, 2. 
4 See “Preface” to Bird, The Communication Trench, where Bird decries that the official 
records were “more closely guarded than the gold of the Mint.” Bird was not the only to 
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across the border throughout the 1920s, much to the concern of nationalists, 
such as George Drew, who worried Canadians would be unduly influenced 
by an Americanized version of the war.  
When a series of American articles belittled the British Empire’s war 
effort, Drew led the charge to correct the historical record. His article, “The 
Truth About the War,” which appeared in the Dominion Day issue of 
Maclean’s magazine, attacked American claims that the Empire had “shirked 
its duty.”5 By calling on documents held by the Historical Section of the 
Department of National Defence, Drew laid out a statistical defence of the 
British Empire’s achievements between 1914 and 1918.  “The Truth About the 
War” struck a chord and a series of additional articles soon followed, 
including profiles of Canadian Airmen. 
Drew’s writing preserved one version of the war’s history and, 
according to Jonathan Vance, any account that strayed from the accepted 
narrative was rejected as “a dangerous falsehood.”6 While this mythical 
history enshrined a particular memory of the conflict, the war generation was 
not bound by the myth’s limited scope. In addition to the conflict’s public 
memory, it judged the war’s history in light of personal experience. To these 
                                                                                                                                           
notice this. So did Wilfrid Kerr, as well as Bird’s own readers. See DUA, Bird Papers, Vol. 9, 
Scrapbook 5, Ed to Bird, 9 January 1934. As Jonathan Vance argues, the gap was filled by 
popular histories, including Unit Histories, pulp magazines, and other sources that adhered 
to the war myth. See Vance, Death So Noble, 163. 
5 George A. Drew, “The Truth About the War,” Maclean’s (1 July, 1928): 2. Later, 
Drew expanded his argument by focusing specifically on Canada’s contributions to the war 
effort.  The most successful of these articles were a series of profiles of Canadian airmen, 
which proved so popular that they were re-published as a book, Canada’s Fighting Airmen 
(1930). See too Vance, Death So Noble, 178. 
6 Vance, Death So Noble, 179, 187 
116 
 
 
 
men, the memory of the conflict was complex. It could be used to defend 
Canada’s military record but it was also cited as justification for strong 
critiques of the war and its aftermath. Such criticisms were rooted in the 
generation’s hopes for an improved postwar future and when this world 
failed to materialize young men began to question the meaning of the war.  
Record of this disillusionment is sparse. While few veterans were 
comfortable discussing their war experiences, it was rarer still to discuss the 
war’s impact. Even the most candid of memoirs, such Will Bird’s And We Go 
On, omitted life after coming home. Fred Bagnall’s Not Mentioned in 
Despatches, another candid account of the war experience, did offer some 
critiques of postwar life, but such discussion was limited to asides. In fact, 
Bagnall apologized to his readers each time his narrative veered towards 
postwar Canada: “I am trying to keep [this] from being a problem story,” he 
wrote.7 As a result of this collective silence, vocal critics of the war, including 
the historian Frank Underhill, have been dismissed as unrepresentative. But 
Underhill should not be pushed aside so easily. While his politics differed 
from Drew’s (the former was closely aligned with the CCF, the latter a 
Conservative) both men were equally critical of the Great War’s wider legacy, 
a similarity often overlooked when equating the war’s meaning with an 
idealized history of the Canadian Corps.8  
                                                 
7 Bagnall, Not Mentioned in Despatches, 132. 
8 See for example Sheftall, Altered Memories, 2, 88. See too Vance, Death So Noble, 6. 
Both Drew and Underhill veterans who were wounded during the conflict. Underhill was 
wounded twice in the leg. Drew suffered a serious wound to his forearm that required nearly 
two years recuperation, including bone grafts from his shin to repair missing sections of his 
left arm. See Drew’s CEF Service File, LAC, RG 150, Vol 2556.  
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Both Drew and Underhill were young educated elites when war broke 
out. Their understanding of its meaning was shared by other members of 
their generation, including Edward Binns, Will Bird, F.P. Day, Bill Deacon, 
and Robert Manion. During the 1920s and 1930s, these men began to question 
the meaning of the Great War. Some doubted the legitimacy of public 
commemoration, while others reflected on why they reconsidered the 
conflict’s purpose. Their positions contrasted with those of older Canadians, 
such as William Creighton, father of historian Donald Creighton and editor of 
the Christian Guardian, who “hated the physical facts of war,” but nonetheless 
maintained that its “great moral purpose … would redeem its crimes.”9 The 
                                                 
9 Peter Buitenhuis argued that while older men accepted that war was horrible, their 
generation reacted to the horrors of the front with renewed idealism rather than outright 
criticism. According to Donald Creighton, his father believed this so passionately that “the 
war … became a family affair” and “hope of a better post-war world dominated” their 
household both during and after the conflict. Donald Creighton “My Father and the United 
Church,” in Creighton, The Passionate Observer: Selected Writings (Toronto: McClelland and 
Stewart, 1980), 97. I would be remiss if I did not thank Donald Wright for sending me early 
chapters from his biography on Donald Creighton to help better understand Creighton’s 
relationship with his father. Creighton’s essay was originally intended for the United 
Church’s Observer, but was not published until its inclusion in The Passionate Observer. See too 
Buitenhuis, The Great War of Words, 153.  
L.M. Montgomery, often so perceptive of the nuances of the Canadian character, was 
another who had difficulty critiquing the war, in part because she professed to be unable to 
make sense of the conflict. After asking what would come of its end, decided she could 
“never know.” But she hoped, maybe the next generation could. See Mary Rubio and 
Elizabeth Waterston, eds., The Selected Journals of L.M. Montgomery, Vol. II: 1910-1921 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 274. Similarly, those who were too young for the 
war understood that they were different. As a boy, Harry Boyle reminisced that he 
recognized little in the “quiet men” who had come back from the war. “Something happened 
during the Great War,” he recalled, which made them different and those who had returned 
forever remained a “mystery.” Harry J. Boyle, With a Pinch of Sin: Fond Recollection of a Rural 
Background Some Forty Years Ago (New York: Doubleday, 1966), 82. British writer and critic 
George Orwell made a similar observation: “As the war fell back into the past, my particular 
generation, those who had been ‘just too young’, became conscious of the vastness of the 
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war generation never accepted this position. Together, these men produced a 
disparate body of work that included articles, books, and unpublished 
writing. It does not form a canon, but it represents some of the only instances 
in which the war generation discussed why it re-interpreted the war’s 
meaning, particularly in light of the conflict’s aftermath. This writing 
demonstrates that not only did the war remain a matter of great personal 
concern, but that its meaning was also continually re-evaluated in response to 
the postwar present.  
After the success of his early articles in Maclean’s, Drew branched out 
in his writing beyond the British Empire’s war record. These later pieces 
examined the contemporary world and offered a much wider interpretation 
of the war’s impact than his articles about Canadians overseas. Drew was 
worried that the Great Depression and the rise of totalitarianism were 
destabilizing the fragile international order. One piece from 1932, “Salesman 
of Death,” about the League of Nations disarmament conferences in Geneva, 
was particularly critical of war and the risks re-armament posed for 
international security. It tapped into concerns about the West’s economic and 
diplomatic stability during the late 1920s and early 1930s. If European leaders 
did not stop the apparent slide towards another conflict, Drew warned, then 
world’s youth risked being killed in “meaningless slaughter.” Leaders had a 
clear choice. They could reduce arms and enter in a “wave of prosperity,” 
                                                                                                                                           
experience they had missed. You felt yourself a little less than a man, because you had 
missed it.” See George Orwell, “My Country Right or Left,” in Sonia Orwell and Ian Angust, 
eds., The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell, Vol. 1 (London: Harcourt, 
Brace & World, 1968), 538. 
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followed by swift “economic rejuvenation,” or they would face the “ghastly 
spectre of a war of machines and chemicals which would carry death and 
destruction to the civilian populations even more than to the soldiers in the 
field.”10  
Drew’s description of modern warfare was damning, particularly 
when contrasted with his defense of the Canadian and British actions during 
the Great War. These historical arguments did not portray the conflict as a 
‘meaningless slaughter’, yet that is exactly how he described warfare in the 
1930s. Another article, “The Truth About War Debts,” expanded this critique 
of modern warfare describing the Great War as “fruitless.”11 Despite this 
apparent contradiction, Drew based his conclusions on his reading of the 
war’s history. Any “study of the last war,” he wrote, clearly indicated that 
militarism was “largely to blame” for the July Crisis of 1914. Avoiding 
another arms race would reduce the risk of another conflict.12 Drew did not 
know if the disarmament conference would succeed. Nonetheless, he hoped 
that the talks in Geneva would prove at least a “substantial beginning” on the 
road to peace. If not, Drew feared that Canada would be engulfed in another 
slaughter.13  
                                                 
10 Drew, “Salesmen of Death,” Maclean’s (1 August 1931): 3.  
11 Drew, “The Truth About War Debts,” Maclean’s (15 April 1931), 82. 
12 Drew, “Salesmen of Death,” 34.  
13 Drew, “Salesmen of Death,” 3. Drew’s critique of war in this issue of Maclean’s (as 
well as his April article, “The Truth About War Debts), is further noteworthy for criticism of 
Canadian Defence Quarterly, the military’s scholarly review, which argued for the need to 
prepare for another war.  
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Given their political differences, Drew’s characterization of the war 
was remarkably similar to one of the conflict’s harshest critics, Frank 
Underhill. During the interwar years, Underhill was known as a strong 
supporter of isolationism, but his position was different in 1914. When war 
broke out, he supported it wholeheartedly and, in 1915, he enlisted with the 
CEF before transferring to a British unit as a machine gun officer. Underhill 
was wounded twice and, at war’s end, was hired by the University of Alberta 
as part of the Khaki University (the education system organized by the 
military to help convalescent soldiers continue their education). According to 
his biographer, Underhill had “mixed feelings” about discussing the war, 
though this did not stop him from contributing a Canadian section to Charles 
Lucas’ multi-volume history The Empire at War (1923). Underhill’s “Canadian 
Forces in the War” was a dry study about the country’s military overseas.14 It 
praised Canada’s achievements, while downplaying its failures.15 Underhill 
applauded the Canadian Corps for its “striking force,” “resourcefulness,” the 
“energetic spirit” of its soldiers, and its “business-like” staff who planned the 
Corps’ assaults.16 This history of the CEF overseas also reflected a nascent 
version of the colony-to-nation thesis. The “Canadian Corp,” Underhill wrote, 
                                                 
14 Underhill later described his work as “dull.” See Francis, Frank H. Underhill, 49. 
15 In a chapter on the Second Division’s failed attack on the St. Eloi craters, he 
declared reassuringly that the Canadians might have been “beaten,” but “certainly not 
disgraced.” Frank Underhill, “The Canadian Forces in the War,” in Charles Lucas ed., The 
Empire at War, Vol II (London: Oxford University Press, 1923), 114. 
16 Underhill, “The Canadian Forces in the War,” 130. 
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was “the greatest national achievement of the Canadian people,” which stood 
as “real testimony to Canada’s entrance into nationhood.”17 
Over the following decades, however, Underhill’s view changed. He 
reversed his opinion of the value of the war, a transformation he believed 
common to his generation. “We did not really achieve maturity in the years 
1914-1918,” he argued, “though that is what we used to claim for ourselves in 
the 1920’s.”18 The reason for his reversal was a complex and deeply rooted 
disappointment in the postwar world. The conflict, he concluded, 
undermined nineteenth-century notions of progress. With the war’s end, the 
“old sense of established values” disappeared. By the 1930s, the Depression 
“completed the work of destruction that the war had begun.”19 Underhill 
admitted that the war was a “leap forward” for Canada but argued that such 
successes were outweighed by the failures at home.  
By the end of the 1930s, Underhill rejected any thought of Canada 
joining another European war. He was upset at the failure of the League of 
Nations and skeptical of the justifications for another conflict, no matter the 
rhetoric of peace, freedom, or democracy.20 “All that we can help to assure by 
such action is the burying of 60,000 more Canadians somewhere across the 
ocean.” His skepticism was grounded in this history of war and postwar 
failures. “Our experience during and since the last war,” Underhill argued, 
                                                 
17 Underhill, “The Canadian Forces in the War,” 286.  
18 Frank Underhill, “The Aftermath,” Flanders’ Fields, 14. 
19. Underhill, “The Aftermath,” 15. 
20. Francis, Frank H. Underhill, 107. 
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“should have made us skeptical about such claims. And we should be 
especially suspicious of all those elderly statesmen and publicists who so 
nobly dedicated one generation of Canadian youth to these high causes of 
1914, and who can now think of no more fitting way of sanctifying that 
sacrifice than to dedicate another generation to a similar sacrifice.”21 
Frank Underhill’s support for isolationism was informed by a sense 
that Canada failed to make its wartime sacrifices worthwhile. While victories 
at Vimy Ridge, Hill 70, and the gains during the Last Hundred Days helped 
secure Canada’s place as an international player, the country’s actions in the 
1920s and 1930s forced him to question if Canada was capable of acting as an 
independent country. He was not optimistic and believed the country was too 
tied to Britain (a connection he called an emotional complex) to act 
independently. This was a pessimistic reading of what the country had 
achieved since 1918. If Canada had fought for a seat at the international table, 
if that is why it had sacrificed so heavily, why was it unable to wield its 
independence? In Underhill’s opinion, it might have been possible for prewar 
politicians such as Robert Borden to believe that the war was worthwhile, 
provided it resulted in an equal partnership between Britain and Canada. 
But, Underhill was not convinced that Canadians had actually achieved that 
goal. Instead, he believed Canadians were merely “flattering” themselves 
about membership in the Commonwealth. If it came to war again, Canada 
                                                 
21. Underhill, “Keep Canada out of War,” in In Search of Canadian Liberalism (Toronto: 
Macmillan, 1960), 184. 
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would never have any “real” control of the British Foreign Office.22 Without 
such control, Underhill could not say that the war was worth it.  
Like many of his generation, Frank Underhill remained proud of the 
achievements of the Canadian Corps. He remained troubled, however, that 
these sacrifices were being squandered. He summed up his position in 1941 
by describing what he considered to be the contradictory nature of Canada’s 
wartime and postwar history. It was defined by a “strange dualism” between 
a capable—even “brilliant”—ability to handle the concrete tasks of waging 
war and a “persistent political incapacity” to address the challenges of 
governing during peace. Underhill lamented that the initiative Canadians 
displayed during the war was not carried into the postwar era: 
What became of all those young Canadian soldiers who showed 
such indomitable courage, such individual initiative, such 
capacity for discipline and organization; what became of all 
those young captains and lieutenants and sergeants who led 
their men across no man’s land, who cleared out trenches and 
captured pill-boxes; what became of them all in the post-war 
Canada to which they returned? How was it that their splendid 
qualities seemed to have no purpose but to be dissipated in the 
sorry futilities of the 1920’s and 1930’s?23 
Peace, more so than war, proved a disillusioning experience.  
                                                 
22. Frank Underhill, “The Outline of a National Foreign Policy,” in Violet Anderson, 
ed., World Currents and Canada’s Course: Lectures Given at the Canadian Institute on Economics 
and Politics, August 7th to 20th, 1937 (Toronto: Nelson, 1937), 133-138. 
23. Frank Underhill, “Canada and the Last War,” in Chester Martin, ed., Canada in 
War and Peace: Eight Studies in National Trends Since 1914 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 
1941), 148.  
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Neither Underhill nor Drew discussed the extent to which their 
disenchantment was personal. Such disclosure was particularly rare among 
veterans. One man who bucked this trend, however, was Will Bird. During a 
career that spanned fifty years, he published a plethora of memoirs, novels, 
and articles about the conflict. Many were serialized in newspapers and 
magazines in Britain and the United States. By the 1970s, Bird had published 
six books on the war. But it was in the 1930s that he published his most 
reflective work, including a series of articles that explored veterans’ 
psychological disenchantment in the postwar era.24  
William Richard Bird was born 11 May 1891 at East Mapleton, 
Cumberland County, Nova Scotia. In 1904, the family moved to Amherst. Six 
years later, Bird headed west on a harvest excursion to Alberta. In 1915, he 
moved to Saskatchewan. After the war broke out, he tried several times to 
enlist, but was turned down. Only later did Bird learn that his brother, Steve, 
who had enlisted before him, had asked recruiters to keep him in Canada. By 
1916, Bird finally secured his enlistment and served the majority of the war 
with the 42nd Battalion, CEF. He witnessed some of the Canadian Corps’ 
worst fighting, including its engagements at Passchendaele and the Last 
Hundred Days. In 1918, during the final days of the war, Bird was awarded 
the Military Medal for his service at Mons.  
                                                 
24. These were Private Timothy Fergus Clancy, And We Go On, The Communication 
Trench, Thirteen Years After, The Shy Yorkshireman, and Ghosts Have Warm Hands. Bird’s articles 
appeared in, among others, Canadian Defence Quarterly, The Canadian Veteran, Canadian War 
Stories, Collier’s, The Legionary, Maclean’s, The Maritime Advocate and Busy East, Reveille, 
Whirligig, and The Ypres Times. He also wrote for multiple newspapers, especially those based 
in Nova Scotia, though his work appeared in national publications, including the Toronto 
Star, as well.  
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After the war, Bird returned to Nova Scotia where he worked as a 
writer, historian, and novelist. All told, Bird sold five hundred and fifty two 
short stories and won numerous awards, including the Ryerson Press All-
Canada Fiction Award, which he was awarded twice. He served two terms as 
the president of the Canadian Authors Association, the first from the 
Maritimes. During the 1930s, when he produced the most war-related work, 
Bird was hired by Maclean’s to tour the battlefields and write a retrospective 
that tapped into the increasingly popular trend of battlefield tourism. The 
contract resulted in seventeen articles, which were later collected into a book, 
Thirteen Years After. Bird parlayed his travels into a successful lecture circuit 
and delivered over a hundred lectures across the country.25  
It was the war that turned Bird into a writer.26 While overseas, he was 
involved in a gas attack, during which he gave his mask to a young soldier in 
his unit. As a result, Bird inhaled gas and, two years after the war ended, he 
began experiencing symptoms of gas poisoning. His right arm was painfully 
swollen and needed to be treated by sitting with the arm in a solution for a 
week.27 Unable to do anything else, Bird read widely. He came upon a writing 
                                                 
25. Dalhousie University Archives [hereafter DUA], MS-2-367 [hereafter Bird papers], 
Scrapbooks, Biographical note, n.d., typed on Bird’s stationary. Bird uses the same figures 
(552) in a letter to Miss May Martyn, 2 April 1969. See Bird papers, Vol. 1, folder 1. N.B. 
McKay and Bates also cite this letter, but note it in Bird’s Scrapbooks. 
26. He elaborated on the chance that set him on his career in 1973, telling Rev. A.E. 
Kewley that if it were not for that gas attack “I would never have written about the war or 
those who I came to know so well.” See Bird papers, Vol. 1, folder 3, Bird to Kewley, 4 May 
1973.  
27. Bird’s ailment is another example the lack of documentation of the war’s physical 
toll. His service record does not list any mention of this experience and notes that the only 
time he spent in hospital during the war was for a case of mumps. He deals with this 
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contest for the best fish story in the Halifax Sunday Leader. As he recounted 
later, the outcome of the contest proved a surprise: “it was spring and trout 
fishing was about to start. I had never written anything or thought of writing 
but I scribbled out a story and to my utter amazement won the prize.” Bird 
was soon on staff with the paper writing children’s adventure stories. What 
started as a whim turned into a viable career that produced over twenty-five 
books.28 While he may not have been a trained writer, Bird mastered his craft 
and by the end of the 1920s, he was writing short stories, articles, humour 
pieces, and a memoir. The latter, And We Go On, was published in 1930. Its 
descriptions of the war’s psychological impact, the realities of the battlefield, 
and the trials faced by common soldiers were based on Bird’s diary. 
Bird’s work was praised widely during his lifetime.29 As with so many 
of Canada’s interwar authors, however, he is now largely forgotten. Yet, 
among Canada’s historians he is used as the voice of the country’s war 
generation. Jonathan Vance cites Bird widely in his work, describing him as 
                                                                                                                                           
experience and the gas attack in his memoirs. With regards to the mumps, he notes: “I was 
just sixteen days at St. Pol, then coolly walked away from the place and got on board a train. 
… I never had seen a doctor again.” See And We Go On, 68.The gas attack and Bird’s gassing 
are not recorded on his record and he was demobilized with “no disability” in 1919. See 
Bird’s medical examination form in his service file, LAC, RG 150, vol. 748. 
28. DUA, Bird papers, Vol. 1, folder 1, Bird to Martyn, 2 April 1969.  
29. After Bird’s tenure as president of the Canadian Authors Association Bill Deacon 
wrote to Bird telling him that he considered him “the greatest president we have ever had.” 
DUA, Bird papers, Scrapbook 18, Deacon to Bird, 3 October 1948. Hugh MacLennan was 
equally praiseworthy of Bird’s accomplishments and skill as a writer; so too was Watson 
Kirkconnell. See DUA, Bird papers, Bird Scrapbooks, MacLennan to Bird, 13 July 1949 and 
Kirkconnell to Bird, 5 July 1956. 
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the “quintessential articulator of Canada’s war.”30 Ian McKay and Robin 
Bates, despite holding contrasting views of the war to Vance, are similarly 
praiseworthy of Bird, calling him “Mr Great War.”31 Norm Christie, whose 
publishing company CEF Books republished several of Bird’s works, 
describes Bird as “a one man remembrance program.”32  
The praise for Bird’s work is testament to the insight and nuance of his 
war writing. His body of work does not shy away from describing men’s 
complex reactions to warfare. Books such as And We Go On are filled with 
haunting observations and humorous asides. Bird’s short stories and poetry 
about the postwar years are equally revealing, making him one of the few 
postwar writers who wrote about the war while also considering its 
aftermath. This material is often overlooked in favour of Bird’s more lengthy 
and self-reflective memoirs, despite the fact that returned men were 
captivated by Bird’s writing about the postwar era and his short stories more 
generally.33 This material did not shy away from addressing the 
disappointments of peacetime or the disillusioning of Canada’s war 
generation.  
                                                 
30. Vance, Death So Noble, 196. Bird plays a critical part in both this text and Vance’s 
article on war books, “The Soldiers As Novelist.” 
31. Ian McKay and Robin Bates, In the Province of History, 133. 
32. Norm Christie, “Introduction,” Will R. Bird, Private Timothy Fergus Clancy (CEF 
Books: Ottawa, 2005), n.p. 
33. Both 1930’s And We Go On and the more accessible Ghosts Have Warm Hands, 
which was republished in 1968. For the widespread popularity of all of his war writing see 
Bird’s scrapbooks at DUA, which contain pages upon pages of pasted letters from veterans 
discussing and responding to his war writing.  
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Bird wrote several poems and short stories that examined the postwar 
era, particularly about veterans and their memories of the war. Most of these 
are not examples of critical commentary, but their use of postwar 
disenchantment as a literary device illustrates how readily readers accepted 
the war generation’s disillusionment. One poem, “The Veteran’s Thoughts,” 
from Maclean’s in 1936, is an example of Bird’s concern for men’s private 
thoughts about the war and their disappointment in postwar Canada.34 In his 
memoir, And We Go On, Bird emphasizes the “psychic” effects of the conflict. 
This later piece uses a veteran’s thoughts on Remembrance Day to cover 
similar ground.  
The poem describes a man haunted by his war experience. He is 
unhappy and embittered that Canadians devoted only two minutes a year to 
commemoration and he rages at Canadian society, which he believed did not 
properly remember his or his comrades’ sacrifices. Like the author himself, 
Bird’s fictional veteran went to war as a young man, but he is now older, 
“tired, time-lined, and gray.” His memories of the war include disheartening 
descriptions of no man’s land, a “pock-marked ridge where Death was king.” 
Looking back, he concludes the war amounted to “a “devil’s game” in which 
he was merely a “human pawn.”  
The veteran in Bird’s piece does not see war as glorious. In place of 
skill, honour, or other prized qualities of men in battle, he believes they died 
futile deaths and that their names filled monuments because of a mere “freak 
                                                 
34. Bird, “The Veteran’s Thoughts,” Bird papers, Scrapbooks, n.d., signed Will R. 
Bird; same page as the continuation of the clipping for “What Price Vimy,” Maclean’s (1 April 
1936). 
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of Fate.” Such passages are reminders that veterans often held contradictory 
views on the war. According to the war myth, veterans rejected such 
pessimistic portrayals of the conflict. To them, the conflict was supposed to 
remain a defensible, even noble, endeavour in which Canadians continued to 
perform gallant acts. While veterans wanted the war remembered, Bird’s 
story challenged notions of glorious warfare and even contradicted an earlier 
assertion in his memoir that men were not dehumanized by the war.35 
Canadians had to do more than just remember the war, they had to do so 
correctly. As Bird’s critique demonstrates, in the aftermath of 1918, veterans 
were not above questioning the war’s meaning in light of its public 
commemoration. 
Disenchantment with Remembrance Day is a subject Bird returned to 
in other short stories, including “Jimmy Benton, War Vet, Views Militia 
Parade On An Armistice Day.” This piece also evokes the symbolism of 11 
November, again by describing a veteran’s disillusionment in postwar 
Canada. Originally published in the Saint John Evening Times, the piece 
chronicles the story of veteran James, ‘Jimmy’, Benton the day he dies. Benton 
attends the city’s Armistice Day, watching a militia company on parade. The 
sight of the young men marching before him brings back memories of his 
own time at war, but he is disappointed these new soldiers fail to live up to 
the standards set by he and his comrades. “They lost step, jostled, were out of 
lines; they crowed, elbowed,” and, he lamented, these young troops seemed 
to take “an endless time getting correct.” Angered, Benton can only look 
away in disgrace.  
                                                 
35 In And We Go On, he maintains that soldiers maintained a “strength of soul.” 5. 
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When eleven o’clock arrives, Jimmy is overcome by memories. 
“Burning” they flood back, “choking him, scalding him, shaking him.” He 
wishes his comrades could have witnessed the service too, to share his shock 
at how poorly the new militia compared to their example. Jimmy returns to 
the Legion hall “disgusted.” After settling into his chair, he is startled to meet 
“a stirring group” of fellow veterans. They decide to show the young militia 
how to march properly and together they head out on parade, with Jimmy 
proudly in the lead. Soon their old Colonel appears and Jimmy feels amazing, 
as though he could “march forever” and the music carries the whole unit off, 
“all in step.” Benton is finally happy. Unfortunately, however, Bird informs 
the reader that none of this had taken place. Jimmy died in his chair, his death 
and subsequent march reminiscent of Abel Gance’s film J’Accuse, in which the 
war dead arise and march on screen. By transporting Jimmy amongst his 
comrades as he dies, Bird contrasts the glory of the past with the perceived 
failures of the present. Postwar life, this piece suggests, was nothing like war 
and Jimmy is forced to suffer in silence, only finding solace in death, when he 
rejoins his wartime comrades.36  
Men like Bird may have been embittered by their “dashed hopes,” 
however, according to histories of the war myth, they never dared blame their 
disillusion on the war.37 As Bird’s own memoir makes clear, veterans 
remained proud of their war service. Yet, this does not mean that the war’s 
meaning was static, enshrined upon a mythical pedestal, never to be debated. 
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Rather, the critiques that men such as Bird, Underhill, and Drew produced in 
the conflict’s aftermath did not shy from challenging its commemorative 
symbols; symbols that they used to re-evaluate the meaning of the war.  
After the Armistice of 11 November 1918, the date became invested 
with special symbolism and was soon the accepted way to remember 
Canada’s sacrifices. For the war generation, critiquing the public 
manifestation of the conflict’s memory was an expression of its postwar 
disillusionment and changing understanding of the war’s meaning. Although 
rarely discussed in public, veterans, such as Edward Binns, were even more 
critical in private.  
Binns was a doctor from Welland, Ontario. During the war, he and his 
three brothers all served. They survived, except for Percy, who was killed by a 
shell near Arras in 1918.38 In the early 1930s, Binns wrote a poem re-assessing 
the war’s meaning that used Remembrance Day as a way to explain his 
shifting feelings about his brother’s death. The piece, simply titled 
“November Eleventh, Nineteen Thirty-Three,” was dedicated to Percy Binns, 
“my brother, Killed in Action, very shortly before the Armistice.”39 Its nine 
stanzas describe how Edward Binns began to reconsider the war and his 
beliefs about the meaning of his brother’s death.  
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39 TFRBL, Deacon papers, Vol. 2, File 33, Edward Binns, “November Eleventh, 
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The poem opens with Binns explaining how each Remembrance Day 
would bring on a wave of war memories about his brother’s death. By 1933, 
Edward decided he needed to address his feelings about the war. His solution 
was to subject his memories to a “frank appraisal.”40 As Binns explained in 
his poem, each 11 November he would ritually assume that Percy’s death was 
worthwhile. Faced with the “cruel master of black despair,” Binns admitted 
that he needed to “feel” his brother “had not died in vain.” Such thoughts 
helped him deal with his grief, but he admitted that the need to ‘feel’ 
meaning in his brother’s death did not last. Instead of comforting him, Binns 
found postwar life unsatisfying and, in spite of his brother’s sacrifice, nothing 
about the postwar era justified Percy’s loss. In response, Binns described that 
his understanding of the war began to shift. Instead of taking comfort in 
Percy’s death, he began to “hope” that he had not died in vain. In the end, 
this hope also fails. It no longer comforted Edward and he admitted that the 
passage of time undermined his family’s certainty in the war’s purpose.41  
Edward did not want to doubt the meaning of his brother’s death. But 
he had little choice. He realized that during the 1920s he engaged in a “sordid 
quest” to convince himself that Percy had died in a “war-to-end-war.” Yet, 
the war’s aftermath gave no reason to support his earlier view and he began 
to fear that his belief in the war’s meaning was misplaced. In time, he and his 
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family found themselves doubting their hopes, wondering: “Could it be, ye 
died in vain?”42  
The poem culminates in a damning realization that the war was a 
“monstrous Fraud.” At last, Edward concludes, “we know the bitter truth.” It 
was clear that Percy’s sacrifice had achieved nothing. More than a decade 
after war’s end, Binns concludes that Percy and his comrades were “futile 
heroes” who had indeed “died in vain.” In the final stanza, he summed up his 
sense of the futility of his brother’s death: 
Wherefore I hail you as the goodliest band  
Of myth-deluded Knights did ever deign 
To tilt at windmill or defy the wand 
 
Of warlock-ogre … All hail, who 
    died in vain!43 
These concluding lines are rich with metaphor and demonstrate that Binns 
rejected popular ideas of the war’s ‘goodness’ as well as its mythic status. The 
poem is a clear statement of post-war disillusion that evokes and parodies 
many of the postwar tropes used to assure Canadians that their wartime 
losses were not in vain. The Canadian Corps may well have been a ‘band of 
brothers’, but against the ‘warlock-ogre’ of modern industrial warfare, the 
cause proved futile.  
Binns never published his poem. But he did send it to his friend Bill 
Deacon, describing it as a “bitter little poem.” The two conversed for several 
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years. As Binns explained in his letter, his poem summed up his sentiments 
about the war’s legacy. “[I]t expresses what I feel,” he told Deacon, who 
thought the piece “very fine,” and he debated whether he should publish it.44 
The poem’s message motivated the two men. They recognized that it 
challenged notions of a good war because, unlike histories that only 
described the war itself, it judged the conflict in light of its aftermath. Binns 
figured his piece was likely to “disturb a few complacent people” and 
thought it “so much the better” if it aroused some “protest.” Deacon agreed 
wholeheartedly, telling him that “we need it now” and that he hoped it could 
be published “at once.” 
Binns and Deacon were critics of the war because they feared another 
was on the horizon. Deacon, in particular, was horrified at what he 
considered the looming prospect of another European conflict. The poem 
echoed Deacon’s concern. It bothered him that the world seemed to be 
lurching to war, which confirmed that the previous conflict had not been “to-
end-war.” What then was the point of the Great War? Binns and his brothers 
enlisted and did their part. Immediately after 1918, Edward was sure that his 
brother’s death—and by extension the entire war—stood for something 
important. A decade later, however, this was not the case. By 1933, he re-
assessed what the war and his brother’s death meant. The conflict had lost its 
purpose and the loss was no longer a sacrifice, but a waste. While Binns may 
have used 11 November as a forum to express his discontent, his poem was 
about more than just the failure to properly remember the war. It was a 
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private exploration of how his understanding of the conflict shifted in the 
1920s and 1930s.  
Although a poem about his personal re-consideration of the war’s 
meaning, Binn’s willingness to consider publishing the piece suggests that he 
was open to discussing his transformed views. Certainly Robert Manion 
(future leader of the federal Conservative Party) welcomed the chance to 
publicly discuss why he reconsidered the conflict. In 1936, Manion published 
his autobiography, Life is an Adventure, which completely revised his earlier 
writing on the war. Manion was another member of the war generation 
disillusioned by peacetime Canada and, like fellow Conservative George 
Drew, Manion was also a veteran. During the war, he served as a surgeon 
with the Canadian Army Medical Corps (CAMC) and was awarded the 
Military Cross for action at Vimy Ridge. When he returned home, Manion 
was elected as an MP for Borden’s Union Government in 1917. After Arthur 
Meighen replaced Borden as Prime Minister, Manion served briefly as 
Minister of the Department of Soldiers Civil Re-establishment. His wartime 
memoir, A Surgeon in Arms, was published in 1918.  
Manion’s first book sought to explain the conflict to those on the home 
front. It divided the war into different themes and categories, interspersed 
with personal anecdotes. Manion also described the war experience. His 
account of a gas attack, for example, was harrowing. “Never elsewhere had 
we experienced anything akin to it,” he wrote. “The inflamed eyes; the 
suffocation in our lungs; the knowledge that inhalation of sufficient gas 
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would put us into Kingdom Come.”45 He was also praiseworthy of Canada’s 
part overseas and his chapter “Over the Top,” lauded the spirit of the 
Canadian Corps. As the men waited for the moment of attack, Manion 
recounted how 
Something which struck me then, and which still impresses me 
as extraordinary in looking back at it, was the buoyant, cheerful, 
optimistic spirit in which our army of citizen-soldiers looked 
forward to the day when were to take part in one of the greatest 
battles in history. We knew it was to be a fearful and 
magnificent trial of strength out of which many of us would 
never return to the people and the lands we loved. And yet all 
awaited it with a gay, hopeful, undaunted optimism, asking 
naught but the opportunity, anticipating nothing but victory.46 
The bulk of A Surgeon in Arms echoed this passage’s optimistic tone. When he 
re-examined his war experience for his 1936 memoir, Life is an Adventure, 
however, he described a very different view of the war.  
 This later book covered similar ground to his earlier memoir but did so 
in hindsight. As a result, Manion admitted that the war failed to live up to its 
purpose, a failure that forced him to revisit his earlier position. He now 
believed that the war was futile. This reconsideration of the war’s meaning 
began with a rejection of the reasons for his enlistment. At the outbreak of 
war, Manion wanted to enlist, but his wife opposed it. He convinced her 
otherwise and joined up in 1915. Looking back at this decision, he conceded 
that he was irresponsible, especially leaving his wife with three young 
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children. “My wife was right in opposing my going,” he wrote, “for it is not 
fair to leave a wife and three boys, the oldest less than seven, and take a 
chance on not coming back.”47  
Manion railed at length against the stupidity of the war: 
What a brutal and barbarous custom it is, to send our loved 
ones to face the love ones of other people … to encourage them 
madly, insanely, to shoot or stab each other, or poison each 
other with horrible gasses, because of some silly dispute 
regarding a piece of land or trade policy! 
Surely, he continued, “we are a lot of madmen that we cannot settle our 
differences internationally as we settle them individually — in the courts!” 
Manion recognized that it was impolitic to take strong positions on the war. 
He wrote candidly, however, because he had seen the war’s horrors first 
hand and he feared for the future. The “mutilations and the killings, the 
brutality and the butchery of war in the trenches” needed to be remembered 
in their entirety because it seemed as though the world was “once more 
preparing for another slaughter of innocents!”48 
 Manion’s criticisms stopped at the men themselves. He knew the war 
experience remained an integral part of men’s lives and he was proud of his 
own service. As with so many returned men, living through the conflict left 
“a memory which surpasse[d]” all others. Manion was unwilling to criticize 
men’s actions in war, nor was he willing to besmirch the “undying 
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recollections” veterans had of friends killed overseas. 49 It was because of their 
memories, he explained, that veterans were so unhappy with the prospect of 
another conflict. They had had their share of “horrors” and “filth” already, 
and knew well that man’s “inhumanity to man” was never clearer than when 
nations sent their “sons to the mass slaughter of modern warfare.”50 
 The prospect of another war was too much. Manion and his comrades 
had gone to war believing it could still be a noble affair. Men’s stoicism and 
optimism on the Western Front impressed him. But nothing had come of it. 
Now, they knew better. In a lengthy denunciation written to dissuade anyone 
considering taking up arms in the future, Manion explained why he had 
come to reject the monstrous nature of total war: 
To-day war means the clashing of whole nations; it means the 
wholesale slaughter of men on both sides by high-powered 
explosives, or the wholesale poisoning of combatants by deadly 
gasses. The machine-gun, the long range gun, and other 
scientific and mechanistic instruments … have turned war into 
the most horrible type of slaughter, in which not only are huge 
armies necessary in the fighting zone, but in which as well (due 
to the aeroplane, the airship and the submarine and their ability 
to spread death far and near) civilian populations are visibly 
running the same risks as those on the immediate battle-front. 
… What an outlook for our so-called Christian civilization!”51 
Modern war was slaughter. It could achieve nothing but destruction. 
And so, Manion concluded his description with a sad lament that exemplified 
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why the failure to live up to wartime ideals left so many of his generation 
disenchanted with peace: 
When one looks about to-day at the chaotic condition that exists 
throughout Christendom, and the failure of our ideals of peace 
to be realized, one feels all the more pity that these boys of all 
nations should have been asked to give up their lives for a cause 
unrealized and apparently unrealizable.52 
Such disappointment with peacetime Canada was a common cause for 
disenchantment. Some men proved able to discuss their changing views of 
the conflict and its meaning in public. But others, including others writers—
such as Edward Binns or F.P. Day—never did so. Their experience reveals 
how the war continued to be re-conceptualized in private as the generation’s 
personal understanding of the conflict transformed after 1918. 
Frank Parker Day published several novels and short stories, most 
famously Rockbound in1928. But, with the exception of “The Iroquois” (1925), 
the veteran never published anything about the war, despite serving with the 
85th Battalion, the 185th Cape Breton Highlanders, and the 25th Battalion. His 
memoir of his youth, The Autobiography of a Fisherman (1927), was similarly 
vague about his war experience. It summed up his time overseas as “four 
years of restless worried life in which I had no time to think of fishing.”53 Not 
surprisingly, therefore, Day has been omitted from Canada’s war book canon. 
Yet, he did write about the war, though he made no effort to publish it.  
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Day was born in 1881, in Shubenacadie, Nova Scotia. He was a Rhodes 
Scholar and an impressive boxer, winning the heavyweight championship at 
Oxford. In 1912, he joined the English Department at Carnegie Mellon 
University in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. He returned to this position after the 
war and, in 1926, became the head of the English Department at Swarthmore 
College. Between 1928 and 1933, Day served as president of Union College. 
While at Oxford, Day joined a yeomanry regiment, the King’s Colonials. 
Three years later, he was made a Second Lieutenant and, when he returned 
home, he was promoted major in the 28th New Brunswick Dragoons, a prewar 
militia regiment. He served through much of the war in various units before 
taking command of the 25th Battalion during its assault on Amiens, in 1918. 
He led the battalion during some of its worst fighting, until early October 
1918 when he was hospitalized. He spent the remainder of the war in and out 
of convalescence recovering from surgery for a variety of bowel related 
issues.54  
In the years that followed, Day worked on a collection of poetry titled 
“War and Peace.” It was never published but it demonstrated the complex 
and contradictory responses of returned men to the war. The collection was 
likely intended to contain fourteen poems written between 1919 and 1936: 
“Old Alumnus,” “House-Painter Hitler,” “The Regular,” “War,” “The 
Civilian Soldier,” “Through the Sleeping Village,” “The Trench Cat,” 
“Pacifist,” “Think Well,” “The Soldier,” and “Peace.”55 The poems describe 
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aspects of military life, post-war commemoration, and re-evaluations of the 
conflict and ensuing peace.  At times, Day wrote positively about the war, 
particularly when it concerned the roles of individual Canadians assisting 
local inhabitants of war torn Europe. When it came to the war’s aftermath, 
however, he was highly critical of what the conflict achieved.  
Poems such as “Through the Sleeping Village” and “The Trench Cat” 
are generally positive. The latter offers fond memories of a small cat that is 
nursed back to health in the trenches. It highlights the very human and every 
day experiences of men seeking hope in a world of war. Day describes how 
the cat could have “scorned the war and all mankind” but instead found 
affection in the most unlikely of places. After giving birth, the cat becomes the 
battalion’s mascot, “stalking along the parapet.”56 The poem “War,” contains 
only twelve lines. It paints a vivid picture of the unglamorous, day-to-day life 
of the soldier. “Most of war is just humdrum,” Day wrote, including chores 
such as feeding men, providing water provisions, delousing, repairing 
bridges and roads, and emphasizing the importance of clean feet.57 The 
poems “Last Long Hill” and “Through the Sleeping Village” also offer 
positive recollections, again focusing on the daily grind of soldiering. Day 
sympathizes with soldiers’ “[w]eary marching feet and deep-lined faces.” 
Though their bodies may have failed, these men persevered “by nerves and 
will” and Day praised the Canadian Corps for its willingness to see beyond 
rank:  
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Worn men stagger to the ditches at the side,  
Mount them on the Colonel’s horse, let the sick men ride; 
Pile them on the limbers, on the doctor’s car, 
Canadians leave no stragglers, who have played their part.58  
Day was relatively old for the war generation and his writing was often 
sentimental, verging on the romantic. Parts of “War and Peace” conclude 
with portrayals of men lifting their heads high, “alight with hope.”59  What is 
surprising, however, is the inclusion of poems such as “The Civilian Soldier,” 
“Soldier,” and “Peace,” which challenge this sentimentality.  
Day’s most bitter poems focus on the peace. In “The Civilian Solider,” 
“The Soldier,” and “Peace,” he was especially critical of postwar life. “The 
Civilian Soldier” tells the story of a returned man. It is undated but portrays 
the psychological turmoil that veterans suffered. Day begins by describing a 
“bland and kind” veteran’s outward appearance: “He does not limp, he 
wears no medals / Old soldiers’ tales he seldom peddles.” Yet, despite 
appearing as an ordinary citizen, the poem emphasizes how veterans without 
obvious injuries lived in a private world of isolation and suffering: “You’d 
scarcely guess whats [sic] in his mind / Or how his memory backwards ran.”  
The poem recalls the horror of facing another human being in a trench, 
knowing that one would have to bayonet the other: 
In a trench I killed a man,  
Breathless gasping, in the dark, 
Left him there without a mark. 
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That was the worst, that was the worst, 
But for a slip, he’d had me first.60 
These otherwise shocking experiences were made normal by the war. They 
left “[s]ome peasant mother miss[ing] her son,” but this butchery “was how 
the war was won.”  Such blunt, even emotionless, discussions leave the 
reader with clear questions about the justification of such brutality. 
 “The Soldier” was written between 1933 and 1936 and references 
Arthur Currie’s death as well as the opening of the Vimy memorial in 1936. 
The veteran in the poem suffers in the uncertainties of the postwar world and 
ironically longs to return to the certainties of war. Unable to attend either 
Currie’s funeral or the opening of the Vimy memorial, the veteran loses his 
sense of belonging. Now alone and isolated, he practices old drills, 
surrounded only by his haunting memories.61  
In “Peace,” Day allowed his disillusionment to manifest fully. The 
poem opens by presenting an idealized version of peacetime Canada. The 
landscape “smiles,” the young country is full of hope and optimism. Later 
stanzas bring the reader back to reality. The dream ends and the reader faces 
a world bordering on nightmare. Instead of factories “full of work,” 
Canadians face an economy where the unemployed are left wandering “up 
and down the earth.” But the search will fail and nothing of value will be 
found. Those that find wealth and prosperity learn that their nightmare only 
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worsens because they have profited on the backs of those who continue to 
suffer. It is the greedy capitalists who have profited: 
Hardworking poverty paying through the nose 
While idlers live at their repose; 
Fat-jowled fellows with piglike eyes 
Full of treachery, full of stealthy lies; 
Grasping selfishness and stupid greed, 
Still are in the vanguard, still are in the lead. 
This is the postwar world; this is the world for which the veterans sacrificed. 
“War may kill your body,” Day mourns, “but peace your soul.” Despite his 
deep disillusionment, F.P. Day never expressed his disenchantment in public. 
Like so many veterans, he left discussion of the transformation of his personal 
understanding of the war’s meaning to others, including Will Bird, Robert 
Manion, and Bill Deacon. 62  
If Robert Manion, George Drew, Frank Underhill, and other prominent 
Canadians were critical of the war’s legacy, Bill Deacon went further still. In 
similar fashion to many of his generation, Deacon was an ardent Canadian 
nationalist. He differed from some, however, when it came to Canada’s place 
in the British Empire. Drew believed that Canada was best served by 
furthering its interests alongside Britain. Deacon could not have disagreed 
more. By the early 1930s he embraced isolationism and wanted the country to 
divorce itself from the Empire and to disavow engagement in foreign wars.  
Two events led Deacon to this conclusion: the fighting of the Great 
War and his strong belief that there would soon be another. He thought often 
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about the war and its consequences, and his beliefs changed in response to his 
deeply held conviction that the postwar era had failed to live up to 
expectations. Unlike Drew, however, Deacon blamed Canada’s failures on 
entanglements in European wars; events which Canada would never have 
become ensnared had it not been for its commitments to the Empire. “Our 
connection with the Empire has led us into two foreign wars, for causes and 
interests not our own,” he explained during a meeting of the Native Sons of 
Canada, before telling those who had gathered why he so despised the war: 
I look on the Boer War as a disgrace to Canada, and on the 
Great War as a futile tragedy. It is a terrible thing to say to those 
who have suffered, as some of you have; but we poured out our 
blood and our treasure in vain. 
 We did not end war with our victory; we did not 
preserve democracy, since most countries are now under 
dictatorships. What was accomplished? NOTHING. I mean 
nothing good. The fruits were wholesale slaughter, debts that 
crush nations under taxation, the debauchery of women and 
many other things we should like to forget.63 
The Empire had done nothing to serve Canada’s interests. Any further 
participation in it risked the possibility of becoming embroiled in yet another 
European conflict. 
During the first half of the 1920s, however, Deacon was not nearly as 
bitter about the war. He still blamed Canada’s involvement on Britain but he 
was noticeably less critical of the conflict compared to his later views. “Do 
you know why Canada entered the war?” he asked his friend Laura 
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Davidson: “Out of impuls[e] to England.” Other causes included “Liberty” as 
well as a series of “inner economic factors.” By 1918 it did not matter why the 
country had gone to war. The only thing that mattered was the conflict’s 
human costs, which for Deacon, included both friends and family. The war 
was no longer about ideals and he freely admitted that he hated it: “I think 
we should all have been pacifists.”64 To some degree, however, Deacon 
remained sentimental. His sense that the war had been fought for something 
as “precious” as liberty stopped him from rejecting the conflict outright. “I 
cannot say it was wrong,” he concluded, but the war’s aftermath continued to 
weigh heavy regardless.65 By the time he published his nationalist call to 
action, My Vision of Canada (1933), his beliefs had changed.  
In the late 1920s, Deacon was certain there was going to be another 
European war and that it could break out soon. Although he proved wrong 
on the conflict’s timing, the fear of being drawn into another conflict pushed 
him further away from the Empire and strengthened his calls for Canadian 
isolationism. “War threatens Europe,” he wrote, and “Canada must stay out 
this time.” This flagrant rejection of war notwithstanding, Deacon was not a 
pacifist. Indeed, were Canada asked to help “prevent a war in Europe,” then 
he believed the country should risk “all in the attempt” to maintain peace. 
Joining in total war was a different matter, however. It amounted to “mass-
insanity and mass-murder.”66 Deacon would do almost anything to keep the 
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country out of such a conflict: “I have told my son that, if I am to die in the 
next war, it will be right here in Toronto, resisting war, where he can see me 
being a hero, and where my death may possibly do him some good.”67  
Although he came to believe the war had been futile, Canada’s soldiers 
remained a subject of considerable pride. “[M]an-for-man,” Deacon declared 
during a promotional talk for My Vision of Canada, “our soldiers in the Great 
War were rated the best fighters in Europe. I am proud of those men: but I am 
glad Canada is not one of those nations now disturbing the peace of the 
world by possession of heavy armaments.”68 Such praise for the Canadian 
Corps reflected his generation’s reluctance to criticize its achievements 
overseas. His support did not waiver but the achievements now lacked 
meaning. The sacrifices were wasted, especially if there was another war. As 
Deacon explained on the eve of the Second World War, the real possibility 
that men might again find themselves engulfed in European conflict was 
more than “terribly depressing,” it was further proof that “every idealistic 
impulse” in the world had “gone awry.”69  
Veterans such as Will Bird, F.P. Day, George Drew, Robert Manion, 
and Frank Underhill were all, to some extent, elites. So too were Bill Deacon 
and Edward Binns. These men had little in common, either in profession or 
politics, yet they were all disenchanted with the outcome of the Great War. 
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There was no single cause for this discontent. International instability was 
one factor. General disappointment with the direction of peacetime Canada 
was another. For the veterans, their changing postwar views were also linked 
to their war experience. The memories of that conflict continued to inform 
their understanding of the peace. While public commemorative ceremonies 
called on all Canadians to remember the war, these men and their postwar 
disenchantment lacked a similar unifying purpose, often because their views 
were a reaction to the present. Although a disparate record, these changed 
interpretations of the war’s meaning were no less valid a reaction to the 
challenges and failures endured in the war’s aftermath.  
149 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
Unemployment and the Problem of the Returned Man 
“[The unemployment problem] … is no occasion for faintheartedness 
but in the name of those who have fallen in the defence of the liberties 
of the country and in obligation to those who have returned from that 
struggle, the Canadian people have before them the task of presenting 
to the world, a nation morally and materially great, a monument 
worthy of the men living and dead who have made this possible.”1 
- Harold Innis, “The Returned Soldier”  
 
In 1919, Canada celebrated its “Victory Year.” The war was finally over. For 
those who came of age with the conflict, however, postwar life proved a poor 
reflection of the nationalist myths already being constructed. They may have 
won the war but now veterans struggled amidst a pessimistic and troubling 
reality: demobilization did not go smoothly and their resulting list of 
grievances was long and often contradictory. Dashed hopes soon led to 
frustration and even despair as postwar Canada endured widespread and 
prolonged unemployment. These setbacks fuelled a sense among veterans, 
including writers such as F.P. Day, that not enough was being done to 
recognize and address the problems they faced after coming home. 
                                                 
1 Innis, “The Returned Soldier,” 20.  
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Veterans did not initially expect to have trouble finding jobs. The war 
was waged for a better world and propaganda encouraged the belief that 
soldiers would return to a prosperous Canada. Department of Soldiers’ Civil 
Re-establishment (DSCR) publicity material assured veterans that Returned  
Figure 4. DSCR Poster advertising employment in 
“every province” of Canada.  
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Soldiers Commissions existed in “every province” to “secure proper 
Employment for all honourably discharged Canadian Soldiers.”2 Such 
advertisements touted all forms of work, from house painting to poultry 
farming to typewriting to teaching, mechanical farming, mechanical drawing, 
and work in machine shops. The wounded were not forgotten either. They 
would be employed using “ingenious” substitutes for missing limbs. 
Veterans in need of recovery would recuperate for civilian life at garden clubs 
in convalescent hospitals. Whether rural or urban, industrial or agricultural, 
in the trades or the classroom, Canada was committed to putting its returned 
men back to work. Yet, when the country slid back into recession, returned 
men were particularly hard hit.  
Historians acknowledge that some veterans struggled after the war, 
but few evaluations study how the postwar economic decline affected these 
men or their understanding of the war’s meaning. Histories of major labour 
unrest, including the Winnipeg General Strike and the On-to-Ottawa Trek, 
say little about how the war generation reacted to these struggles. More 
general considerations of how the war changed Canadian society are equally 
silent on the war’s economic legacy, focusing instead on the war’s impact on 
social reform, such as the temperance question, or shifting beliefs about the 
power of the state.3 In the case of Winnipeg in 1919, debate continues about 
the position of veterans during the strike, in part because returned men lined 
                                                 
2 See for example the DSCR , no. M.H.C. VII 5-2-18. 
3 John H. Thompson, “ ‘The Beginning of Our Regeneration.’ The Great War and 
Western Canadian Reform Movements,” in R. Douglas Francis and Howard Palmer, eds., The 
Prairie West: Historical Readings (Edmonton: Pica Pica Press, 1985).  
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up both for and against the strikers.4 Their role during the On-to-Ottawa-Trek 
and the Regina Riots is even more ambiguous because most of the relief 
workers who protested were much younger than the war generation. As Bill 
Waiser argues, when the men in federal relief camps protested their 
employment and living conditions, the march on Ottawa was led not by 
veterans but by “hundreds of young men, many still in their teens.”5  
Conventional wisdom dictates that Canada’s veterans “were re-
absorbed into civil pursuits without much unemployment or industrial 
disturbance.”6 While true, to an extent, for veterans who returned during the 
war, this was not the case for the postwar era. The notion that veterans 
reintegrated relatively easily into the postwar economy endures, a 
misconception which helps explain why their struggles have not been 
considered relevant to the discussion of the war’s wider meaning. Despite 
this misunderstanding, however, returned men were particularly affected by 
the 1920 downturn and by subsequent unemployment throughout the 
interwar era. Admittedly, the picture of how badly these men struggled is 
                                                 
4 See for example, David Bercuson, Confrontation at Winnipeg: Labour, Industrial 
Relations, and the Genearl Strike (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1974), 
Reinhold Kramer and Tom Mitchell, When the State Trembled: How A.J. Andrews and the 
Citizens’ Committee Broke the Winnipeg General Strike (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2010), A. Ross McCormack, Reformers, Rebels and Revolutionaries: The Western 
Canadian Radical Movement, 1899-1919 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), D.C. 
Masters, The Winnipeg General Strike (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950). 
5 Bill Waiser, All Hell Can’t Stop Us: The On-to-Ottawa-Trek and Regina Riot (Calgary: 
Fifth House, 2003), xi. 
6 Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Book I, Canada: 1867-
1939 [Hereafter Rowell-Sirois Commission] (Ottawa, 1940), 100. 
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clouded by a lack of statistical information on unemployment generally but 
the records indicate that veterans faced serious hurdles after 1918. 
Comprehensive employment figures were not kept during the 
interwar period and analysis of employment in the 1920s is limited by this 
lack of statistical data.7 An exception was the Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 
which began to make forays into employment research as early as 1920, but 
even this data was limited. It was derived from small averages of selected 
trades unions and, as a result, there is no consensus on how many men were 
unemployed at the outbreak of war or at its close.8 As the University of 
Toronto economist Gilbert Jackson complained, Canada could “scarcely claim 
to possess the data from which a calculation of the risks of unemployment 
could be made.”9 The era’s policy makers were forced to rely on estimates 
and no national statistics were recorded until after the Second World War.10 
                                                 
7. The most extensive considerations of Canadian employment in this era include 
James Struthers’ work in No Fault of Their Own: Unemployment and the Canadian Welfare State, 
1914-1941 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983) and The Limits of Affluence: Welfare in 
Ontario, 1920-1970 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994). The development of social 
security is better studied. See for instance Dennis Guest, The Emergence of Social Security in 
Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997), Raymond Blake, From Rights 
to Needs: A History of Family Allowances in Canada, 1929-1992 (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 2009), and Nancy Christie, Engendering the State: Family, Work, and Welfare in 
Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000). 
8. Struthers, No Fault, 13. 
9. Jackson, quoted in Struthers, No Fault, 20. 
10 Although important steps were taken to compile statistical portraits of 
unemployment in Canada after 1920, no regular measure existed before 1945. See Dave 
Gower, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/studies-etudes/75-001/archive/e-pdf/87-eng.pdf 4 June 2014. 
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In the 1920s and 1930s the unemployed were not “counted regularly”11 and 
Ottawa “did not even know how many Canadians were unemployed.”12 It is 
                                                 
11 Bothwell, Drummond, and English, Canada 1900-1945, 219. 
12 Thompson and Seager, Canada, 1922-1939, 26. Estimates for the 1920s suggest that 
the average unemployment rate for the decade was 3.5%. The figure is a poor reflection of the 
difficulties faced in the early 1920s because the percentage is artificially buoyed by the more 
prosperous period between 1926 and 1929. See Fortin, http://www.csls.ca/repsp/1/06-
fortin.pdf, 114. According to James Struthers, the real unemployment rate between 1920 and 
1925 was nearly double the average for the decade. The years with the highest rates were 
1921 (8.9), 1922, and 1924 (both at 7.1). See James Struthers, No Fault, 215. In 1921, nearly 
250,000 men were unemployed, approximately twelve percent of the projected labour force. 
Such figures, while offering a more accurate picture of the overall unemployment situation, 
are more a reflection of the distribution of unemployment in the economy generally and they 
remain silent about the overall numbers of unemployed. See M.C. Maclean, et al., Census 
Monograph No. 11, Unemployment: A Study Based on the Census of 1931 and Supplementary Data 
(Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1938), 23. Other estimates indicate that the country’s unemployment 
rate was considerably higher, especially during the fall and winter months. See “1,500 
Returned Men Without Employment,” Globe, 13 June 1924, 12. In January 1920, Ottawa’s 
department of labour concluded that Canada’s unemployment rate was sixteen percent. The 
report did not expect the situation to improve soon. See “Unemployment on Increase in 
Canada,” Globe, 27 April 1921, 3.  
Unemployment on the prairies is less well documented, but is estimated at equally 
high rates. Anecdotal figures from James Gray suggest it “may well have reached 20 or 25 per 
cent” in the region’s urban centers. See James H. Gray, The Roar of the Twenties (Toronto: 
Macmillan, 1975), 71. The most dire years could well have been worse. Kenneth Buckley 
reported in 1955 that the unemployment figures for the interwar era were skewed by the 
failure to recognize that in times of economic difficulty excess farm work tended to stay on 
the farm. Moreover, there may even have been a “reverse movement from the cities to the 
farms.” See Kenneth Buckley, Capital Formation in Canada, 1896-1930 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1955), 46, 152 n. 22. Regardless of the rate, it should not be forgotten that the 
proportion of men of working age actually declined after the war. See O.J. Firestone, Income 
and Wealth Series VII: Canada’s Economic Development, 1867-1953: With Special Reference to 
Changes in the Country’s National Product and National Wealth (London: Bowes & Bowes, 1958), 
55. Between 1870 and 1910 men aged 15-64 rose from fifty-four per cent to sixty-four percent. 
The losses incurred during the war forced these figures down and by 1920 the percentage of 
working age men had declined to 61½ percent. The percentage did not rise to 1910 levels 
until 1939 (when it reached 65½ percent). 
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unsurprising, therefore, that scholars consider it nearly “impossible” to 
document the scope of interwar unemployment.13 
Social scientists began extensive study of the economy in the 1930s to 
address the lack of information on the labour market. This work contributed 
to policy debates about the role of government and business in the market, 
but it rarely focused on veterans.14 Rather, it examined the causes of 
unemployment, studies of regional or municipal reactions to labour issues, 
and the role of private industry. L. Richter’s Canada’s Unemployment Problem 
(1939) was one of the major publications released during the era. It was the 
first study published by Dalhousie’s Institute of Public Affairs, which 
coordinated research between the governments of Newfoundland, the 
Maritime Provinces, and the region’s universities. Leading social scientists, 
including Harry Cassidy, Director of Social Welfare in B.C., Dorothy King, 
Director of the Montreal School of Social Work, and A. MacNamara, deputy 
minister of Public Works and Labour in Manitoba, contributed to the volume. 
The U of T economist, S.A. Saunders, acknowledged that returned soldiers 
received assistance for unemployment immediately after the war, but none of 
the remaining studies of the relief question considered veterans’ place in 
                                                 
13. Gray, The Roar of the Twenties, 71. See too C.P. Gilman and H.M. Sinclair, 
Unemployment: Canada’s Problem (Ottawa: Army and Navy Veterans in Canada, 1935), 17, 
which also laments the “paucity” of data on unemployment.  
14 See for example Norman Rogers’ Foreward to L. Richter’s edited collection, 
Canada’s Unemployment Problem (Toronto: Macmillan, 1939).  
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postwar society or how unemployment affected them.15 Instead, these men 
were lumped into the wider pool of unemployed workers.  
The tendency to overlook veterans was also true of other studies 
produced earlier in the 1930s. F.R. Scott and Harry Cassidy’s Labour 
Conditions in the Men’s Clothing Industry (1935) was an important report on 
urban labour but it said nothing about jobless veterans in the clothing 
industry.16 The same is true of Leonard Marsh’s research, which did not 
highlight the plight of unemployed veterans although it did acknowledge 
that postwar unemployment was a product of the war’s aftermath caused in 
part by “commercial, monetary, and political dislocations which derive from 
the War.”17  
Despite a lack of concrete statistics, by 1921 it was estimated that 
200,000 Canadians were unemployed, “many of them veterans.”18 According 
to Desmond Morton, “too many veterans had chosen overvalued or 
                                                 
15 The omission is notable because the book contains work by leading experts, such 
as Harry Cassidy and Charlotte Whitton. 
16 F.R. Scott and H.M. Cassidy, Labour Conditions in the Men’s Clothing Industry: A 
Report (Toronto: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1935).  
17 Leonard Marsh, Employment Research: An Introduction to the McGill Programme of 
Research in the Social Sciences (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1935), 44. Marsh expands on 
this “dislocation” in a chapter on “Industrial Fluctuations.” The conflict left a “legacy of 
overequipment and inflated capital values in its wake,” he wrote. See Employment Research, 
197. 
18 Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 153. 
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unproductive land in the Soldier Settlement plan.”19 The promises of “full re-
establishment” boiled down to a “brutally simple” reality: returned men 
would have the “renewed privilege of fending for themselves in a business-
like, profit driven society.”20 In the estimation of the Great War Veterans’ 
Association (GWVA), unemployment among veterans was “intolerable.” 
Instead of life getting better after 1919, it got worse. Unemployment increased 
between 1920 and 1921, and veterans were the group “most severely 
affected.”21   
During the early 1920s, the GWVA produced the most statistical 
information on returned men. Yet its estimates were as varied as others, 
making it difficult to compare the figures with municipal, provincial, and 
federal records. In 1919 the association counted at least 1,500 members who 
were unemployed in Toronto and it estimated the provincial figure to be 
close to five thousand.22 Provincial soldiers’ aid commissions, tasked with 
finding employment for veterans, reported that need for relief was so great 
that Ontario’s relief funds were “considerably” overdrawn.23 Churches and 
                                                 
19 Desmond Morton, “The Canadian Veterans’ Heritage from the Great War,” in J.L. 
Granatstein and Peter Neary, eds., The Veterans Charter and Post-World War II Canada 
(Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1998), 27. 
20 Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 104. 
21. “Unemployment on Increase in Canada,” Globe, 27 April 1921, 3. 
22. AO, RG 8-5, Soldiers Aid Commission, B226501, “Notes of Interview with 
Gentlemen Representing the G.W.V.A. Introduced by Sergeant Conroy, District Secretary for 
Toronto District,” 19 February 1919 [hereafter “Notes of Interview”]. 
23. AO, RG29-165, Soldiers’ Aid Commission, Minutes of the Soldiers’ Aid 
Commission, 31 December 1919; AO, RG 8-5, B226501, Soldiers’ Aid Commission, “Notes of 
Interview.” 
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benevolent societies noted similar pressures as unemployment increased. 
Veterans living in urban centres were especially hard hit. In 1922, the Toronto 
Brotherhood Federation recognized that returned soldiers were badly 
affected by the economic downturn. In response, the federation put out an 
“S.O.S.,” asking individuals to pledge for relief efforts for unemployed 
veterans. The appeal reminded the city’s congregations of the debt they owed 
the country’s returned soldiers:  
The Christian Churches received much praise for helping to 
secure volunteers for the great conflict. Now that it is over and 
nobly won and the men are back with us, many of them in 
distress the Churches will not stand by and see them suffer for 
lack of the mere necessaries of life. 
The plan here proposed by the Toronto Brotherhood 
Federation, and endorsed by the authorities of the different 
Churches, is simple, direct and effective. 
He who gives quickly gives twice.24 
But community efforts could not solve unemployment, however well 
intentioned, and jobless veterans continued to face difficulty into the 1920s. 
By the winter of 1924, job prospects were so poor that returned soldiers had 
resorted to hoping for winter storms to make extra money removing snow.25  
The economy improved halfway through the decade but 
unemployment problems continued. George Parker, for example, was an 
experienced pipe fitter. Despite his training, he was unemployed and 
                                                 
24. “Churches Will Hear Appeal for Members to Come to Aid of Distressed Returned 
Men,” Globe, 14 January 1922, 13. 
25. “Snow Proves Boon to Many Soldiers and Workless Men,” Globe, 21 February 
1924, 8. 
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desperately seeking a job. In 1926, Parker wrote Ontario’s premier, Howard 
Ferguson, asking for a letter of introduction. He hoped to secure a position 
with the Temiskaming and Northern Ontario Railroad, but was 
uncomfortable asking for such assistance. The precarious state of the 
economy forced him to put aside his “regret.” As he explained, “things have 
come to such a pass, that I am almost desperate.”26 Ferguson was sympathetic 
but did little more than direct the veteran to an official at the northern 
railway. The premier regretted that Parker was in such a condition. He 
emphasized, however, that his hands were tied by the fact that others in the 
province were in similar circumstances. “The conditions all over the Province 
… are very serious,” he explained. He could do nothing more to help. 
According to estimates, the unemployment rate in 1926 had fallen to under 
five per cent. Yet, in spite of the increase in jobs, Ferguson’s letter painted an 
especially dreary picture of veterans’ employment prospects: “In a centre like 
Toronto particularly there are thousands of men walking the streets, and 
similar conditions prevail in every centre in the Province.”27  
Five years later, by the second year of the Great Depression, veterans 
in urban centres, such as Toronto, were even worse off. In 1931, the city’s 
Central Bureau of Unemployment Relief produced one of the most detailed 
accounts of urban unemployment. It tracked age, physical condition, 
residence, economic status, family responsibilities, and nationality of the 
                                                 
26. AO, RG3-6-0-961, Civil Service Applications for Positions #1, Parker to Ferguson, 
1 January 1926.  
27. AO, RG3-6-0-961, Civil Service Applications for Positions #1, Ferguson to Parker, 
7 January 1926. 
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unemployed. The bureau calculated that between August and November 
there were 36,500 unemployed men. A large number— 7,310—were veterans. 
The bureau’s figures do not specify how old these men were but by 1931 the 
vast majority of the war generation were aged 36 to 55, indicating that their 
ranks accounted for approximately 52% of unemployed men.28 According to 
the Hyndman Report on unemployment of ex-service men, by the mid 1930s 
as many as twenty percent of non-pensionable veterans were unemployed.29  
 
Table 1. Age Distribution of Unemployed Men, Toronto 
(17 August to 30 November 1931)30 
 
Age Single Married Total 
20 and under 2,801 108 2,900 
21 to 35 8,875 7,563 16,438 
36 to 55 4,056 9,930 13,986 
56 to 69 883 2,159 3,042 
70  and over 49 126 175 
Total 16,664 19,886 36,550 
                                                 
28 Cassidy, Unemployment and Relief in Ontario, 38. 
29. This figure was an approximation based on the exclusion of pensionable men and 
those estimated to be receiving municipal or federal departmental relief. With these men 
excluded from the total of CEF veterans, it means that of the roughly 189,000 men not eligible 
for some sort of assistance, at least 38,000 of these were unemployed. No explanation is 
provided in the report for how the committee reached these figures. See Report of the 
Committee Appointed to Carry Out an Investigation into the Existing Facilities in Connection with 
Unemployment of Ex-Service Men and Care and Maintenance while Unemployed, and to Report 
Thereon with such Suggestions and Recommendations as may be Deemed Advisable (Ottawa: King’s 
Printer, 1935), 5. 
30 Data derived from Cassidy, Unemployment and Relief in Ontario, 37. 
161 
 
 
 
Amidst the Depression, veterans wrote impassioned letters to 
provincial premiers asking for jobs. But these desperate appeals did not 
commence with the 1929 downturn. Even during the so-called boom years of 
the late 1920s, returned men were pleading for aid for unemployment from 
all levels of government.31 James Rowan Linton, for example, wrote the 
Ontario government seeking work. He enlisted in 1915 and was severely 
wounded overseas. In 1926 he was unemployed. Premier Ferguson assured 
him that it would have given him “great satisfaction” to help a returned man, 
especially an amputee (as Linton now was). But it was impossible. “I have 
made enquiries throughout the service,” he explained to the young man, 
“and I am unable to find that there is any opportunity presenting itself at the 
present time.”32 The employment problem was both widespread and 
prolonged.  
When the war ended, the expectation was that employers would 
accept healthy returned men back to work as part of their patriotic duty.33 
                                                 
31. The correspondence from returned men to the province’s premiers from the 1920s 
demonstrates that their appeals pre-date the cases cited by Lara Campbell in her analysis of 
Ontario’s veterans during the Great Depression. See especially Chapters 2 and 5, respectively 
“‘If He is a Man He Becomes Desperate’: Unemployed Husbands, Fathers, and Workers,” 
and “Militant Mothers and Loving Fathers: Gender, Family, and Ethnicity in Protest,” in Lara 
Campbell, Respectable Citizens: Gender, Family, and Unemployment in Ontario’s Great Depression 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009). 
32. AO, AO, RG3-6-0-961, Civil Service Applications for Positions #1, Ferguson to 
Linton, 14 January 1926. Ferguson did pass on Linton’s request to Col. Price, the Provincial 
Treasurer, however, in hopes that he could find the man a position with the Soldiers’ Aid 
Commission. 
33. Sessional Paper No. 35a – 1916, Military Hospital Commission, The Provision of 
Employment for Members of the Canadian Expeditionary Force on their return to Canada 
and the Re-education of those who are unable to follow their previous positions, 5. 
162 
 
 
 
This did not happen, either because jobs were scarce or because employers 
were reluctant to hire veterans because they feared employees with physical 
or psychological wounds. The difficulty these men had in finding work was 
noticed early on and newspapers, such as the Edmonton Herald, ran ads that 
called on employers to “find out what jobs are vacant in your community” 
and then make it a matter of pride “to give the first chance to a returned 
solder.” Other ads argued that veterans needed to be encouraged to return to 
work. They preyed on period fears about idle men, declaring that “[loafing] is 
bad for them, as it is for any of us.” As Robert Rutherdale points out, this type 
of advertising framed returned men’s difficulty finding work in terms of 
existing fears over male unemployment. Idle soldiers were no longer heroic 
volunteers; they were now malingering ‘loafers’.34  It was not just employers 
that were at fault.  
As the Star noted, returned men could also make difficult employees. 
The paper reported that “some of the [returned] men are hard to handle.”35 
They wanted employers to make concessions on their behalf. Veterans 
believed that fighting for the nation meant that the government and 
businesses had a responsibility to help them. This assumption did not sit well 
with potential employers. In their experience, veterans may well have wanted 
to work, but they seemed too selective when it came to what they were 
willing to do. Employers complained that returned men wanted 
                                                 
34. Rutherdale, Hometown Horizons, 238. 
35. “Fifty Soldiers Register,” Star, 13 October 1915, 1. 
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“sinecures.”36 The hostility of the labour market put veterans in a doubly 
difficult position. They had sacrificed for the country on the expectation that, 
should it be necessary, their needs would be addressed after the war. The 
postwar market, however, was not sympathetic to men who returned home 
less capable than before the war and the re-establishment programs created to 
assist them proved equally inadequate. The harsh reality for many veterans 
was that they were left worse off because of their military service.  
According to the GWVA, ex-soldiers were denied good jobs because 
they were being filled by unworthy men. During the war, much of this anger 
was directed at foreigners. The hostility of ex-soldiers towards those they 
perceived as un-British was both a reflection of men’s desire “to fight the war 
at home” and a call for “better re-establishment efforts” that would ultimately 
result in an idealized “vision of Canada as a British country.”37 By war’s end, 
however, veterans had come to the realization that they had little power to 
influence the hiring practices of private businesses.38 Ideally, they wanted 
businesses to be “accommodating.” If employers were willing to give them 
greater leniency, then these men would surely be back on their feet in no 
time. “We are asking the manufacturers … to take men who are not 100%,” 
explained Col. Hunter of the GWVA. The hope was that if such 
accommodation were made, men would be helped along “until they become 
                                                 
36. “Fifty Soldiers Register,” 1. 
37. Smith, “Comrades and Citizens,” 144.  
38. AO, RG 8-5, Soldiers Aid Commission, B226501, “Notes of Interview.”  
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efficient.”39 This did not happen and returned men were increasingly turned 
down in favour of civilians.40 In response, veterans’ associations refocused 
their advocacy. They stopped calling on private business and shifted 
attention to elected officials and government agencies, such as Ottawa’s 
DSCR and Ontario’s Soldiers’ Aid Commission (SAC). By concentrating on 
government, veterans’ associations ceded their ability to advocate for 
employment for all returned men—both able-bodied and disabled—in favour 
of securing better benefits for those deemed eligible for federal assistance. 
This change led to a nearly two-decade long struggle with the federal 
government over pensions. It revealed that veterans’ associations were as ill 
equipped as provincial and federal governments to offer solutions to the 
problem of postwar unemployment.  
William Edward Turley was one of the GWVA’s leading spokesmen. 
While in uniform he was a sergeant. Out of uniform, he was an ex-boxer and 
former reporter for the Toronto Telegram.41 Born in 1882, Turley was a well-
known Orangeman who had enlisted in September 1914. After his return to 
Canada, he was actively involved in recruiting efforts in Toronto. Turley then 
served as secretary of the Ontario branch of the GWVA. It was in this capacity 
that he and the GWVA tried to draw the government’s attention to the plight 
of unemployed soldiers. The association opted to focus on government 
because the GWVA concluded that private businesses were not responding to 
                                                 
39. AO, RG 8-5, Soldiers Aid Commission, B226501, “Notes of Interview.”  
40. AO, RG 8-5, Soldiers Aid Commission, B226501, “Notes of Interview.”  
41. See Turley’s biographical information on his Attestation Papers and in Smith, 
“Comrades and Citizens,” 82. 
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appeals to hire more veterans. As Turley explained, “one does not expect or 
get much sentiment from private business, [but] one does expect some … 
sentiment and consideration in connection with government positions.”42 If 
business would not hire ex-soldiers, then the government had to step in. 
Politicians had made well-publicized commitments to bring them into the 
public service. As one GWVA member explained to the Ontario SAC, asking 
for increased aid from the government may have seemed “selfish” in a time 
of difficult employment but  
for reasons that are apparent we [returned men and the state] 
have a linking up with each other that you cannot get in any 
other way, and kindly consideration by the Government of this 
problem would go far to make us more quickly the power for 
good that we are going to be in the Province of Ontario and the 
Dominion of Canada. We are going to do this right and make 
this country a better place to live in.43 
The GWVA devoted considerable energy to such advocacy, with many of its 
campaigns directed at ensuring government employed returned soldiers.  
The Ontario SAC was aware that returned men faced difficulty 
securing jobs and that they lacked sufficient social and medical support as 
well.  The commission was created in 1916 to facilitate the re-establishment of 
veterans. It had limited scope to provide work but it did act as an advisory 
body that documented soldiers’ efforts at re-integration. The group tracked 
the number of men returning to Ontario and also organized committees and 
branches to help men find work. By 1918, its efforts included organized 
                                                 
42. AO, RG 8-5, Soldiers Aid Commission, B226501, “Notes of Interview” 
43. AO, RG 8-5, Soldiers Aid Commission, B226501, “Notes of Interview” 
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appeals to secure the “good will” of employers. The Commission also worked 
with the federal and provincial governments to ensure returned men were 
considered when either government made appointments. Aside from some 
vocational training, however, the commission was limited to offering aid and 
assistance to men in need. As with the provincial efforts to address 
unemployment, generally, it had no powers to ensure veterans received jobs. 
In a confidential memo, the commission identified some of the major 
obstructions facing returned soldiers. One of the most daunting challenges 
was the veteran assistance system itself. It was a confusing combination of 
organizations with overlapping jurisdictions. Men often had no way to use it 
“without the benefit of advice or counsel.”44 A myriad of groups and 
organizations all purported to assist veterans. These included benevolent 
societies, municipal assistance, provincial organizations, and those operated 
by the federal government. Some, such as the CPF, were officially sanctioned 
but privately operated. Others, such as the provincial aid commissions were 
arm’s-length extensions of government. Others still were entirely 
unconnected to government and based on charity. This patchwork of 
programs left men bewildered. A.E. Lowery of the GWVA cautioned that 
Canada’s various levels of government had failed to approach the problem of 
returned men in any comprehensive manner. “The trouble,” he wrote, “is that 
if the problem grows to be very great and neither the Provincial nor the 
Dominion Government is primarily responsible for the solution there is 
                                                 
44. AO, RG 8-5, Soldiers Aid Commission, B226501, Confidential Memo: Proposed 
Organization of the Ontario Soldiers’ Advisory Board, n.d. 
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danger of a good deal of falling through between the two.”45 The result was a 
maze of programs and agencies that proved difficult to navigate. 
 Many assistance programs did little to assist veterans, which only 
added to men’s frustrations. Veterans were often confused about which 
organization was best suited to their needs and they faced a myriad of groups 
claiming to offer help. One such organization was Toronto’s Civic League 
(TLC). It was part of a laundry list of organizations and groups created to 
assist returned soldiers and, while well meaning, it offered little practical 
assistance. In fact, no veteran was sure of what the organization actually did. 
According to Edward Turley, the group had a “broad plan” to help returned 
men reintegrate into civil life. Despite its desire to help, the group’s mandate 
did not include provision for assistance of returned soldiers. Instead, it 
seemed that the league existed solely “for the purpose of giving [a man] a 
feed once a month.” Veterans did not discount this work, but “when it comes 
down to practical things,” they concluded, the organization was of little use.46  
Veterans were angered that assistance programs lacked oversight. 
They felt that returned men who appeared before pension boards (not to 
mention the boards of benevolent associations, including those of the 
provincial canteen funds), were at the mercy of their decision, no matter 
whether “right or wrong.” If a veteran believed he had been turned down 
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unjustly, he had no recourse or appeal. This situation was ripe for abuse. As 
an Ontario report noted, 
there is no check either, on behalf of the man, on the 
interpretations placed upon the regulations under which the 
various departments operate. Such interpretations are, in some 
cases, unnecessarily strict and narrow. Matters of policy directly 
affecting the veteran are at times decided more from a point of 
view of office management, administration, or economy, than 
from regard to the interest of the veteran himself. The system 
that some organizations adopt in dealing with the men is not 
satisfactory to the men.47  
The federal and provincial governments may have been well intentioned in 
their desire to assist veterans, but the policies and procedures implemented to 
assist them proved naïve in their assessment, particularly of the employment 
problem. The resulting strain on the system proved unbearable and many of 
the programs established were over-burdened by the influx of men claiming 
assistance 
In Ontario, veterans’ organizations offered few solutions about how to 
address the unemployment of returned men. Beyond information campaigns 
explaining that returned soldiers faced perilous job prospects, groups like the 
GWVA did little more than advocate for special status for veterans. Indeed, 
the group spent much of its postwar energy fighting for positions in 
government agencies. In Ontario, the Labour Bureau came in for particular 
rebuke. It was the province’s primary employment body and it employed a 
staff of eight, three of whom were veterans. The GWVA advocated strongly 
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that this number needed to be higher. It also took issue with the fact that at 
least one of the civilian employees had been eligible for duty. According to 
the veterans’ association, failure to don a uniform meant this man did not 
deserve his postwar position.  
The GWVA also singled out a young woman who was placing men as 
farm labourers. According to the association, because so many returned men 
were heading to farms, “a returned soldier would be more efficient in placing 
returned soldiers on farms than a girl could possibly be.”48 The federal DSCR 
was similarly rebuked for not employing enough veterans. As the 
organization complained, “this Department is being administered, to a great 
extent by civilians, who are just as capable of serving overseas as any man 
who went.” The GWVA believed these men were not worthy of employment, 
not least because they were profiting off of the hard won labour of Canada’s 
soldiers. Instead of doing their part overseas, DSCR employees had “stayed 
behind” and secured “good positions,” which “could [now be] filled by 
returned men.” The GWVA believed that the DSCR employees received 
“good pay” at the expense of returned soldiers. This was not a “square 
deal.”49 
Returned men wanted recognition and fair consideration for work. But 
they were also critical of those who considered them for employment and the 
“majority of returned soldiers” chafed at receiving assistance from civilians. It 
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was the GWVA’s position that civilian employees were ill-equipped to deal 
with former soldiers, particularly when it came to cases of disabilities.50 Not 
all returned men had issues with civilians, but they certainly did when it 
meant “rubbing shoulders” with them looking for employment.51 By asking 
for recognition of their status as veterans, ex-combatants set themselves apart 
from the rest of society, a distinction that ran up against the fact that they 
were now demobilized. Once back in civilian clothes, they were treated as 
regular men. Many did not think it fair because their war service had set them 
back in comparison to their peers. As a result, “the returned soldier desire[d] 
to maintain [that title] by virtue of his having gone over and fought and 
earned [it].”52  
Despite ongoing advocacy on behalf of their membership, the 
veterans’ organizations did not secure meaningful change in hiring policies 
and, much like the case with private businesses, the lobbying of government 
proved ineffective. These efforts failed because with the exception of calling 
for new hiring, the alternative proposals put forward were impractical. 
Edward Turley, for instance, wanted to ensure that governments hired 
returned men. When pressed how the GWVA would achieve this goal, Turley 
admitted to the Ontario SAC that the only solution to employing returned 
soldiers was to fire civilians who had not served. Even then, however, Turley 
recognized that there were not enough jobs to meet the need. During an 
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exchange, the veteran pointed out that London, Ontario, had at least 450 
unemployed returned soldiers. Yet, Turley conceded that “even if all 
government employees were relieved of their duties that would not relieve 
the situation so far as soldier unemployment is concerned.”53 Even if veterans 
did not want to admit it, the GWVA’s lobbying of government highlighted 
the point that the war had put these men at a disadvantage. While making his 
case for “releasing present employees,” Turley admitted that they would 
have a better chance at finding a new job than returned men. These male 
employees were “physically fit,” in part because they had not served. As 
such, they would “have less difficulty in securing employment from the 
ordinary private employer of labour than the returned man, [who was left] 
more or less disabled.”54 
The GWVA also wanted Ontario’s employment offices to provide a 
separate employment bureau exclusively for veterans. As the province’s 
deputy minister of labour noted, what the association desired was a “Bureau 
that will be given up exclusively to returned soldier applications.”55 The 
GWVA pushed for this option because it recognized its members were 
increasingly unhappy with their employment prospects. “We have many 
dissatisfied men coming to our offices with various grievances,” explained 
the association’s Col. Hunter. “We try to smooth these things out as we go 
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along, but the situation is becoming more acute all the time.”56 The push for a 
separate veterans’ employment bureau was also the result of a tacit admission 
that returned men were not always as predictable as their civilian 
counterparts. With jobs scare and men increasingly desperate, instances of 
abuse and assault increased.57 Veterans were ‘fed up’ with having to deal 
with men who had “never been over” to Europe and were threatening to give 
civilian men “a punch in the jaw” for taking their jobs.58  
Labour bureau staff worked to match prospective employees with 
prospective employers, a task that required considering both the needs of an 
employer and a potential employee. In Ontario, individuals who visited the 
provincial labour bureaus utilized the same space. Officials only considered a 
veteran’s status if a potential employer—generally the government—agreed 
to give preference to these men. The problem for veterans was that there were 
too few jobs in the public service, let alone in the private sector. Many 
veterans, such as Patrick G., were considered less desirable than ‘civilian’ 
men, for whom labour bureau employees could more easily find work. 
Patrick suffered from chest pain that prevented him “from engaging in any 
strenuous form of employment such as heavy labour.”59 As a case officer from 
an employment bureau acknowledged, there was no employment for the 
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veteran, despite the fact that he was “a regular applicant for work, and … 
always willing to take on anything he could do.”60 Veterans like Patrick 
realized that they were disadvantaged and they were angry at being passed 
over for open positions. As tensions increased inside the employment 
bureaus, the GWVA warned that it could not control its ranks, many of who 
had “been brought up to fight.” To prevent a “battle royal” erupting at these 
offices, the association called for a divided space. In the GWVA’s view, 
securing an exclusive returned men’s office would alleviate tension caused by 
civilian men securing the majority of available positions. It would also ensure 
that veterans received some sort of de facto recognition of their status as 
returned men.  
 The GWVA did not succeed with its efforts to get the government to 
hire more returned men. Its proposals were impractical. Firing employed 
workers and setting up a separate employment service to deal with civilians 
could not address the major downturn in employment. The extreme nature of 
the association’s suggested solutions to the employment issue reflected the 
inadequate responses to postwar labour problems. Veterans may have called 
for unified employment schemes, but these calls aligned poorly with the 
commitments made by the state, or its jurisdictional responsibilities. While 
some men may have returned to Canada without having lost their “initiative 
or a desire to better [their] position,” this did not mean they had jobs waiting 
for them and the struggle and strain of the ensuing decade tested the 
generation’s resolve, making it difficult to argue that they were receiving a 
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“square deal.”61 Indeed, as Pierre van Paassen described, men became 
increasingly disenchanted with assistance programs:  
Officials were assuring men that they would be properly looked 
after … There was going to be a gratuity, a bonus; land was 
going to be made available for settlement; convalescent camps 
were to be established; even broken-up homes were going to be 
mended by martial relations boards. 
“All of that sounded fine,” van Paassen remembered, except that he had “a 
feeling, nevertheless, that I had been the victim of an enormous nonsense.” By 
enlisting, men submitted to “an arbitrary fate” that “deprived” them “of 
everything that makes for human dignity.” The veterans now raged that men 
had thrown their lives away “on the supposition that they were helping to 
preserve something precious.” In reality, all they had done “was to clear the 
road for the same bourgeois democracy which had unleashed the storm just 
stilled, to start all over again.”62 
During the Great Depression, difficulty finding work stressed many 
veterans to the breaking point. Returned men took particular exception to this 
state of affairs. The hardships their generation faced did not reflect the world 
for which they had sacrificed and their disenchantment, its relationship to the 
war, and their postwar economic prospects was made clear in a series of 
articles written by members of the Army and Navy Veterans of Canada, later 
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collected in the volume Unemployment: Canada’s Problem (1935). The principle 
authors were Capt. Clement Percy Gilman, M.C., a decorated officer from the 
CEF, and Huntly McDonald Sinclair, professor of economics and author of 
The Principles of Economic Trade (1932). In perhaps the most detailed 
explanation of the economic complaints raised by veterans during the early 
1920s, their text argued that returned men were particularly hard hit by the 
economic downturn. “Modern economic life,” they argued, “victimized the 
returned man more than his contemporaries.” Moreover, for the war 
generation, 
the process of victimization started in 1914. The patriot, the 
idealist, the man of resource, the searcher for adventure – those 
who in the past history of mankind had made the greatest 
contribution in carrying back the frontier between civilization 
and the lack of it, progress and stagnation – these men went 
overseas in return for the munificent sum of $1.10 with bad 
food, uncomfortable clothing, and primitive housing thrown in. 
While they were overseas the slackers, the materialists, the 
unimaginative enjoyed the high wages and fabulous profits 
associated with wartime industrial activity.63 
In Gilman and Sinclair’s analysis, returned men had good reason to be 
disenchanted with their postwar lives. They were Canada’s best—its patriots, 
idealists, and adventurers—and they had given their all during the war. The 
war had cost them dearly and all for the benefit of slackers, materialists, and 
others who were not their equal.  
 The war’s economic and human toll was self-evident. But it was not 
the rigors of conflict that sapped men’s spirit. It was the disappointments of 
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the peace. In a striking passage that highlighted the wasted youth of many 
men who had gone overseas, Gilman and Sinclair explained why the 
generation was disillusioned. No clearer example of postwar waste existed 
than the fate of a typical, relatively young returned man: 
[He] is … thirty-five, married and with a small family, with 
twenty per cent. paid upon the purchase price of a modest 
home, who finds himself suddenly out of a job that he thought 
secure for life. Startled but not discouraged, he goes out to 
search for work. Day after day, week after week, month after 
month, even year after year, he searches in vain, as thousands of 
others have searched. Optimism gives place to blind despair; 
courage gives place to fear; self-confidence to a withering sense 
of inferiority. In the end, without further hope, he sinks into the 
ranks of those whose spirits have been broken – whose souls 
have been wrinkled by too much stretching.64 
Gilman and Sinclair’s analysis was critical of the lack of work both for 
its economic and its moral and social effects. “The unemployment problem,” 
they argued, reached “far beyond … the ranks of the unemployed.” Its 
economic shocks were incalculable and were already bringing about 
“tremendous” losses in production. Even more damning, however, was 
unemployment’s wider repercussions, including its psychological, moral, and 
societal impact. Such costs were more difficult to measure than the 
unemployment rate, but they represented the most dangerous risks. The price 
paid in “loss of courage, in broken spirit, in the abandonment of hope, and 
even in the loss of self-respect has been appallingly high.”65  
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 According to Gilman and Sinclair, returned men had a special part to 
play in the employment situation because of the relationship between the war 
and the economy. Or, as they put it, together these men had a “peculiar 
interest in the unemployment problem.”66 Men willing to put their lives on 
the line for the betterment of Canada had a deep interest in the public affairs 
of their country. The generation was also considered more patriotic, more 
idealistic, with a “greater interest in the welfare and security of the State,” 
than older Canadians. Above all else, however, these men were interested in 
unemployment because in their view, the “war [was] the cause of … modern 
unemployment.”67 For them, the conflict remained a central reference point in 
their lives and anything that pertained to the war—its causes, conduct, or 
aftermath—remained important. Its memory was “acute” and anything 
associated with it was of “tremendous interest.” The critique did not shy 
away from linking the war with postwar unemployment. The men of the CEF 
had made sacrifices overseas and it was an “injustice” that they did so while 
others stayed home and profited. Even worse was the fact that this 
discrepancy continued after the war, especially with the difficulty returned 
men faced (re)-gaining employment. Their jobs had been surrendered to 
others; their skills were out of date or had been more ably performed by 
women; and in some cases, employers were reluctant to fire employees to 
allow a veteran to return to work.68  
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The collective experience of the war had become a reference point 
through which these men framed their postwar world. They used it to make 
sense of their disillusion and as a way to articulate why they felt isolated from 
the rest of society. As Gilman and Sinclair explained, “it [was] difficult to 
make people understand how great a contrast to civil life four years of war 
activity could be.” The conflict “wrenched” men from their civilian lives and 
exposed them to “the ghastly experience of life in the trenches with its 
appalling demands on physical endurance, mental placidity, and moral 
integrity.” It was not, as a result, “a small wonder that the lives of many were 
so revolutionized by the contrast” between their wartime and peacetime 
existence.69  
Those who had seen the worst of the war were conditioned by the 
experience. Returning to their normal postwar lives—if that was even 
possible—required years and a myriad of “new adjustments.” Many found 
the return difficult, so much so that they rejected their peacetime lives by 
taking comfort in the challenges they faced during the war:  
In shot and shell 
  I have been free, 
  ’Tis peace that’s Hell,  
  Oh God! Help me!70 
Given their troubles, it was not surprising that men were disillusioned. They 
had gone to war for a set of ideals and it was difficult to maintain such 
optimism in the face of continued failures.  
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In Unemployment, Gilman and Sinclair outlined the direct relationship 
between men’s postwar disenchantment and the memory of the war. “Much 
has happened in the past few years to disillusion the idealists,” they wrote, 
and it could be excused if they readily parodied even the most cherished of 
the war’s memories. If John McCrae had written, “They shall not die / 
Though poppies grow in Flanders fields,” by the 1930s, Gilman and Sinclair 
dismissed such sentiments as the product of youthful idealism. During the 
war, men like McCrae had hoped their sacrifices would be remembered. Such 
hopes continued even in the Depression, but they were tempered by the 
realization that they were just that: hopes. To these disillusioned idealists, it 
was now all too clear that the realities of the war’s aftermath were much 
darker than anything they had ever expected. They thus repurposed McCrae’s 
hopeful lines to reflect the newfound realization: 
They had to die; 
  They aimed too high.  
  So poppies grow in Flanders fields.71  
This re-wording of In Flanders Fields says a great deal about the nature of 
these men’s disenchantment. Canada had not failed overseas, but postwar 
failures to live up to wartime ideals proved that its youth had in fact ‘aimed 
too high.’ The world about which they dreamed had simply not materialized 
and this failure was never clearer than with the ongoing employment 
challenges faced by so many returned men.  
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Chapter 5 
In Search of a ‘Square Deal’ 
 
“Many men are returning from the war unfit for carrying on the 
ordinary vocations by which they earned their living. Experience in 
European countries has shown that much can be done by vocational 
training to improve the wage-earning conditions of such of these as 
are not completely incapacitated for work. Moreover many young 
fellows, whose vocations were not fixed before enlisting, will return 
after the war with no adequate preparation for earning a livelihood. 
The return of these two classes of soldiers provides a new problem in 
vocational education which must be solved.” 
 
- F.W. Merchant, Report of the Minister of Education, 19151 
 
Canada was ill prepared to respond to the postwar economic downturn or its 
affect on veterans. The fact that men faced problems re-establishing 
themselves was recognized almost immediately.2 Their struggles were widely 
reported in the press and soon became the subject of parliamentary hearings 
and royal commissions. Veterans associations, the media, and politicians all 
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tried to curry favour with a group of men they perceived to be a rising and 
influential political force. As Peter Neary argues, it was against this “highly 
charged backdrop that Ottawa had to quickly invent and administer a 
program of veteran’s benefits.”3 These programs failed and, while veterans 
remained proud of their wartime service, the intractability of postwar 
problems left many disenchanted with postwar Canada. In the war 
generation’s mind, the conflict’s meaning became linked with the realities of 
its aftermath, which were directly related to the economic problems faced by 
the returned man.  
Postwar disillusionment was rooted both in the hopes men had when 
they enlisted and in what they learned about war while overseas. Some men 
‘joined up’ as a means to return home to Europe. Others were enticed by the 
prospect of a dollar a day. Others still believed in Canada’s duty to the British 
Empire. Defense of democracy, civilization, and Christianity were common 
justifications. For most, the decision to enlist was shaped by a variety of 
factors.4 Nevertheless, Canadians rarely enlisted for the defence of Canada. 
England may have been threatened but the same was not true of North 
America.5 Regardless of motive, enlistment was often driven by idealism, but 
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idealism did not equate to naiveté. Daily casualty lists and the increasingly 
common sight of returning wounded reminded men of the risks they were 
taking. Their diaries, letters, and memoirs reveal that the generation had few 
illusions about the conflict.6  
To the men in the Canadian Corps, the war was a business, not an 
adventure. They took their job seriously and over the course of the conflict 
their military developed a reputation for professionalism and success.7 
Canadians, along with their Australian counterparts, became the British 
military’s “shock” troops.8 The Corps’ commanders, especially Julian Byng 
and Arthur Currie, were known for taking the time to learn from their 
mistakes. They respected their men and believed in the importance of 
training and innovation.  
Such an environment fostered a sense of pride and commitment 
among officers and enlisted men, which contributed to their generational 
identity.9 In countless cases, collective pride in the development and 
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required to see the war through to completion. As A.Y. Jackson wrote home to J.E.H. 
MacDonald, “You would be proud of the Canucks if you could see them. They have 
developed a wonderful army, more Canadian and independent than it used to be, it does 
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achievements of the Canadian Corps mirrored a sense of individual, personal 
growth. Men who served argued that the war changed them and many 
believed their postwar lives were tied inextricably to the conflict. Some, like 
Will Bird, felt “prisoner” to their war memories, although he also found a 
silver lining in the war’s camaraderie.10 Others, including Fred Bagnall, felt 
strongly that men who lived the war firsthand could never “dissociate” 
themselves from the experience.11 The journalist Greg Clark was even more 
forthcoming about how the war shaped his postwar life. While Bagnall 
believed that no man could leave the war behind, Clark was adamant that the 
conflict also engendered significant personal change. He felt his service 
transformed his “mind,” “spirit,” and “personality.” Clark attributed his 
postwar maturity and self-confidence to the war and he continued to feel he 
had returned “greatly enlarged” by the conflict.12  
A sense of personal growth was one of many explanations for why so 
many of Clark’s peers identified as a distinct generation. But unlike many 
veterans, Greg Clark’s experience of postwar re-establishment was 
uncharacteristically easy. Upon demobilization, he returned to a secure 
position as a reporter for the Toronto Star. Nonetheless, like many, Clark did 
not relish starting up at his old job and salary. As a junior officer during the 
war, he was forced to take command of eight hundred men when his 
                                                                                                                                           
most of its own thinking now, and does not have to find out how the old army did things or 
that before going ahead.” See LAC, MacDonald papers, Jackson to MacDonald, 6 April 1918. 
10 Bird, And We Go On, 342.  
11 Bagnall, Not Mentioned in Despatches, 39. 
12 LAC, Flanders’ Fields, Vol. 17, 4th C.M.R., Greg Clark, 2/3. 
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superiors were killed in battle. The experience taught Clark that he could lead 
while shouldering significant responsibility.  Afterwards, and despite a 
secure position, Clark was not content to simply “run errands” as he had 
before enlisting. About to quit his job, Clark was offered a new post as a staff 
writer for the Star Weekly, making him one of the lucky few who successfully 
leveraged his war experience into better postwar employment. For countless 
returned men, the reality of finding postwar employment was very different. 
They had difficulty finding work and many felt they were being punished for 
giving the prime of their youth to their country. 
Harold Turner’s postwar situation was more common. Originally from 
Seaforth, Ontario, Turner enlisted in 1916 and served overseas with the 
Canadian Engineers. After demobilization, he was restless and unable to 
remain employed. He failed at farming and carpentry, and it was not until 
1925 that Turner settled down and re-integrated into civilian life.13 The 
difficulty he faced re-establishing himself was a reality the veteran considered 
common to “most returned soldiers.” He “found it very difficult to settle 
down after the war and kicked around for several years, running threshing 
engines in the fall and doing a bit of everything” to make ends meet.14 While 
his experience may have been little different from itinerant labourers before 
1914, he believed he had common cause with other disgruntled veterans in 
the war’s immediate aftermath.  
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Another veteran, Harold Innis, described men’s restlessness as that 
“‘fed-up’ feeling” that plagued them after the war. At the time, Innis was in 
recovery for wounds received near Arras. He wrote his Master’s thesis on 
Canadian veterans and felt that “no man as a rule is physically better through 
life in the army.” Innis’ research surveyed hundreds of veterans. He 
concluded that the war destroyed men’s initiative, leaving them “incapable of 
doing rough vigorous work such as they [had] been accustomed to in pre-war 
days.”15 The journalist Pierre van Paassen reached a similar conclusion. The 
war “implanted a restlessness in my spirit which filled me with an 
inexpressible contempt for the uneventful drudgery of everyday life.”16 
George Pearson also believed that veterans were possessed by a “terrible 
restlessness.” It was like an “evil spirit,” he explained, an “indefinite 
expression of a vague discontent.”17 The restlessness described by these 
veterans was a physical and psychological reaction to the stresses endured 
during the war. Few received treatment, either during or after the conflict, 
however, because Canada’s rehabilitative programs focused almost 
exclusively on physical disabilities.18  
                                                 
15 Innis, “The Returned Man,” 8. 
16 van Paassen, Days of Our Years, 91. 
17 “Fitting in the Returned Men,” Maclean’s, March 1919, 27-8. 
18 An exception was F. McKelvey Bell, Director of Medical Services, DSCR. During 
an address to the Alberta Medical Association, Bell argued veterans’ war service had left 
them with “abnormal” “neurological or psychopathic conditions” that directly affected men’s 
“individuality and desire for personal initiative.” See Bell, “Medical Services of the 
Department of Soldiers’ Civil Re-establishment,” The Canadian Medical Association Journal 9:1 
(1919): 34. Bell later resigned his position after a disagreement with Senator Lougheed over 
the direction of the DSCR’s approach to medical assistance for veterans. See LAC, RG 26H 
[hereafter Borden papers], Vol. 142, 75489-75560. 
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When the war started, the country lacked a plan to deal with veterans, 
to say nothing of men suffering from physical and psychological trauma. The 
Department of Militia, headed by Sam Hughes, was largely unconcerned. 
Instead of planning for men’s return, Hughes focused on the challenge of 
mobilizing soldiers for war. Yet, men began to be discharged (often because 
of medical conditions) as early as their arrival at Valcartier in 1914. No other 
government department stepped in to care for returned soldiers.19 Instead, the 
gap was filled by private organizations, such as the St. John’s Ambulance and 
the Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire (IODE). While well intentioned, 
their offers to assist men and their families rarely extended to veterans and 
the leading wartime charity, the Canadian Patriotic Fund, specifically 
excluded caring for returned men. The Fund could not afford to care for 
returning men as well as help families of serving soldiers.20  
The number of men injured during training in Canada was relatively 
minimal and haphazard efforts to deal with wounded and returning soldiers 
proved sufficient for a short time. Once the troops moved overseas, however, 
wounded veterans started returning in considerable number. The need for a 
more coherent plan was pressing.21 In June, the federal government created 
                                                 
19 In effect, Ottawa was simply continuing its position on the South African War. 
The federal government never took responsibility for their care. See Morton and Wright, 
Winning the Second Battle, 11. 
20 Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 4-6; Morton, “The Canadian 
Veterans’ Heritage from the Great War,” in J.L. Granatstein and Peter Neary, eds., The 
Veterans Charter and Post-World War II Canada (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 1998), 16 
21 By summer 1915, discharge depots in Canada were dispatching one hundred 
invalided soldiers a week. See Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 9. 
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the Military Hospitals Commission (MHC). Senator James Lougheed, Prime 
Minister Robert Borden’s leader in the Senate (and minister without portfolio) 
was appointed head of the commission. The commission’s Secretary, Ernest 
Scammell, was appointed after the group’s initial meeting in July. Scammell’s 
first task was determining what the federal government could do for 
veterans. In 1915, Canada was in recession and the priority was to get 
veterans back to work. The MHC Secretary suggested dividing returned men 
into four categories: able-bodied veterans who could return to work 
immediately; fit men who could work but needed help re-establishing 
themselves; the wounded, who could be re-trained; and casualties with 
severe wounds needing permanent institutional care.22 The immediate 
priority, however, was caring for casualties. Scammell and Lougheed secured 
hospitals and convalescent homes. By the autumn the commission oversaw 
530 beds. Two years later, it controlled fourteen sanatoria, including 
institutions devoted to “incurables.”23 While the MHC was initially 
responsible for the “provision of hospital and convalescent homes in 
Canada,” its mandate quickly expanded.24 Soon it was also involved in the 
retraining and rehabilitation of returned men. The MHC could not act alone, 
however. Rehabilitation, hospital care, education, and employment—all areas 
where returned men needed assistance—fell under provincial jurisdiction. 
Yet, soldiers were the responsibility of the federal government. The prime 
minister recognized that the federal government could not implement the 
                                                 
22 Morton, “The Canadian Veterans’ Heritage from the Great War,” 16. 
23 Morton, “The Canadian Veterans’ Heritage from the Great War,” 17. 
24 LAC, RG 38B, Finding Aid for Military Hospital Commission, n.d. 
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MHC without consulting the provinces. Borden called a dominion-provincial 
conference for October 1915.  
The conference began 18 October at the Château Laurier. All the 
premiers, except British Columbia’s Richard McBride (who already 
supported the MHC), attended. Canada’s political leaders agreed to put 
dominion-provincial jurisdictions aside in favour of a heavily centralized, 
federal system. As Ontario’s Premier William Hearst declared, the war was “a 
national undertaking” and the provinces had “no desire” to fight over new 
responsibilities. Co-operation was the order of the day and Ottawa agreed to 
shoulder the costs of rehabilitating disabled soldiers. In exchange, the 
provinces promised to establish employment committees and to cover “any 
expenditures necessary” to find work for discharged soldiers who were “fit to 
assume such employment.”25 The federal government gained the control it 
wanted and the provinces were pleased they did not have to pay for extra 
programs. Caring for veterans, however, proved to be just the beginning of 
Ottawa’s commitments to returned men. 
Pensions were also a major responsibility of the federal government. 
When it entered the war, Canada’s system of military pensions was 
unchanged from the Militia Pension Act of 1901. The law proclaimed that a 
private rendered “totally incapable of earning a livelihood” was entitled to a 
$150 annual pension. In 1915 two orders-in-council extended pension 
payments to men wounded in service of the CEF. The system, however, was 
                                                 
25 Archives of Ontario [hereafter AO], Hearst Papers, RG 3-3-0-106, Memorandum 
from dominion-provincial conference, October 1915. 
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ill prepared for the approximately 70,000 casualties sustained by the end of 
1916. To reform it, the federal government called a special committee of the 
House of Commons to investigate and report on changing pension 
requirements. It recommended appointing a Board of Pension 
Commissioners. They were responsible for overseeing Ottawa’s new 
commitment to pay for all “pensions, expenses for appliances – such as 
artificial limbs – and for vocational training, or other advantages” awarded to 
members of the CEF or their dependents. This new system, which was 
retroactively applied to the first day of the war, introduced a scaled payment 
plan that considered a man’s rank, his need, and his medical condition.26  
Pension officials wanted veterans to be active members of the labour 
force. They did not consider the assistance veterans received to be welfare. 
Rather, it was payment acknowledging a man’s debt for his service overseas. 
Whether veterans saw their pensions in the same way, however, constantly 
worried officials. They were concerned that the regular payments could 
undermine men’s sense of initiative and to prevent this the program 
encouraged “industry and adaptability.” Pensions could not be reduced if a 
man found new work “or perfected himself in some form of industry.” The 
committee encouraged men to better themselves beyond what their pension 
afforded, reasoning that if a pension was clawed back because of additional 
                                                 
26 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Soldiers’ Pensions: Proceedings of the 
Special Committee Appointed to Consider and Report Upon the Rates of Pensions to be Paid to 
Disabled Soldiers, and the Establishment of a Permanent Pensions Board (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 
1916), n.p. (“Appendix No. 4, Third and Final Report”) 
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earned wages, then “a premium would be put on shiftlessness and 
indifference.”27 
As the pension system expanded, so too did the responsibilities of the 
MHC. By 1918, its civilian and military functions were separated, leading to 
the creation of the Invalided Soldiers’ Commission.28 This new commission 
was short lived and, in May 1918, it was folded into the newly created 
Department of Soldiers’ Civil Re-establishment (DSCR). Along with the 
increased duties of the Board of Pension Commissioners, this new ministry 
controlled “all matters relating to the re-establishment [of all soldiers who 
had served in the war] in civil life.”29 It was responsible for administering 
hospitals, sanatoriums, and outpatient clinics, and the provision of free 
medical services and vocational training and re-training for eligible 
veterans.30 By the Armistice, the federal government had presided over an 
unprecedented expansion of the state’s social welfare system that included 
administration of new programs for veterans’ health, education, and training, 
all of which was designed to get returned men back to work. 
Ottawa’s vocational training programs targeted wounded veterans 
and minors who enlisted with the CEF. The DSCR’s approach “pioneered” a 
combined program of “occupational therapy, functional training and 
                                                 
27 Neary, On to Civvy Street, 10.  
28 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Report of the Work of the Invalided Soldiers’ 
Commission (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1918). 
29 Canada, Public General Acts [hereafter Acts], 1918, c. 42, 137-8. 
30 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Report of the Special Committee on Soldiers’ 
Civil Re-establishment (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1919), 8-16. 
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vocational training.”31 The programs were designed to ensure veterans 
became “self-supporting and independent of Government aid as quickly as 
possible.” Approximately 53,953 men received training. The DSCR partnered 
with labour and employers in “industrial establishments,” as well as with 
universities and technical schools. According to a 1919 report by the Special 
Committee on Re-establishment, the program achieved 90 per cent 
employment, with nearly 68 per cent securing a job in their field.32 While the 
achievements of these vocational courses were impressive, they were limited 
to wounded veterans. Able-bodied men, who numbered several hundred 
thousand, were not eligible for similar federal assistance. Apart from a one-
time gratuity payment, the only federal program that created jobs for 
veterans was Ottawa’s land settlement scheme.33  
Both Ontario and the federal government considered soldier 
settlement the only acceptable program to employ returned men.34 These 
                                                 
31 Robert England, Discharged: A Commentary on Civil Re-establishment of Veterans in 
Canada (Toronto: Macmillan, 1944), 164-67. 
32 Report of the Special Committee on Soldiers’ Civil Re-establishment, 13. According to 
Neary, 52,603 men joined the department’s programs, 43,457 of which completed courses. 
His figures for employment also break down differently, including 64 per cent who found 
work in their field and 25 per cent in other occupations. See Neary, On to Civvy Street, 15. 
33. Repatriation Committee, Returned Soldiers’ Handbook: Contains Valuable Information 
and Tells You Where to Get More (Department of Public Information, n.d.), 5. See too Neary, 
“‘Without the Stigma of Pauperism’,” 32. While Ottawa did distribute relief grants in the 
early 1920s to address veteran unemployment, the federal government maintained 
throughout the interwar era that “the question of unemployment amongst ex-service men 
has not been assumed by legislation as a responsibility of the Federal Government.” See 
DPNH Deputy Minister J.A. Amyot quoted in Neary, “Without the Stigma of Pauperism,” 36. 
34 The exception was a series of direct federal grants, administered by the CPF, to 
provide season relief from unemployment. As Peter Neary notes, by 1921 this assistance was 
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governments recognized that jobs for veterans were critical to the country’s 
postwar success and soldier settlement combined support for rural farming 
with the need to find work for returned men. Canada’s wartime leaders also 
hoped that settling the country’s unpopulated regions would usher in a wave 
of postwar prosperity. What neither provincial nor federal government 
anticipated, however, was how a rapidly destabilizing economy would 
undermine returned men’s faith in the future.  
In Canada, the tradition of compensating soldiers with land began 
with the Régiment de Carignan-Salières, which was offered land in exchange 
for settling New France. It continued during the American Revolution with 
provision of land for Loyalists and again with the “vast tracts” of territory 
given to British militiamen in the 1870s and 1880s. After the South African 
War, the Volunteer Bounty Act of 1908 offered veterans a parcel of 2.3 million 
acres in Alberta and Saskatchewan.35 Three years into the First World War, 
Ontario was the first jurisdiction in Canada to offer land to the conflict’s 
veterans. The provincial soldier settlement scheme was established at 
Kapuskasing, west of Cochrane. It was championed by Howard Ferguson, 
Minister of Lands, Forests, and Mines, who considered the program the 
perfect way to colonize Ontario’s north.  
Prime Minister Borden was impressed with Ontario’s initiative and 
requested additional information about the scheme. In January 1917, Borden 
called an inter-provincial land settlement conference to discuss the possibility 
                                                                                                                                           
reduced to helping “unemployed pensioners.” Men who could work and who were not in 
receipt of a pension were not eligible. See Neary, “Without the Stigma of Pauperism,” 33.  
35 Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 100.  
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of a dominion-wide program offering lands to returned soldiers. A federal 
cabinet committee began framing Ottawa’s new legislation, which passed 
parliament as the Soldier Settlement Act of 1917. The Act also created the 
Soldier Settlement Board (SSB), which was empowered to grant twenty-year 
loans, up to $2,500, at five per cent interest.36 These loans could be used for 
the purchase of land, machinery, and livestock and could be applied either to 
property already owned or to new lands a veteran wished to purchase. 
Ottawa’s legislation also opened up all “undisposed-of land” within fifteen 
miles of a railway, which was made available to returned men in tracts of 160 
acre grants of free land.37   
Initial participation in Ottawa’s plan was a disappointment. Between 
1917 and 1919, barely 2,000 veterans took part in the program, in part because 
it restricted participation to dominion lands in western Canada.38 If potential 
settlers east of Saskatchewan wanted to take part in the program, they had to 
do so provincially, with only Ontario operating such a plan. “The remaining 
Dominion lands,” a 1921 report concluded, “did not afford the necessary 
scope for a land settlement policy for returned soldiers.”39  
                                                 
36 Fedorowich, Unfit for Heroes, 63. 
37  Soldier Settlement Act (1919). 
38 Eayers, In Defence of Canada, 49-50; in his biography of Meighen, Graham describes 
the figures as “slightly over two thousand.” See Graham, Arthur Meighen, Vol. I, 246. 
39 Soldier Settlement on the Land: Report of the Soldier Settlement Board of Canada, 31 
March 1921 (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1921), 26. 
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In 1919, Arthur Meighen put forward a revised program in an effort to 
make the federal scheme “more attractive” to prospective settlers.40 Ottawa 
agreed to an increased credit program to assist the “best of [Canada’s] 
manhood.”41 To be eligible for the new scheme a veteran had to have served 
overseas (or be in receipt of a pension) and he could not have been 
discharged “on account of misconduct.” Widows of men who died overseas 
were also eligible, as were men who served in the Imperial forces, provided 
they appeared before additional committees to determine their suitability. 
Those in need of institutional instruction were provided a training allowance, 
ranging from ten to sixty dollars a month, depending on the size of a man’s 
family and marital status. The total number of men who undertook training 
was small, totaling approximately 2,300 by March 1921.42  
Once approved, settlers were eligible for free grants of land of up to 
160 acres. Financial assistance was provided for settlers who purchased land 
through the SSB, to those with lands in the Prairie Provinces, and to qualified 
settlers already in possession of agricultural land. In the West, Ottawa 
reserved all vacant dominion land within a fifteen-mile radius of the railway. 
The railway belt in B.C. was also reserved for settlement. Should speculators 
refuse to sell these lands, Meighen’s new Act empowered the SSB to purchase 
it “at a price set by the Exchequer Court.”43 
                                                 
40 Soldier Settlement on the Land, 76. 
41 Soldier Settlement on the Land, 8. 
42 Soldier Settlement on the Land, 46. 
43 Soldier Settlement on the Land, 152, 154. 
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The new program proved more popular than Ottawa’s initial foray 
into soldier settlement. According to surveys conducted in early 1918, nearly 
twenty-five per cent of the CEF overseas wanted to settle on the land. 
Meighen later revised these figures downward, reporting that of the 273,444 
replies received from members of the CEF, 87,771 (approximately 20 per cent) 
were interested in “farming and stock raising.”44 Veterans had to prove that 
they would make suitable farmers. Men were evaluated on their physical 
fitness, military qualifications, general fitness, and agricultural experience. 
Applicants could be deemed qualified, unqualified, or qualified but in need 
of “further farming experience.” This latter category was eligible for both 
agricultural training with another farmer and institutional training at 
provincial agricultural colleges.45 
Initially, the settlement scheme appeared promising. When Canada’s 
postwar economy began to decline, however, soldier settlers faced a series of 
setbacks. According to Morton and Wright, “soldier-settlers had arrived too 
late for wartime profits, but they had paid wartime prices for land and stock, 
and their debts must be paid off as farm incomes plummeted.”46 Subsequent 
downturns soon “ushered in a period of failure, foreclosure, abandonment 
                                                 
44 Fedorowich, Unfit for Heroes, 79. It is unclear whether these latter men wanted to 
take part in the soldier settlement program, or whether they were simply interested in 
farming and stock raising more generally.  
45 Soldier Settlement on the Land, 33-34. The vast majority of men whose applications 
were turned down were disqualified because they were generally unfit. Seven per cent were 
disqualified because they did not meet the qualifications for military service, three per cent 
were disqualified for reasons and physical fitness, and ninety per cent were disqualified “on 
account of general fitness.” See too Soldier Settlement on the Land, 46 
46 Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 151. 
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and indebtedness which haunted solider settlers and politicians alike 
throughout the inter-war period.”47 The costs to operate the new farms 
continued to increase just as prices for agricultural products (particularly 
wheat) began to decline from artificial wartime highs. Walter Woods, who 
worked in the Calgary office of the federal Soldier Settlement Board, 
described the overall shortcomings of the settlement policies: 
Our conclusion after some years’ experience was that [the debt 
loads incurred by settlers meant that establishing themselves] 
simply could not be done. Not even if prices remained stable 
and the weather was kind to them. The settler’s equity of $500 
could be wiped out by the loss of a couple of head of cattle, by a 
hailstorm in a matter of minutes, or a drop of a few cents per 
bushel in wheat prices, leaving him with an overhead debt for 
everything around him. He was bankrupt. So we concluded that 
the financial basis of our settlement plan was unsound. 
Remedial measures such as revaluation of the land and 
writing off some of the debts, extending the term of payment, 
waiving of the interest, writing off the debt for stock and 
equipment were applied to restore the financially sick scheme. 
These acted as palliatives but had the effect of the veterans 
losing confidence.48  
The federal government’s leading policy to employ returned men was a 
failure. By 1924 more veterans left the scheme than were willing to take up 
homesteads and the program began a long, slow decline.49  
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48 Walter Woods, The Men Who Came Back (Toronto: Ryerson, 1956), 86.  
49 Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 204. 
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Ontario’s soldier settlement plan was as ambitious as that of the 
federal government. It set aside six townships of land off the National 
Transcontinental Railway west of Cochrane, Ontario. The scheme planned to 
employ veterans while also colonizing the province’s northern region. In 
Howard Ferguson’s opinion, this development would spearhead a major 
expansion into Ontario’s vast hinterland. It was also designed to address 
growing wartime complaints that more “should be done for … returned 
men.” As the future premier explained during the inquiry into the colony’s 
failure, “the agricultural feature was emphasized in view of the necessity of 
production, and that [returned men] should be given an opportunity on the 
land.”50 Ideally, Ontario’s settlement program was designed to allow veterans 
who wanted to work the land to do so.51 The province never laid out in clear 
policy for the colony’s operation, however, and the settlement evolved 
without clear direction.  
Despite a grand vision for its success, Ontario’s soldier settlement 
scheme at Kapuskasing proved an even greater disappointment than 
Ottawa’s. It operated between 1917 and 1921 and failed so spectacularly that 
Premier E.C. Drury cancelled the program outright. Participating veterans 
were frustrated by the scheme’s inefficient administration and poor returns. 
Many were disillusioned by the program’s failure to meet expectations and 
that the province was unwilling to do more to help them secure postwar 
employment. The failure of Ontario’s soldier settlement scheme, like its 
                                                 
50 AO, RG3-5-0-63, Soldier Settlement – Kapuskasing Evidence (1), Testimony of Rt. 
Hon. George Howard Ferguson, n.d., 33.    
51AO, RG3-3-0-78, Soldier Settlement.  
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federal counterpart, affected returned men’s views on employment and 
postwar Canada in general, foreshadowing the relationship between federal 
and provincial approaches to veterans’ policies and their negative impact on 
returned men throughout the interwar era. 
Many of the veterans who joined Ontario’s program lacked either the 
capital or the experience to farm in the province’s north. Nonetheless, 
Ferguson’s plan discounted these shortcomings when it promoted the plan to 
serving soldiers and veterans.52 In place of experience, the province assumed 
that a co-operative organization could sufficiently train and fund the new 
settlers. In order to help the new settlers establish themselves, the Ontario 
government agreed to provide a communal resource pool of instruments such 
as threshers and other “expensive” classes of equipment. Smaller 
investments, better suited to the budgets of individual farmers, including 
ploughs and horses, could be purchased through loans.53 In addition to 
purchasing machinery, Ontario also centralized control of the Kapuskasing 
colony under the settlement’s superintendent. He was responsible for the 
administration of the colony as well as directing its organization and training. 
The province believed it designed the Kapuskasing settlement to allow 
                                                 
52 In 1917 premier Hearst sent Colonel Cecil G. Williams, formerly in charge of 
recruitment in Canada, to Europe to pitch the province’s settlement scheme. Williams’ report 
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unskilled farmers to prosper and it assumed that because the men lacked the 
requisite experience they would need additional direction and supervision. 
Unfortunately, none of the superintendents proved capable of controlling the 
settlement and its administration deteriorated along with the prospects of the 
settlers.54 
When the colony opened, settlers had immediate difficulty meeting 
their production targets. In exchange for their plot of land, men were required 
to clear ten acres. In both 1917 and 1918, however, few were able to meet this 
goal. A contract system was implemented to address this shortfall whereby 
settlers pooled their labour on each other’s farms. The hope was that working 
together would help men meet their objectives. Ideally, each group of farmers 
would be led by a more experienced hand, so that they could gain practical 
experience while learning how to carry out their work.55  
No amount of training could prepare men for the climate in 
Kapuskasing. In 1918, for example, the colony suffered frost every month of 
the year. Whole crops were ruined, especially potatoes, one of the main 
vegetables under cultivation. A harsh climate was not the only reason 
Ontario’s settlement scheme failed. The provincial government also 
undermined the colony by supporting incompetent or inefficient 
administrators. Kapuskasing was isolated and the settlement relied heavily 
on a centralized system of stores and lodging. Veterans were angered that 
                                                 
54 Report Commission of Enquiry Kapuskasing Colony 1920 (Toronto: Wilgress, 1920), 9. 
Men alleged too that the administrators refused to provide instruction to the men. Capt. 
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these services, including the provision of food stores, were lacking or 
expensive. Colonists also faced delays in the preparation of their land, and, 
once prepared, their clearings proved insufficient, “either to provide fodder 
for a cow or a team of horses.”56 Worse yet, the province misrepresented the 
price for pulpwood and a lack a local employment meant men could not 
supplement their meager earnings outside the colony.  
When the veterans began to complain about these setbacks a series of 
superintendents refused to address the colonists’ concerns, causing the 
settlers to lose confidence in their leadership. Rather than address these 
complaints, administrators clashed with the colonists. When one 
superintendent, Colonel Ennis, discovered that some of the settlers had 
attempted to organize a branch of the GWVA at the colony, he ordered it 
disbanded and had the “ringleaders” rounded up, placed in a boxcar, and 
removed from the settlement.57 By 1920, many Kapuskasing veterans felt that 
they had been sold a shoddy bill of goods. They were not making money, 
there was inadequate medical care for themselves and their families, and the 
stores in the settlement were over-priced and inferior. Moreover, their debts 
were rising, rather than decreasing, and the veterans felt the capital they 
invested in their homes was going to be lost because they were not worth 
projected market value.  
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The deterioration of the Kapuskasing colony contrasted with the rosy 
picture the Ontario government painted in its advertisements for the 
settlement plan. The province touted the scheme in publications overseas and 
at home. Yet, as a commission of inquiry called to investigate the settlement’s 
failure concluded, none of these advertisements accurately portrayed the 
conditions in northern Ontario. According to the inquiry, this literature 
“induced” men to come north under false pretenses. “Faced with unexpected, 
but not unusual conditions,” the settlers blamed the government for their 
failures.58 They were unhappy with the conditions at the settlement, with 
their training, with the scheme’s management, and with the returns they 
failed to receive. Ferguson was finally informed about the state of the camp 
towards the end of Hearst’s time in office. Instead of dealing with the 
complaints, however, he opted to do nothing, and left the matter to E.C. 
Drury’s incoming United Farmers of Ontario (UFO) government.59 
The new premier was critical of the scheme from the outset. Drury 
concluded that Ferguson’s plan was “ill conceived, ill executed, [and] 
founded on a mistaken appraisal of the agricultural possibilities” of the 
region.60 To rectify matters, the premier met with a delegation from the 
Kapuskasing settlement immediately after taking office. Life on the 
settlement, men complained, was “intolerable.” They informed Drury that the 
situation was near “open rebellion.” The premier agreed and wasted little 
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time in appointing a commission of inquiry to study the “administration, 
management, conduct, discipline, equipment and welfare of the Soldiers' 
Settlement Colony at Kapuskasing.”61 It vindicated the settlers’ claims and 
recommended that they be moved out. The government agreed, compensated 
every man who opted to leave, and wrote the entire scheme off “as a total 
loss.”62  
While the Kapuskasing scheme proved unrealistic, its failure was not 
entirely the fault of the climate, or the personalities involved. The settlers 
were poorly prepared for the rigors of homesteading. Many men who joined 
the program were “unsuited to pioneer life.” These veterans based their 
interest on idealized notions of farming and domestic life, not on an 
experienced understanding of the challenges they would face working the 
land in northern Ontario. They placed great importance on spending time 
with their families and such colonists “felt that having been overseas for a 
considerable time they should now have work such that they could be at 
home each night at least.”63 Nonetheless, the scheme was flawed, no matter 
how hard veterans were willing to work.   
Ed Stephenson, for example, was a colonist with over ten years 
experience homesteading on the Prairies. Given his time farming in the West, 
he should have been an ideal candidate to succeed at Kapuskasing. Yet, this 
experience did little to prepare him for the mismanagement and 
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disorganization in Ontario’s colony. Stephenson believed that the settlement 
compared poorly to the prewar system of federal settlement in the West, 
particularly the quality of the land. On the Prairies, homesteaders paid less 
for more land and these holdings were “level as a table.” With hard work, 
this veteran argued, settlers could have their land cropped in the first year 
and Prairie settlers could make a living within three years. This was not the 
case in northern Ontario. At Kapuskasing, the men were given 100 acres 
compared to the 160 offered by Ottawa, all of it completely unprepared for 
cultivation. Under the provincial scheme  
the settler … might clear [the] first ten acres himself and receive 
an amount fixed by the authorities, or it could be farmed out. At 
any rate … then he was obligated to clear another ten acres at 
his own expense, and then having put in two seasons of 
arduous labor in a rather inclement climate and facing rather 
unusual conditions from an agricultural standpoint … he then 
came under the Dominion Homestead laws on the same status 
as a foreign born immigrant, and at the end of five years he 
would have his patent for one hundred acres of bushed land.64 
These problems were compounded by incompetent management, which 
Stephenson likened to a “vicious form of benevolent autocracy.” The veteran 
was incensed that the government controlled every facet of the plan, 
including “every inch of land,” and all access, services, and decisions about 
its management. Moreover, Stephenson was angry that the provincial 
government insisted on maintaining this level of control, despite calls by 
veterans to allow them to share in the colony’s administration. The province 
                                                 
64 AO, RG3-5-0-63, Soldier Settlement – Kapuskasing Evidence (1), Testimony of Ed 
Stephenson, n.d.  
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was “jealously” guarding against any attempt by the colonists to form a local 
government.65  
The veterans who signed on to the province’s settlement scheme did so 
with high hopes, but the challenges they faced at Kapuskasing left them 
disenchanted. William York, for example, was initially enthusiastic about his 
participation in the settlement plan. As he explained to the commission 
investigating the scheme’s failure, he “had faith in the country” and he 
considered the colony a way to “make good” his peacetime future. York 
remained optimistic that the scheme could work if its organization and 
administration were changed. Unfortunately, this did not happen and 
continued setbacks tested the colonists’ resolve. York warned that if “one 
more thing” went wrong, they would be forced to quit.66  These men were 
keen to succeed but recognized that they were “steadily [getting] behind.”67 
Even if they did not want to stop farming, they concluded that they had to cut 
their losses. John Davidson was equally eager to succeed, but after the 
scheme’s failure, he was reduced to “hoping to save a loss, as I had all I 
owned in my holding.”68 Thomas Boyle’s position on the viability of the 
settlement captured the sense of utter frustration: “I most decidedly want[ed] 
                                                 
65 AO, RG3-5-0-63, Soldier Settlement – Kapuskasing Evidence (1), Testimony of Ed 
Stephenson, n.d. 
66 AO, RG3-5-0-64, Soldier Settlement – Kapuskasing Evidence (2), letter from 
William H. York, n.d. 
67 AO, RG3-5-0-64, Soldier Settlement – Kapuskasing Evidence (2), Statement of 
George Dyson, 5 March 1920. 
68 AO, RG3-5-0-64, Soldier Settlement – Kapuskasing Evidence (2), Statement of John 
Davidson, 4 March 1920.  
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to get out.”69 As George Harrow explained, there were “no prospects of 
making farming go.”  
Harrow’s disillusionment was made worse because, much like Ed 
Stephenson, he had been a farm labourer before the war and believed that 
farming was what he did “best.”70 If Harrow and other farmers found the 
scheme unworkable, then the Kapuskasing settlement was doomed, a view 
shared by William Baker. Baker had farmed in Prince Edward County for 
eleven years before he enlisted. Despite his prewar experience, however, the 
veteran complained that he could not “make enough to live” at Kapuskasing. 
He informed the inquiry that “the farm does not pay. The climate is too cold. 
The frost killed all my stuff and my neighbour’s last summer. I do not want to 
quit, but I must.”71 Charles Clifford Waterhouse summed up the colonist’s 
sentiments. He was “greatly disappointed” with the whole experience.72  
The failure of Ontario’s soldier settlement scheme demonstrated the 
limits of the province’s program to support returned men and was another 
example of the setbacks veterans faced. When this failure became clear, the 
province provided limited compensation, but it was unwilling to re-consider 
its wider approach to re-establishment, no matter how difficult a time men 
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had re-establishing their lives. The federal-provincial agreement of 1915 
divided responsibility for disabled and able-bodied veterans and continued 
to shape provincial and federal reactions to re-establishment. If a veteran was 
not disabled by wartime service, he was considered a provincial 
responsibility and the provincial Soldiers’ Aid Commissions had no power to 
create positions for returned men. If veterans had trouble securing 
employment, it was up to each individual to take the initiative to find a job. 
For many returned men, however, the transition from military life to civilian 
society was not so easy.  
When men enlisted, they entered a military world defined by 
discipline, hierarchy, and orders. Few understood how significantly this 
experience would change them.73 After demobilization, neither the military 
nor the state made a concerted effort to guide men back towards civilian 
independence and any energy expended to this effect focused exclusively on 
the rehabilitation of wounded and disabled soldiers. The DSCR recognized 
that veterans would face setbacks but its officials expected them to prepare 
themselves for civilian life. The department warned able-bodied men that re-
                                                 
73 Lt.-Col. L.W. Mulloy, “Demobilization,” Reconstruction: Bulletin Published by the 
Department of Soldiers’ Civil Re-Establishment for the Information of all Interested in the 
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establishment was not the responsibility of the government. “Individual 
effort,” it advised, had won the war and the same would be true for peace.74  
Veterans were disappointed that the state’s demobilization policies 
conflicted with commitments made during and after the war.75 The federal 
government made public promises to soldiers that they “need have no fear 
that the government and the country [would] fail to show just appreciation of 
[their] service.” Prime Minister Robert Borden considered it Canada’s “first 
duty” to support the troops and he promised them that none would have 
“just cause to reproach the government for having broken faith” with its men. 
Later, the Union Government made more sweeping commitments promising 
to expand state support for veterans. These vague promises included care for 
the “maimed,” “broken,” “the widow and the orphan.” According to the 
federal government, each would be protected and Ottawa re-assured serving 
men that “duty and decency demand[ed] that those … saving democracy 
[should] not find democracy a house of privilege, or a school of poverty and 
hardship.”76 Borden never revealed what he thought about these 
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commitments or how they would be implemented.77 Although vague, soldiers 
and the public understood these promises to mean they could expect postwar 
social and economic assistance if needed.  
Veterans and their families had good reason to believe in such support 
because the promises to assist returned men were only one part of a much 
wider chorus of voices offering support. All of these commitments remained 
vague, but they assured men that in return for military service, they and their 
families would be looked after, especially if they needed postwar 
employment. Any veteran who read the mandate of the MHC, for example, 
would learn that the commission committed itself to the “provision of 
employment for returning soldiers and training of disabled soldiers.”78 Public 
statements by the commission reinforced this position. Once established, the 
MHC quickly assumed responsibility for “taking care of and providing for all 
returned soldiers who for any cause are incapacitated for employment, or 
who require special training or treatment before being able to undertake 
employment.”79 The MHC secretary, E.H. Scammell, was even more direct in 
his support for returned men. He believed that the government and the 
public needed to ensure that Canadian veterans returned “to a means of 
livelihood.” To Scammell, a livelihood meant both the disabled and able-
                                                 
77 The Prime Minister’s memoirs, for instance, make no mention of how he would 
have addressed the commitments. According to John English, however, he may not even 
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Life and World (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1977), 161. 
78 AO, RG3-3-0-95, “Employment and Settlement of Returned Soldiers,” R.L. Borden 
to W.H. Hearst, 11 October 1915. 
79 AO, RG 3-3-0-106, “War: Settlement of Returned Soldiers (1915),” n.d. 
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bodied, and he considered the former an “obligation” which fell “primarily 
on the State.” The government’s duty for veterans’ care and livelihood went 
beyond a simple cheque and was a responsibility that could not be 
“extinguished by the award of a pension from public funds.”80  
Provincial premiers were also supportive of Canada’s soldiers. Ontario 
Premier William Hearst understood that families expected politicians to keep 
their promises to veterans. “As public men,” he explained, “we say to the 
Soldier, ‘Go and fight for us and we will take care of you.’” With such 
statements of support, Hearst recognized that the state fostered an impression 
that it was bound by “a compact, and a most solemn one at that” that 
committed Canada to “take care of [its soldiers] to the best of our ability.”81 
Hearst could not foresee that failure to keep these promises would cause 
postwar disillusionment, but he did appreciate that breaking them would 
affect support for the war effort. The promises politicians made were integral 
to recruitment and, in a memorandum on federal-provincial responsibilities 
relating to the care of returned men, he explained that if the government did 
not act, 
men would be justified in saying ‘It is all right to get up on the 
platform and tell me to go and fight, it is all right to cheer and 
applaud as we go away, but what we want to know is: Who is 
going to look after our wives and families or who is going to 
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look after us if we return maimed, or find us work that we are 
able to do.’82  
To what extent the war generation appreciated that their politicians promised 
support in exchange for service is unknown, but the wartime and postwar 
record indicates they expected to be ‘looked after’. To veterans, the state had 
established a ‘social contract’ and they and their families considered wartime 
promises of support to be assurances that they would be cared for after the 
war.83 
After 1918, when returned men faced difficulty finding work, veterans 
expected Canada to “do its duty in caring for them” but all levels of 
government resisted responsibility for men’s postwar employment.84 Apart 
from the land settlement schemes, however, governments did little more than 
direct men to provincial Soldiers’ Aid Commissions, which remained limited 
in how they could assist veterans needing employment. The call for postwar 
aid was not a surprise, as the provinces had begun studying questions about 
demobilization as early as 1917.85 In Ontario, for instance, the provincial 
government commissioned a report from Cecil G. Williams, Chief Recruiter 
for the Dominion, to determine what the province’s men expected upon their 
                                                 
82 AO, RG 3-3-0-106, “War: Settlement of Returned Soldiers (1915),” n.d. 
83 AO, RG 3-3-0-106, “War: Settlement of Returned Soldiers (1915),” n.d. 
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return. Williams was struck by the extent to which Ontario’s soldiers were 
worried about postwar jobs. He warned Hearst that these men would not just 
“seek reward for [their] sacrifice,” but would “aggressively demand what 
they esteem their right to support, maintenance and betterment at the hands 
of those in authority.”86 
Appended to his report were letters from Ontario’s soldiers describing 
their desire for postwar work. This correspondence reveals that soldiers were 
deeply concerned about the future. They planned to hold Canada’s politicians 
to their promises. Private Frank Oldacre, who worked as a printer in Toronto 
before enlisting, explained that ensuring there were jobs for returned men 
must be the top priority for any re-establishment program.87 He anticipated 
that men would emerge from the war both physically and mentally wounded 
and he worried about whether the province (or nation) would live up to its 
promises. Would veterans be given the opportunity to “earn a decent 
livelihood,” he asked? Although he never defined “decent,” Oldacre 
explained that veterans wanted to “live comfortably,” to have a chance to 
support a wife and family, and to avoid having “to depend on charity.” 
Achieving this goal was essential to a meaningful peace and these vague 
ideals were the benchmarks by which he measured proposed solutions to the 
problems of the returned man.  
If a man could not return to work then Oldacre maintained that a new 
job had to found for him at least “as good as the one he quit” upon enlisting. 
                                                 
86 AO, RG3-3-0-109, “Reports on the War Conditions Overseas,” 
87 AO, RG3-3-0-109, “Reports on the War Conditions Overseas.”  
212 
 
 
 
For a man invalided home, Oldacre went even further. He had earned the 
right to receive full pay while recuperating and, once able to be discharged, 
that “a suitable job [be] given [to] him whereby he could earn a decent 
livelihood.” Should the state not back up its claims, then Oldacre warned that 
Canada’s soldiers risked regretting “standing by the Empire” and the last 
thing the government wanted was a postwar world where a man rued the 
“day he answered the Country’s call.”88 
While Frank Oldacre’s vision of postwar Canada outlined what men 
wanted, other veterans who contributed to Williams’ report focused on 
soldiers’ worries about the future. Stanley Bennett wrote Williams a lengthy 
memorandum on what Canada needed to do to demobilize successfully. He 
believed that rather than focus on what men hoped for, Williams needed to 
concentrate on what soldiers were concerned about. The latter would tell 
Williams far more than the “vague” hopes of a serving soldier. Bennett 
argued that dealing with veterans required a holistic approach to 
demobilization. He called for a committee to oversee “employment, labour 
relations, and demobilized men.”89 Unfortunately, Bennett did not have the 
chance to elaborate on his scheme. He was killed in August 1918. His 
surviving memo nonetheless laid out a series of recommendations about how 
to approach the postwar era. Returned men wanted a “square deal.” 
Although also vague, this general sense of a need for fair treatment reflected 
the links soldiers drew between the state and its wartime promises, and their 
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concerns over the economy and postwar prosperity. Men were worried that 
the war was going to hurt their ability to earn a living, either because of 
injury, lost experience, or a lack of training. Bennett believed these fears were 
the key to formulating effective demobilization policies because they went to 
the “root of the troubles that are going to cause many anxious moments to the 
future political parties when in power.”90  
Bennett argued that soldiers realized the economy was changing. He 
highlighted the fact that businesses were adapting to the wartime economy 
and that soldiers feared missing out on the new positions being created. To 
ensure that veterans were not disadvantaged in this new world, he 
recommended that Ontario create a committee to integrate policies of 
employment and demobilization.91 This position reflected his belief that 
Canada needed to embrace a comprehensive approach to re-establishing 
veterans. According to Bennett, the problems accompanying demobilizing 
tens of thousands of men dovetailed with existing social challenges, such as 
the need for employment. If they were not treated together, then Canada’s 
leaders would make “a jumble” of demobilization. Only a comprehensive 
committee could avoid postwar “chaos” and alleviate employment pressures 
by ensuring the most efficient use of resources. 92 
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Harold Innis was another young veteran who supported a more 
comprehensive approach to demobilization. In his Master’s thesis, Innis 
anticipated the creation of the Department of Soldiers’ Civil Re-establishment 
and he called for a “rational” plan to guide men’s return to civilian life. Innis, 
who rightly believed that the system in 1918 was haphazard at best, called for 
a “Department of Demobilization” that would supervise “all matters in 
connection with returned or discharged soldiers, or with the dependents of 
deceased soldiers.” Innis did not limit his analysis to ex-service men and he 
argued that a successful postwar Canada had to plan for the care of widows 
and orphans, disabled soldiers, and able-bodied soldiers as well. Like Oldacre 
and Bennett, Innis understood that the economic and personal impact of the 
war extended to families and he recognized that securing employment was 
not just a concern for men in service.93  
While Innis took the long view, Bennett believed that the most 
pressing requirement for successful demobilization was caring for disabled 
men. He also drew attention to the problem of failed wartime businesses, the 
need to plan for the transition from wartime to peacetime industry, the 
question of women in the workforce, and the importance of adequate 
“political representation” for veterans.94 First and foremost, however, were 
                                                                                                                                           
Rowell-Serois Commission’s report on the impact of the war. Its chapter on the postwar era 
argued that: “the success with which the Dominion Government had organized a peaceful 
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the interests of returned men. Any committee established to oversee postwar 
re-establishment had to be for their benefit and, in a recommendation that 
foreshadowed postwar division between veterans and civilians, Bennett 
recommended granting such a committee wide power, including the ability 
to compel businesses to justify their employees’ wartime service. His goal 
was to ensure that veterans were employed. Returned men, not those who 
stayed in Canada, were going to benefit from wartime service.95  
Bennett’s concern over postwar employment was fuelled by fear that 
the war’s end would bring about a “retrenchment” of the economy. The 
Canadian market had expanded during the war, Bennett warned, and if the 
country was going to ensure postwar prosperity, then it had make sure the 
economy continued to expand. His solution argued for an interventionist 
monetary policy: “Even as we [Canada] were prepared to lavish fast sums of 
money for the prosecution of the war, so must we be equally ready and 
determined to put our hands in our pockets and spend freely but wisely for 
the purposes of reconstruction.”96 In a similar vein, Bennett argued that if 
unemployment persisted, the government should be willing to keep men in 
the military. This policy of ensuring long-term employment would support 
men facing unemployment. Those who had jobs could demobilize and return 
to them immediately. Men without work, however, could stay in the service 
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and be put “into construction and forestry work until absorbed in factories, 
warehouses, railroads and mines as business gradually revives.”97 
As Williams’ report made clear, soldiers such as Bennett worried about 
postwar employment even before they returned home. They had enlisted as 
young men, some just out of high school or early in their careers. These men 
did not have jobs lined up for when the war ended and the prospect of 
demobilizing without a secure future was frightening. Edmund Malette, for 
example, enlisted after graduating from high school. He worried that even if 
he was spared by the war, and “not made a cripple,” that a lack of job would 
burden his parents.98 John Wordley also worried about his postwar future. 
Prior to enlisting he was a locomotive engineer for the Canadian Pacific 
Railway, a position to which he hoped to return. If the war left him “unable to 
do so,” then he believed his service entitled him to a “chance of learning some 
occupation,” as least “as remunerative” as his former profession.99 Harold 
Innis was also concerned about men’s postwar employment prospects, which 
he considered a problem for all veterans, not just wounded men: “The end of 
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the war will immediately present a task of finding employment for able-
bodied soldiers.” Innis believed that if the employment problem was not 
addressed, it would quickly spread beyond veterans. He sensed that the war 
had created an “unemployment problem” more generally and that successful 
postwar re-establishment needed to account for returned men and civilians 
labourers alike, particularly those in wartime industries.  
The postwar recession, combined with a hostile business climate, left 
returned men without the support they expected upon demobilization. The 
war generation considered this situation a broken promise and the slight was 
carried for years after. To their minds, these men were promised support in 
exchange for their service overseas and they now felt entitled to assistance 
when the jobs they had hoped for failed to materialize.  
In his embittered memoir, Not Mentioned in Despatches (1933), Frederick 
Bagnall singled out Canadian leaders for failing to live up to their wartime 
commitments. Bagnall, who was born in 1889, had enlisted with the First 
Contingent in 1914. He believed politicians like Borden when they promised 
to help Canada’s soldiers. The realities of postwar Canada, however, made it 
clear that Borden and other leaders could not be trusted. They were mere 
“orators,” Bagnall raged, who made “impossible promises about the things 
the soldiers would get when they got back.” While they may have delivered 
slick speeches, they failed to realize that failure to keep their promises left 
men “cynical.” Bagnall’s cynicism was rooted in postwar treatment. Those 
who had stayed home did not understand what returned men were going 
through. When faced with an unemployed veteran, Bagnall explained, 
society’s leaders did little to help and he singled out the “middle aged” for 
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special criticism, noting that if confronted with a returned soldier they did 
not say “‘young man, take my job’. Rather they would show you their fine 
places while you would be returning penniless.”100  
Broken promises and a lack of help with postwar employment were 
two grievances among many. Another was a simple lack of respect. This was 
worse than the government’s “lack of support” because it symbolized the 
conflict’s wasted idealism. Bagnall claimed that the outbreak of war brought 
with it a chance to “make good capital” on the “idealism of soldiers and their 
superb and enduring courage.” Such hope was fuelled in part by the heady 
rhetoric of politicians like Borden. But the opportunity was “lost” amidst 
postwar mismanagement. Instead of prospect and promise, peacetime 
Canada was defined by “continual calamities and a succession of lies.” 
Veterans lamented that nobody was making allowances for their difficulties. 
Certainly the war changed men but how could it have done otherwise? “The 
wonder,” wrote Bagnall, “was that [men] didn’t come back vastly different.” 
When they served Canada, men had embraced “ideals” and notions of 
“sacrifice.” These were not appreciated at home, leading to “a terrible 
wastage because of the lack of intelligent interest [in the plight of returned 
men] by the most highly educated and by the leaders in business.”101 
The fact that their mistreatment was unnecessary angered many 
veterans. Despite a series of setbacks, the war generation continued to believe 
Canada was capable of living up to its promise to make the postwar world a 
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better place. “Had the war ended in 1916,” Bagnall lamented, its “promises 
might have been fulfilled. There might have been a chance to do something 
but there was to be too much war to make any scheme of the kind workable.” 
In place of the world he fought for, however, this veteran concluded that the 
fighting had achieved the exact opposite. Instead of improving, the postwar 
world had gone to “ruin.”102 His memoir summed up his bitterness with a 
description of how wounded men, like himself, were treated:  
There were many unfortunate lads coming back crippled like 
myself. To give them a paltry pension and not to help them to 
fit into civilian life was cruel, cruel, as that barbed wire between 
the lines. We were to be allowed to carry that crippled feeling 
into that interminable vista of civilian life and we would be 
calloused by our sense of wrong. When we were to reach 
Canada we were to feel this like a blow for the civil life was too 
far from the war and its horrors.103  
Fred Bagnall was not alone in his criticisms. Other veterans offered 
similar critiques of postwar Canada, including Edward Chesley, who first 
voiced his concerns about veterans in 1921 when he wrote to the Toronto Star 
arguing for a more equitable distribution of the country’s Canteen Funds.104 
Ten years later, on the eve of his premature death, Chesley laid out a 
damning evaluation of the problems faced by returned soldiers. In a piece 
entitled “The Vice of Victory,” published in Bill Deacon and Wilfred Reeves’ 
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Open House (1931), Chesley explained the consequences of the failure to 
address the problem.105  
Deacon’s intention for Open House was to give voice to his generation, 
especially “the younger writing men of Canada.” The list of contributors 
reads like a who’s who of up-and-coming literary Canadians, including 
Bertram Brooker, Wilson MacDonald, Merrill Dennison, W.A. Irwin, J.H. 
McCulloch, D.M. LeBourdais, E.J. Pratt, John Armitage, and Charles W. 
Comfort.106 Deacon considered the book a “symposium of broader scope” that 
covered politics, economics, and the arts.107 Salem Bland, Frederick Banting, 
Emily Murphy, and other prominent Canadians all praised the book and it 
proved a moderate success that received “kind” reviews.108 In Deacon’s 
estimation (which should not be discounted given his position in the 
Canadian book market), if Open House had had “more efficient 
merchandising,” it would have been a best seller. Despite the advertising 
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campaign’s shortcomings, however, Deacon still considered the sale to have 
gone “really well.” More importantly he told Austin Campbell, a 
businessman and occasional author, that the book had  
caused more talk than any other 1931 book of whatever origin. 
With all its defects, Open House has made history; and is leaving 
a profound impression. Eaton’s displayed it on their center aisle 
on publication, and after three months it is still there. They have 
been ordering 25 at a time which is the peak performance for 
non-fiction. Libraries everywhere are stocking it.109 
Deacon was obviously proud of the book and he reserved his highest praise 
for Campbell’s friend, Edward Chesley, whose contribution was an “enraged 
and bitter indictment of the total futility of the Great War and of the 
indifference of society to those who returned handicapped physically and 
psychologically.”110 In Deacon’s opinion, Chesley’s study of returned soldiers, 
was “justification” alone for publishing Open House.111  
Deacon believed in Chesley’s piece. He liked its style, its contribution 
to the debate over veterans, and how it aligned with his personal feelings on 
the war, his country, and Canada’s responsibilities to those who served 
overseas. “No other contribution [to Open House]” he wrote Chesley, “comes 
as near to what ought to go into this book.” The chapter on veterans was an 
“important” subject that amounted to a public service. “As one who did not 
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get into the army,” Deacon explained, “I have always felt that I carried a 
peculiar burden; that it was up to me, someway, to compensate.” Publishing 
Chesley’s piece helped Deacon fulfill this debt.112 
 “The Vice of Victory” challenged denials of the problems faced by 
returned men. It listed specific points of contention, including access to 
proper medical care and sanatoriums, inadequate pensions, and the fact that 
men were unemployed and left peddling minor goods to survive. Failure to 
reach a solution to the “returned soldiers’ problem” was also undermining 
Canada’s future.113 As a result, Chesley launched an attack against the status 
quo, arguing that Canadians had drawn the wrong lessons from the war and 
that the failure to learn from the experience was jeopardizing the nation’s 
most valuable asset: its youth. The resulting critique was a major statement of 
postwar disenchantment.  
 Chesley argued that no one was more tired of the debates over 
veterans than returned soldiers themselves. Whether in newspapers, royal 
commissions, or political speeches, nobody seemed capable of solving the 
problem. “For a dozen years now the clamour has swelled or waned 
according to political need,” a situation that Chesley blamed on politicians, 
profiteers, and those overtly religious or patriotic .114 Their ‘clamour’ lacked 
rhyme or reason, however, and their failures resulted in a needless re-hashing 
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of painful memories and broken dreams. Whenever their issues were brought 
up, veterans found their old wounds “twitching” as they tried to protect their 
“quiet homes” from being surrounded by the “froth and dirty debris of war.” 
Chesley’s bitter conclusions echoed Fred Bagnall’s belief that Canada had 
squandered the optimism and idealism of the war effort. Dredging up 
grievances achieved nothing except to remind men of “four years of wasted 
effort and lost opportunity for happiness.”115 
Chesley did not shy away from tackling the consequences of the war, 
unlike many of his contemporaries. Between 1918 and 1939, ex-combatants of 
every stripe published books, articles, and pamphlets about the conflict, 
which explored a variety of experiences, particularly in the different branches 
of military service. Some wrote about the artillery, others about their time in 
the infantry or in the cockpit of an early aeroplane. The resulting work (like 
the war novels All Else is Folly and Generals Die in Bed) could be extremely 
critical of the war, but its focus was the war itself, not the conflict’s aftermath. 
Not so with Chesley. He did not shy away from the subject. In fact, he 
thought so strongly about the issues of returned soldiers that he considered 
them “Canada’s problem.” In his view, the war, commemoration, and 
returned men were interconnected, requiring the “maturest consideration.”116  
Chesley was clearly an impassioned writer, occasionally at the expense 
of clarity. His piece lacked structure and its themes—youth, betrayal, and 
duty—were developed haphazardly. He was not blind to these shortcomings, 
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however, and he admitted that his paper was incomplete. After submitting it, 
Chesley wrote Deacon explaining that he would likely come to “regret” how 
he had expressed his thoughts. Despite organizational shortcomings, 
however, Chesley maintained that his arguments “came straight from my 
heart” and, because he refused to tone down his criticisms, he could only 
agree to publish his paper anonymously.117 This decision was not taken 
lightly, or out of any “fear of criticism.” Rather, Chesley knew his criticisms 
of the war and Canada’s treatment of its veterans was provocative. Although 
he stood by his opinions, he was barely a few months into a new job with the 
provincial government, and at the height of the Depression. He desired 
anonymity to avoid the inevitable “complications” his article might create for 
his career.118  
Chesley asserted that ten years after the war veterans were a lost 
cause. Yet, like many of his generation, he believed that Canada still had an 
opportunity—even a duty—to learn from their experience. He acknowledged 
the disillusionment of returned men and the futility of rehashing their 
complaints. These men were bitter for good reason. Their government failed 
them repeatedly. With each failure, “bitterness” was “added to bitterness” as 
veterans descended into a “chamber of death in agony of mind and body.”119 
Inadequate pensions, lack of hospital beds, and all other grievance were 
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dismissed outright because the sick would “soon die.” According to Chesley, 
fair treatment amounted to more than being “generous” or “humane” to 
returned men. The only thing that would lead to veterans’ “tranquility of 
mind” was if Canadians learned the proper lessons from the war. Then, the 
war’s sacrifices would have been worth it.120  
Chesley was not optimistic that Canadians could draw the correct 
lesson from the conflict. He did, however, see an opportunity in the nation’s 
youth. If properly educated, there was a chance the “younger generation” 
could avoid their parents’ fate. Teaching the youth the right lessons, however, 
required cutting through a decade of misinformation. The young might have 
been aware that some returned men were struggling but such awareness 
barely scratched the surface. “You are not allowed to know the details of the 
suffering of hundreds, yes, thousands, of men,” he explained. Veterans’ 
troubles were too often brushed under the rug, leaving youths wondering 
“what the hell [the war was] all about.”121 Instead of recognizing their 
difficulties, veterans were championed as examples of “magnificent sacrifice 
for Justice and Right.” As a result, the youth learned that these postwar 
struggles were the price required to protect “Freedom, Prosperity, and true 
Patriotic feeling.” For Chesley, these were the wrong lessons to teach about 
the conflict. Had the nation’s leaders learned nothing? Instead of teaching 
youth about patriotism, Canadians needed to guard against such thinking. 
Veterans had been destroyed by the war. They had gone overseas a “motley 
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lot” of younger men but had returned shadows of their former selves, 
“dulled” and deprived of their pre-war inspiration. Whatever a man’s 
experience, those who returned after being “dragged through weary years of 
warfare,” did so with one thing in common: “they were thoroughly 
disillusioned.”122 In Chesley’s view, returned men could not come through 
the war “unscathed.” The conflict tested men’s faith in their leaders and their 
religion. “When the end came and the guns stopped,” there was nothing left 
but a “weary, disillusioned Canadian soldier [who] waited for the dawn of 
the drab day of peace.”123  
In making the case for a Canadian Lost Generation, Chesley wanted to 
protect future youth from the same mistakes. He and his contemporaries 
viewed the war as righteous. While it was waged, enlisting was a matter of 
duty, patriotism, and honour: “This was the war of all wars to set things right 
in the world to make decency and living the lot of all mankind. … Yes, 
indeed, this was a war in which all right-thinking men with a spark of 
manhood should take part.”124 But the war generation was ignorant about 
what modern conflict would cost. While “many thousands of our best men 
and youths” had accepted the call, too many had never returned. Their loss 
was not a sacrifice, however. It was simply a waste. Chesley concluded that 
the postwar world remained wracked by the same problems as before. In fact, 
from the standpoint of the 1930s, the world seemed even worse: “We never 
                                                 
122 Chesley, “The Vice of Victory,” 35-36.  
123 Chesley, “The Vice of Victory,” 37. 
124 Chesley, “The Vice of Victory,” 32.  
227 
 
 
 
imagined that thoughts of material gain from the struggle could lurk in the 
minds of any Canadian worthy of the name.” Chesley admitted that his 
generation had been naïve: 
We were brought up to hold our fathers and our preachers and 
our big business executives in great respect. We had too great a 
veneration for the judgment of our political leaders. We placed 
mankind generally on too high a pedestal. We did not suspect 
the wealth, luxury and power would be bought in blood. We 
had been fed on romantic history of war, songs of war, glories 
of war.125  
Support for the war was misplaced and, in many ways, the dead were lucky 
they never lived to see the betrayal. They were spared having to bear witness 
to the “jackals of greed and gain that would soon feast fat upon these human 
sacrifices.”126 These men squandered the best Canada had to offer. They had 
been “manhandled by numskulls; weakened in spirit; deadened in faith; 
injured in body; and finally sent under woeful leadership into the mud and 
filth, to fall at last, riddled with poisoned iron, upon the thorny last resting 
place of barbed wire.”127 
War destroyed the promise of Canada. The loss of so many promising 
minds left the country “beggared for want of leadership and inspiration.” 
Society’s elders offered no solution. They may have tried to carry on, but 
inevitably they found themselves lamenting the passing of the “flower” of 
Canada’s youth. What about the younger generation? Surely it offered hope 
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for the future. In light of the direction of postwar Canada, however, Chesley 
was skeptical. He feared that the war had also sapped the prospects for 
youth. After all, they were “fathered by weary men” who had lost the “bright 
hopefulness and eager spirit” of the pre-war days. Disillusion and skepticism 
now abounded, “poor food” for the country’s youth to live on. Canada had 
not emerged from the war unscathed. It was now a “horror,” in a world filled 
with despair: 
The men who returned from the war take little part in the 
country’s affairs. Many are physically or mentally unable to do 
so. Others are disinclined. They had their day when the fighting 
was keen for a better world. Now they starve quietly, struggle 
on for the means of existence, laugh bitterly, get drunk when all 
else fails, and are at times querulous over little things connected 
with their comrades’ wealth.128 
When so much was at stake, how could men not be disillusioned by 
their treatment? Chesley tried to protect future Canadians from a similar fate. 
If they were not taught the proper lessons about the war, then they too were 
ripe for similar sacrifice. He pleaded that Canada listen to returned men. 
They knew the horrors of war first-hand. More importantly, they knew the 
disappointments of peace. If war did come again, as it looked like it could, 
Chesley hoped Canada would learn its lesson. When the fighting broke out, 
the country needed to do more than just start to plan for the future; it had a 
duty to start the right kind of planning “for equality of loss, equality of 
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suffering, and equality of material gain.” Doing otherwise would all but 
ensure that the sacrifices of the Great War generation were for naught.129  
These critiques of the place of returned men in Canada were based on 
more than personal experiences. They were part of a larger story, shared by 
those who lived the war and its aftermath. Veterans who discussed their 
disillusion felt secure taking a stand because they considered their personal 
experiences representative of their generation. Fred Bagnall, for example, felt 
his views were worthy of record because his experiences were 
“representative of a phase of life in a condition of war, the effects of which are 
still close to us in our problems.” He compared his experience with those of 
his peers: “[although] many of my remarks are made just in passing I know 
hundreds of thousands have passed along the same way.130  
Chesley’s generational identification was equally strong. In a letter to 
Bill Deacon, he explained that he grappled with questions about the 
representativeness of his views and the diversity of men’s experiences: “My 
main trouble, and what caused me to hesitate & ponder often was this point: 
it is so difficult to interpretate [sic] the feeling of such a varied mass of 
humanity as our returned men.” Yet, he was confident in his conclusions:   
I truly believe that I have struck the truth in the main. Whether 
acknowledged by many an individual or whether declared ‘the 
Crank’, it appears to me that a vast army of men now a’carrying 
on ‘at home’ are not capable of the same inspired thought or 
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action that would have been theirs if war had not dulled and 
hurt their minds & bodies.  
 The rest of the paper, it seems to me, will be 
acknowledged as close to the truth by all decent thoughtful 
minds that are not the tools or playthings of the fool “patriot” or 
the cruel money barons.131  
 
 On 14 June 1931, Edward Chesley fell ill. Thinking he was suffering 
from indigestion, he went to rest and slipped suddenly into a coma. He died 
before his friends could reach a doctor. They attributed his death to his war 
experience.132 Like countless veterans, it burned Chesley out. Yet, he joined 
the conflict freely and continued to believe in its purpose. Living in its 
aftermath, however, sorely tested these beliefs. What set Chesley apart was a 
willingness to discuss this aftermath and its affects. While his peers were 
rarely as open about their disillusionment, Chesley refused to remain silent in 
the face of failed policies and a series of broken wartime promises. He 
believed he spoke for his generation and, as the embittered letters from 
thousands of veterans in Canada’s canteen records demonstrate, he was not 
wrong. 
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Chapter 6 
Returned men and the Promise of the Canteen Funds 
 
“[The] health of almost everyone who served throughout the war was, 
to some extent, adversely affected. Men may not have been wounded 
nor have suffered from any illness, but I do not believe that any man 
could go through the campaigns of the Great War without his power to 
resist disease being minimized. It might be difficult to say that an 
infection of the lungs, or heart or nerves is unquestionably attributable 
to war service, yet a man would have to be superhumanly wise to say 
it was not.” 
- Sir Arthur Currie, 21 April 1927.1 
 
Wartime life strained the physical and psychological health of those who 
served. The resulting side effects manifested themselves differently in every 
individual. Often, however, as Sir Arthur Currie attested, these traumas went 
undiagnosed or untreated.2 For those eligible, pensions were the most 
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common means through which wounded men received assistance. Between 
1919 and 1935, the number of pensioners increased from 19,000 to 78,040.3 
Despite this growth, thousands of men battled with their own government 
over pension issues and over two-thirds were informed they were not eligible 
for assistance. These same injuries also undermined their ability to retain 
work and thousands struggled to find long-term employment throughout the 
1920s and the Great Depression. 
Returned men spent much of the early postwar period looking for a 
solution to these employment and health-related problems. Their first effort—
a call for a postwar bonus—split the nascent veterans’ movement. The largest 
group, the GWVA, sided with the federal government, which rejected calls 
for a bonus. Other groups, including the United Veterans League (UVL), 
backed the bonus campaign. When the fight failed, veterans’ organizations 
ceased trying to act on behalf of all veterans. Instead, the leading groups 
(including the GWVA) focused on specific policies (particularly pensions) as 
a means to improve the lives of wounded and disabled men. The federal 
government responded positively to this more targeted advocacy by calling 
successive commissions to address veterans’ concerns.  
The most significant effort to reconsider the veterans’ assistance 
system in the 1920s was the Commission on Pensions and Re-establishment, 
headed by J.L. Ralston. The commission was convened to examine complaints 
raised by the GWVA and “questions relating to pension, medical treatment 
                                                 
3. Cook, Shock Troops, 606.  
233 
 
 
 
and re-establishment needs” of returned men.4 It was the first time the 
Pension Board was held to account. The commission’s first report agreed with 
the GWVA that the board paid more attention to the treasury’s purse strings 
than to the “rights and benefits” of veterans or their dependents. Ralston also 
found it “striking” that the Pension Act did not allow for appeals. As his 
interim report concluded, the Pension Board was free from “appeal, control 
or effective review by any outside body” and he insisted that a reformed 
system had to include appeals.5  
The Ralston Commission altered how veterans interacted with the 
pension system but it was neither the first nor the last attempt to do so. 
Between 1919 and 1939, the Pension Act was amended sixteen times.6 The 
most important revision was the War Veterans’ Allowance Act, passed by 
Mackenzie King’s Liberal government in 1930. Better known as the ‘burnt 
out pension’, the War Veterans’ Allowance (WVA) was designed to assist 
“aged and permanently unemployable veterans.” Applicants had to be at 
least sixty years old, a pensioner, or a veteran of a theatre of war. Some men 
younger than sixty were also eligible for assistance, but only if approved by 
the WVA Committee established within the DPNH.7 The WVA, however, 
was never intended to address the problems returned men faced during the 
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Depression and it was unable to address widespread unemployment 
amongst veterans.8 
The Canadian Legion began a concerted effort to address veterans’ 
unemployment in 1931. By the middle of the decade, the organization lobbied 
Conservative Prime Minister R.B. Bennett, calling on him to recognize that 
the plight of ex-service men “constituted a special case within the general 
crisis” of the Depression. The federal government responded by calling for an 
inquiry, headed by J.D. Hyndman, President of the Pensions Court. The 
Committee, which submitted its report in 1935, found that Ottawa had not 
shirked its duty to returned men but there were “unemployed veterans who, 
though not eligible for pensions, had been handicapped by their war 
service.”9 Hyndman estimated that at least twenty-percent of veterans 
without a pension were unemployed and concluded that because “no single 
scheme would be suitable for the whole body of the employed,” a Veterans’ 
Assistance Commission should be established to address unemployment.10  
Of the sixteen recommendations suggested by Hyndman, most were 
“readily accommodated” by the DPNH, including increased pension 
payments, the hiring of more administrative workers, and the need for better 
co-operation with municipalities. The committee’s seventh 
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recommendation—a call for Ottawa to supplement municipal relief efforts for 
non-pensioned veterans—was “flatly rejected.” According to Peter Neary, 
what “led an essentially cautious and conservative committee” to make such 
a recommendation “was the shocking distress it found among many 
unemployed” veterans. The federal government was not willing to provide 
assistance to returned men whose “service did not disable them.” 11 
When Mackenzie King’s Liberals swept back into power in Ottawa in 
1935, the government rolled many of the proposed changes to the veterans’ 
system from Bennett’s tenure into a Special Committee on Pensions and 
Returned Soldiers’ Problems, chaired by Charles “Chubby” Power. When 
Power’s committee finally presented its findings in 1937, it again rejected the 
call for Ottawa to fund local relief payments for unemployed veterans. Power 
argued that war service did not “establish a claim on the Canadian people for 
special treatment beyond that given to ordinary civilians” because 
implementing such a policy amounted to giving “a pension or payment of 
some kind for every man who wore a uniform simply because he served in 
the Canadian army and not because he incurred any disability during that 
service.” In terms of men who were unemployable, Power committed only to 
further consultations with veterans’ organizations in hopes that an agreeable 
solution could be found.12   
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The series of interwar recommendations presented to Ottawa to 
address the veterans’ assistance programs did help some returned men. 
While lowering the age of eligibility for the WVA assisted those old enough 
to qualify, however, it did little to assist younger men deemed ineligible for a 
pension. These men continued to struggle throughout the 1920s and 1930s. 
The failure to acknowledge their claims left them hoping for an alternative to 
the pension system, which many believed they had found in the promise of 
the country’s canteen funds.  
During the First World War, the British government centralized the 
provision of supplies for its soldiers. The resulting Expeditionary Force 
Canteen (EFC) handled the procurement and sale of goods. It was operated 
by the Canteen and Mess Society (CMS), a co-operative organization that 
served the Empire’s soldiers, rather than shareholders. By 1917, the CMS 
morphed into the Navy and Army Canteen Board (NACB), which operated 
over two thousand canteens. The sale of its goods eventually amounted to 223 
million francs. When the war ended, the profits from these sales were 
transferred to the British Army Council, which, in accordance with the War 
Service Canteens (Disposal of Surplus) Act, were then allocated to the United 
Services Fund, under the direction of Lord Byng.13 Colonial units, including 
the Canadian Corps, were permitted to opt into the program and Canada’s 
share was overseen by Sir George Perley, Sir Edward Kemp, and the 
Canadian Chief of General Staff. After 1918, the funds were slated for division 
between the dominions.  
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Wartime estimates expected the Empire’s canteen funds to total over 
£13,000,000, although the total amount was debated. According to the British 
Legion, any account of these profits also had to include an additional 
£2,000,000 provided by the Army and Navy Canteen Board and another 
£1,000,000 from the War Office. If the £13,000,000 figure proved accurate, 
Canada was due upwards of $35,000,000.14 The existence of outstanding 
debts, including paying for the material lost during Germany’s Spring 
offensive in 1918, made exact estimates difficult. These and other losses 
remained un-tallied and they had to be deducted before any disbursement of 
canteen profits could take place. Nonetheless, the prospect of a multi-million 
dollar payout left returned men with high expectations. Moreover, having 
been disappointed in their push for a victory bonus and better pensions, 
many veterans hoped these profits would finally provide them with their 
monetary due.15 Again, they were to be disappointed.16  
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When eventually distributed, the canteen money failed to live up to 
expectations. Returned men were also disappointed at the pace of 
distribution, which was supposed to happen in 1919 or 1920, but did not 
formally take place until 1926. But the time it took to disburse the canteen 
money was only one aspect of the failure. Debate over how to divide the 
funds proved divisive and was often exasperated by disagreements over 
veterans’ postwar financial compensation, including the failed bonus 
campaign, the bankruptcy of the GWVA, and a sense that returned men were 
not getting a fair postwar deal. Nor did trouble end once the funds were 
distributed. By the end of the 1920s, veterans in Alberta, Nova Scotia, and the 
Yukon leveled complaints against the trustees overseeing their share of the 
canteen money. In Ontario, disagreement over who was eligible to use the 
funds was even more contentious.  
As the product of soldiers’ labour, the canteen funds were held in high 
regard. Canada’s soldiers had “spent freely” from their relatively respectable 
salaries of $1.10 a day because they believed they were “spending money in 
their own stores.” In a postwar interview, J. Harry Flynn, president of the 
United Veterans League, explained that it was simply “understood” among 
serving soldiers that they would share in the canteen’s profits.17 Men did not 
see this money as another government fund. They had paid into it 
throughout the war and considered it an earned reward. As such, canteen 
money was different from other types of social assistance emerging in 
                                                                                                                                           
man rightly feels that these monies belong to Service men and if there is any loss of 
maladministration or misdirect expenditure, the subject becomes a catalyst which encourages 
the crystallization of all the grievances of ex-Service men.” 
17 “Veterans Want Share of Canteen Profits,” Star, 18 December 1919, 30. 
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interwar Canada. Most notably, the fund did not carry the social stigma of 
employment assistance. Gaining access was not easy, however, and as the 
management and disbursement of the funds became mired in bureaucratic 
and human failings, anger and frustration mounted. The story of the canteen 
funds contributed significantly to veterans’ sense of disillusionment.  
Returned men did not expect that accessing their canteen funds would 
prove difficult. They assumed they would collect their money as soon as the 
war ended, and certainly by the end of 1919. Veterans returned home not just 
at the end of the conflict but throughout the war. Many were facing 
difficulties and the canteen money was expected to help them in the short 
term. The quick dispersal of the funds was widely recognized as a “most 
acceptable and well deserved Christmas present” that would cap off 
Canada’s victory overseas.18  
Expectations were also high because the Empire’s canteen profits were 
projected to total tens of millions of dollars. Rumours shaped expectations 
about the eventual size of the fund’s profits and, in the immediate aftermath 
of the war, huge sums were bantered about. Indeed, many Canadian 
newspapers reported that returns on the canteens were going to lead to a 
massive windfall. Both the Toronto Star and the Globe reported that Canada’s 
share of the total Empire fund amounted to $35,000,000.  
Returned men agreed to divide the funds equally amongst themselves. 
They called on the federal government, which controlled the funds until 1926, 
to distribute them equally to all ex-service men. In December 1919, the UVL, 
                                                 
18 “Veterans Want Share of Canteen Profits,” 30.  
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which supported the Bonus Campaign (unlike the GWVA), was inundated by 
a “stream” of calls, letters, and telegrams from its members calling on it to 
lobby the government. The association responded and its directors wrote the 
Minister of Militia, Sydney Mewburn, whose department was then holding 
the funds:  
returned soldiers of Toronto and Ontario request that the profit 
of the Canteen Fund be paid directly to the soldiers who served 
in France and England; also that the fund be distributed equally 
and paid as far as possible before Christmas.19  
The UVL’s call to divide the money tapped into a sense of brotherhood and 
shared experience. By pushing for control of the funds, however, veterans 
wanted more than just recognition of their service. They were demonstrating 
increased skepticism as to the government’s willingness to assist them. 
Lobbying to keep the money within the control of the former CEF was 
intended to protect their wider interests and the aggressive push for 
compensation revealed that the issue was already adding to postwar 
discontent.  
Returned men called on the government to use all funds available to 
assist them. Some groups, including the Army and Navy Veterans (ANV), 
wanted to pool all assistance funds available, which could then be 
administered by the Canadian Patriotic Fund. According to ANV estimates, 
the resulting lump sum would yield $2,500 for every ex-service man.20 The 
patriotic fund was a civilian organization, however, and many veterans were 
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angered at the prospect of civilian control of their canteen money. They were 
adamant that the group could have nothing to do with the fund. Whatever 
the proposals, veterans believed that the canteen profits belonged to them 
and not to the government or another benevolent organization. The funds 
were the “property of returned men” and no government had the right to 
transfer control of them to another organization. “Anything short of a direct 
and equal distribution” of the canteen profits amounted to “robbing the men 
of money which is justly and legally theirs.”21  
Not all veterans opposed the Patriotic Fund administering the canteen 
funds. One former branch president of the Tubercular Veterans Association 
was disheartened that the group was scaling back its operations and 
suggested that the canteen profits be handed over to the CPF so it could 
continue with its “good work.” Even supporters, however, believed that 
canteen assistance was only for ex-soldiers who were not disabled. 
Furthermore, the Dominion Veterans Alliance (DVA) needed a soldier 
representative on the board of the fund.22 As one GWVA Secretary explained, 
handing administration of this money to any other group—whether 
government or civilian—“would be disastrous.”23  
Even if returned men gained control of the canteen funds, they still 
had to decide how the money would be used and who was eligible to receive 
it. Should every man in the CEF get a portion of the funds or just those who 
                                                 
21 “Veterans Want Share of Canteen Profits,” 30. 
22 “The Canteen Fund,” Star, 3 February 1923, 6. 
23 “Veterans Want Share of Canteen Profits,” 30. 
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served overseas? Did distinctions between officers and enlisted men matter? 
What about dependents of those killed? Were they also worthy of assistance 
from the fund? With an estimated $35,000,000 payout on the line, these and 
other questions motivated significant debate and disagreement about how to 
use the canteen profits.  
The largest veterans organization—the GWVA—argued that 
disbursement had to account for the dependents of those killed. Families 
suffered unimaginable loss and, as one of the executive noted, even “a little 
may go a long way.”24 In terms of organizing the distribution of the money, 
the GWVA’s various branches favoured committees to oversee disbursement. 
The federal government, however, preferred a plan to distribute the money to 
each province. The association’s branches held such proposals in “contempt.” 
Instead, they preferred entrusting the fund’s handling to returned men who 
had served overseas (or to the dependents of those killed). Regardless, 
veterans were adamant that “no civilian organization” could be “entrusted” 
with the handling of the funds.25 
Debate on dividing the money soon spilled over into the newspapers. 
Men wrote to papers across the country with suggestions. Edward Chesley 
recommended that the funds be split into two blocks. The first would benefit 
widows, orphans, and other needy dependents. The rest of the money could 
then be collected in a lottery and divided up among returned soldiers. This 
proposal gained traction among the paper’s readers and, in 1921, many wrote 
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in support of the idea.26 Admittedly, Chesley did not know if his plan was 
legal, but he considered it a “satisfactory method” of dispensing the funds. As 
he put it, those who won would gain something worthwhile, while those 
without “would probably be no worse off than they would be under any 
other scheme.”27  
Returned men were not the only ones requesting access to the fund. 
Parents of men who had died overseas also believed themselves entitled to 
support. The provincial secretary of the GWVA may have agreed with equal 
distribution for returned men and their dependents, but he stopped short of 
sanctioning the fund’s dispersal to every living relative of deceased or 
returned men. “Only the claims of the dependents of those who were killed,” 
he believed, “will have to be remembered, along with those who came back.” 
One mother of fallen soldier disagreed: 
Many of those so very near and dear to the fallen soldiers are 
left much worse off financially than the dependents. Many of 
the fathers and others are left now, since the war has ended, 
broken in health and spirit. In some cases fathers have died 
leaving young children with no means of getting schooling. 
Those fathers getting up in years have no sons now to lean on as 
old age creeps on.  
                                                 
26 The idea obviously resonated with others. A week later another returned man, this 
one formerly of the 19th Battalion, wrote in support of Chesley’s proposal. What appealed 
was that it provided a definite way of ensuring support to between six and seven hundred 
men, who would certainly get “a nice little nest egg.” See “Disposal of Canteen Fund,” Star, 
12 December 1921, 4. 
27 “Disposal of Army Canteen Fund,” Star, 6 December 1921, 6. 
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“Why,” should those who “suffered so much through long days of anxiety 
and dread be called upon to bear this insult?”28 Her questions went 
unanswered but they pointed to the ever-increasing sense of entitlement that 
Canadian families affected by the war were feeling, especially when faced 
with the prospect of real monetary returns from the canteen funds.  
Chesley’s plan to use a lottery to distribute the canteen profits 
highlighted one of the major issues: there was no easy way to distribute the 
money. With over 420,000 soldiers who served overseas, and another 200,000 
in Canada, it was impossible to find a single solution to satisfy over half a 
million men.29 The first step to divide the money was not, however, taken in 
Canada. In 1919, the British Army Council asked Lord Byng, soon to become 
Governor General of Canada, to lead the distribution of the Empire’s funds. 
He agreed, provided he had “freedom” from government control.30 A Council 
of Management was subsequently established, made up of a representatives 
from ex-servicemen organizations. They divided Canada into ten areas and 
tasked over 2,500 local committees with determining the wishes of returned 
men. Although designed to canvas veterans, these committees did little to 
reach out and returned men not were consulted about their preference for the 
use of the canteen funds.  
                                                 
28 “Hero’s Mother Replies to Turley,” Star, 27 December 1919, 6. 
29 To discourage calls for per capita distributions, the DSCR explained that each man 
would only secure $3.50 and that the disbursement itself would be prohibitively costly. See 
“Suggest Four Plans for Canteen Profits,” Star, 12 November 1921, 14. 
30 Ralston Commission, Final Report on Second Part of Investigation, 143-44.  
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A decision on disbursement was slow in coming. By 1921, the federal 
government had been grappling with problems of re-establishment—
including distribution of the canteen funds—for nearly three years, far longer 
than other members of the British Empire. In Britain and Australia, the funds 
were divided by 1920, with the latter splitting the money according to 
military district (an administrative division of the country also used in 
Canada). Australia’s Canteen Fund Act stipulated that these funds were the 
property of ex-service men and should be disbursed “irrespective of other 
grants or provisions of repatriation.” 31 Canada took note and tried to hasten 
its allocation of canteen money by grafting the decision to distribute the 
funds onto an existing Special Committee called to address questions of 
veterans’ pensions, insurance, and re-establishment. This committee 
examined the approaches taken in Britain and Australia and solicited further 
suggestions from the Canadian veterans organizations.  
The Discharged Solders and Sailors’ Federation wanted the money 
used to enable “the transportation of the mothers and widows of the men 
who died overseas to visit the graves of their soldier sons and husbands.”32 
Lord Byng suggested that there was “no better” use for it than funding rest 
homes for ex-service men.33 The Dominion Command of the GWVA wanted 
the funds headed by trustees and devoted to scholarships for the children of 
                                                 
31 The A.E.F. Canteens’ Fund Act, 1920, cited in Special Committee (1921), 404. 
32 Special Committee (1921), 527. 
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returned soldiers.34 Colonel J.L. Regan, director of pay services in the 
Department of Militia and Defence, agreed with the GWVA. In addition to 
entrusting the fund to trustees, however, he preferred distributing it along 
military lines, as occurred in Australia. But, rather than distributing the 
money for educational purposes, the “trustees should be appointed to 
distribute [the funds] to the needy cases of ex-members of the forces, or their 
dependents.” Regan also stipulated that administration of the money 
required strong local representation by returned soldiers.35 No clear plan for 
how to distribute or administer the funds materialized, despite increased 
consultation. In fact, confusion about how the government’s role originated 
with the very committee tasked with finding answers to the canteen fund 
problem. When asked by committee member and New Brunswick MP, 
Arthur Copp how the canteen funds were to be spent, Regan replied: “That is 
up to your Committee.”36 Such uncertainty reflected a lack of information 
about how much money the fund entailed, but it was also a result of 
disagreement over its purpose and the difficulty of determining how veterans 
actually wanted their contributions distributed.  
Prior to 1921, veterans protested loudly against the fund being 
administered by civilian or political organizations like the Patriotic Fund.37 
According to the Toronto World, it was always understood that soldiers “were 
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36 Special Committee (1921), 404. 
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to receive a direct share in canteen profits.”38 The newspapers reported that 
men wanted a direct payment. The UVL demanded that the fund’s profits “be 
paid directly to the soldiers who served in France and England.”39 After three 
months of deliberation, the committee recommended a combination of the 
approaches put forward by Regan and the GWVA. It recognized that the 
funds were for the “benefit” of returned men and their families and that the 
government needed to carry out a full investigation to “determine the balance 
now held in trust.”40 Accordingly, the committee suggested the government 
further consult with the major veterans organizations to determine the “best 
method” to dispose of the funds.41 
In November 1921 the DSCR convened a Canteen Funds Disposal 
Committee to try to determine the method of distribution.42 The committee, 
headed by deputy DSCR minister F.G. Robinson, sought additional input 
from veterans. The department and the leading veterans organizations agreed 
to conduct a plebiscite on the use of the canteen funds. 555,000 ballots were 
distributed with four suggested options: 
1) Establishment of memorial workshops for the provision of 
sheltered employment and home employment for disabled ex-
service men, including the tuberculous; 
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40 Special Committee (1921), xxiv. 
41 Special Committee (1921), xxiv. 
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2) Establishment of a non-competitive industrial enterprise 
jointly owned and operated by ex-service men; 
 
3) Provision of scholarships of other educational facilities for the 
children of ex-service members of the Forces in need of such 
assistance; 
 
4) Provision of burial facilities for ex-members of the Canadian 
Forces who die in indigent circumstances.  
In addition to choosing among assistance for employment, children’s 
education, and burial options for the indigent, there was also space to add 
additional suggestions. The ballot did not offer an option to use the funds for 
veteran unemployment, a serious omission in light of the postwar recession.  
When the votes were counted, only 22,974 men replied. Of these 5,764 
opted for option One, while 3,574 added that they wanted the fund 
distributed as cash payments. The responses were weighed using a 
transferable vote, producing 11,565 votes for the first option. The Special 
Committee, having reconvened in 1922, rejected the plebiscite because it did 
not yield “conclusive results.”43 In so doing, it attempted to determine why 
veterans’ responses were so low. No definite answer emerged. Grant MacNeil 
of the GWVA explained to the committee that the poor turn out was 
“absolutely inexplicable,” but he wondered how different it was from the 
general electorate that did not vote on Election Day.44 What was clear was 
that the ballot options had not motivated returned men.  
                                                 
43 Special Committee (1922), xv. 
44 Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 149. 
249 
 
 
 
The decision to further delay distribution merged the canteen profits 
issue with the larger debates over how the state was addressing (or failing to 
address) the problems of returned men. During pension debates, for example, 
the canteen money was invoked as an issue alongside the failed bonus 
campaign and a myriad of other veterans’ complaints. In November 1920, the 
money was linked to a disagreement over wartime salaries. In what became 
known as the “eight million dollar exchange question,” returned men battled 
the federal government for what they deemed to be unpaid wages. During 
the war, the pound sterling decreased in value. Canada’s dollar, however, 
remained relatively strong. Because men had been paid based on the 
exchange rate, many now believed that they had been shorted considerable 
amounts of pay. The missing funds were estimated to approach eight million 
dollars. The solution, many veterans hoped, was that their salary claims 
could be added to the ample profits from the canteen funds.45 
In 1921, the GWVA called on the recently elected Liberal government 
of Mackenzie King to put the canteen funds to use. It presented the federal 
government with three options: distribute the funds among the provinces, 
establish an old-age pension fund, or use them for child education.46 The 
objective of these proposals was to distribute the funds to help alleviate the 
downturn in the economy while also limiting the government’s handling of 
their money. Unemployment had been rising since 1920 with conditions 
“particularly severe” in the Maritimes. All told, real wages dropped fourteen 
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percent in two years.47 As an added incentive to address these economic 
challenges, the GWVA offered to help coordinate employment relief. 
“Organized co-operation,” the association’s Grant MacNeil explained, “will 
undoubtedly do much to eliminate the necessity for unemployment relief on 
the part of the Federal Government.”48 In exchange, the leading veterans’ 
organization, which was financially-strapped, asked for an advance on the 
canteen funds to shore up its coffers. 
The government responded. On 5 July 1921, it authorized a $50,000 
payment from the canteen funds for the GWVA. Three months later an 
additional $120,000 payment was made. This second payment was split 
among the twenty-two ex-service men’s organizations, with the GWVA 
receiving the lion’s share ($80,000), bringing their total assistance to $130,000. 
These canteen payments were considered an advance “for the purpose of 
extending the scope and usefulness” of the GWVA. The Order in Council 
authorizing the plan recognized that the employment problem for returned 
men demanded “immediate attention” and allotted the money to deal with 
unemployment. 
Despite taking action, $200,000 could not solve the unemployment 
problem for returned men and allegations that the GWVA improperly 
handled its advance added to veterans’ growing frustrations. Instead of 
setting up a separate account to administer its allotted canteen money, the 
GWVA deposited its payment into its general account, making it impossible 
                                                 
47 Rowell-Sirois Commission, 113-114. 
48 MacNeil, cited in Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 188-189. 
251 
 
 
 
to trace. As MacNeil explained to a 1925 Senate Committee examining the 
handling of the canteen funds, the GWVA considered the money, which had 
been allocated for the benefit of ex-service men, synonymous with its own 
goals. As a result, it did not need to distinguish between its funds and those 
advanced by Ottawa. Captain J.T. Shaw, a sitting MP from Calgary West who 
represented the GWVA at the federal hearings investigating charges of 
mismanagement, noted the association considered the purposes of the two 
sums to run “concurrently with the purposes set out in the [Canteen Fund] 
Orders in Council …” and that  “the purposes of the G.W.V.A. are exactly in 
line with the purposes for which the money was voted.”49 Not everyone 
agreed. According to the audit conducted of the GWVA’s books, between 
July 1921 and August 1922, the GWVA spent its entire canteen fund allotment 
on “general” expenses, particularly on salaries and the publishing costs of its 
magazine, The Veteran.50 The committee further concluded that it did not 
appear that “any portion” of the money was spent on unemployment relief.51 
This mismanagement would not come to light until 1925, but in the interim, 
veterans were deprived of relief measures.  
The GWVA spent its canteen money by 1922 and this fact did not bode 
well for unemployed veterans who, after losing out on pensions and a bonus, 
now faced a third setback. The co-incidental establishment of the Ralston 
Commission, called to investigate issues relating to insufficient pensions, 
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however, offered another opportunity to decide how to disburse the funds. 
Ottawa asked Ralston to consider how the canteen money should be 
administered. As head of a federal commission, Ralston was concerned about 
whether the federal government had authority to dictate how the fund was 
administered or whether the money was the property of the individuals who 
paid into it.52 His commission also considered how the funds should be used. 
After a series of consultations, it concluded that Ottawa did have the right to 
dictate dispersal of the money. The two major issues for ex-service men were 
assistance for their children’s education and relief from “distress” among ex-
servicemen and their dependents. The commission determined that assistance 
could not be divided among individuals because it would be “impossible” to 
determine the appropriate share each contributor would be issued. As a 
result, the report recommended dividing the fund along provincial lines, with 
the money administered by groups of trustees. The commission concluded 
that this would be the most effective way to help individuals because it 
would “increase the facilities for securing an intelligent expression of opinion 
from ex-service men and make the administration of the money more 
effective by direct interest.”53  
A lack of provincial enlistment data made determining the percentages 
allocated to each province highly contentious. The commission considered a 
combination of provincial enlistment, discharge, and pension records as the 
fairest method to estimate the proportion of men in any one province. It 
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further determined that the government should make “reasonable efforts to 
ascertain the wishes of the beneficiaries, and if any consensus of opinion is 
obtained to conform therewith.”54 The report addressed veterans’ concerns 
about eligibility and the government’s responsibilities to them. It stipulated 
that any use of funds for relief purposes should be limited to men to whom 
no other source of relief was available. The goal was to ensure that the fund 
did not “relieve the State of any responsibility devolving on it.” Ralston’s 
report recommended that use of the fund be limited to men or their 
dependents. It advised that the funds not be spent immediately. Ideally, the 
funds would be  “used over a period of fifteen years” to help provide enough 
time to accommodate those affected by the war and to give their children 
assistance in “particularly distressing circumstances.”55  
The move to allocate canteen money to the GWVA was immediately 
opposed by other veterans groups. The Discharged Soldiers and Sailors’ 
Federation protested the decision by the Conservative government of Arthur 
Meighen to grant the funds to the largest veterans’ organization and 
demanded that MacNeil’s group return all money advanced, plus 6½ percent 
interest because the prime minister acted without a legal mandate. Meighen 
took the brunt of their anger and his actions were compared to “Prussian 
Kings.”56 Robert H. Harrison, former V.P. of the Ontario Command of the 
GWVA, disagreed with the federal government’s decision to advance canteen 
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money to his own association. “Although I am a member of the G.W.V.A. and 
proud of my connection with that body,” Harrison explained, “I believe that 
the government has made a grave error in agreeing to turn over this fund.” In 
his opinion, the association was not a representative organization. Until one 
was created, any move to advance the GWVA such funds was “illegal.”57  
The decision to provide the GWVA with a portion of the canteen funds 
was criticized during the federal election campaign of 1921. Election literature 
for the Liberal candidate, A.T. Hunter, openly addressed the Union 
government’s handing of the canteen funds. “Isn’t it the [funniest] thing” one 
editorial wondered, how the Tory candidates for the so-called soldier city 
(Toronto) “do not include a single soldier?” Perhaps this omission explained 
why the government proved so inept at determining how to distribute the 
canteen profits. Rather than divide the money amongst those to whom it 
belonged, Ottawa used the funds to bribe returned men “to keep out” of the 
election. The canteen funds, it was pointed out, were held by the government 
with coffers running “into seven figures.” Were the Conservatives really 
above doling out money to veterans’ organizations for political gain?  “What 
body of veterans,” the paper wondered, “looking for the interest in their own 
money would think of voting against the echoes of an administration that has 
the power to dole or withhold?”58 
Pressure to divide the canteen funds was increasing, in large part 
because it was now apparent that the $35,000,000 many expected was greatly 
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exaggerated. As early as 9 January 1920, efforts were underway to clarify the 
workings of the canteen funds. The Department of Overseas Military Forces 
of Canada (OMFC) issued an explanatory statement in hopes it could quell 
expectations of a windfall. It emphasized that the tally was still underway 
and that any attempt to estimate the total was “impossible.” According to the 
Globe, and contrary to press reports, the OMFC wanted Canadians to know 
that no British Dominion had yet received its funds and it would not be until 
at least the end of the year before they knew how much money Canada 
would receive. It was “premature” therefore to estimate the total returns, 
especially because there was no account of canteen losses sustained at the end 
of the war, costs that needed to be recouped before any money could be paid 
out.59 Rumour of the fund’s value continued to circulate widely, however, 
despite such clarifications.  
Some newspapers did attempt to attribute figures to specific officials, 
but the idea that Canada would receive millions of dollars persisted for years 
after 1918.60 By late December 1920 the government decided to address the 
canteen fund rumours directly. The $35,000,000 so widely reported was 
deemed a “fairy tale.”61 The Star was similarly blunt, calling the figure a 
“dud.”62 By early 1921 no specific total existed, but the government made it 
clear that men would not be receiving huge sums in return for their service.  
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The Montreal Gazette reported that the fund had shrunk from this expected 
£13,000,000 to only £7,000,000. Canada’s share was still hoped to be 
“substantial,” but disappointment was mounting.63 Five months later, with 
funds still held by London, the Regina Morning Leader suggested that Canada 
would receive nearly £100,000. The final sum eventually amounted to 
$2,402,586.02.64 
The administration of the central fund was now subject to allegations 
of corruption. What made matters worse was that the mismanagement was 
happening in Britain, far beyond the control of the Canadian government. 
According to news reports, the British Navy and Army canteen board was 
guilty of “amazing charges of waste and fraud.” The board, which formed a 
monopoly on the supply of canteens, was said to have accumulated fourteen 
million pounds. The United Services Fund, formerly headed by Sir Julian 
Byng, before he was appointed Governor General, had managed to secure 
this entire sum from the War Office for distribution to ex-soldiers. Upon 
Byng’s departure for Canada, however, the government procrastinated and 
evaded handing over the profits. In the process, it had “muddled” away, 
either through mismanagement, or outright loss, close to ten million of the 
total, leaving only four million available to transfer.65 
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The Board was incorporated under Sir George May, with a reserve 
estimated at £10,000,000. It was these funds that were in dispute between 
Canada and Britain. Canada claimed a proportional share of the profits. The 
British, however, contended that because Canada was not a partner in the 
board, it was only eligible for the ten percent rebate already provided. 
Canada argued that the reserve was the product of accumulated profits that 
should have been included in the rebates. The question was eventually 
submitted for arbitration.66 In 1922 the British Parliament finally passed an 
Act ratifying payments already made between the dominions, totaling 
£363,450, which also made provision for the distribution of future funds.67 
Ottawa further delayed its decision for another four years, however, only 
dividing the money between the provinces in 1926.  
Once again returned men were disappointed. The Ralston commission 
did not produce a clear plan to distribute the canteen money. It only placed 
limits on how the funds could be used. The commission continued to call for 
consultation with veterans in hopes of securing consensus on disbursement. 
This assumption was naïve. Returned men were not a unified body. The 
divisions in the ranks still existed in the postwar era and, as a meeting of 
veterans at Massey Hall in Toronto demonstrated, divisions among officers, 
enlisted men, and different veterans’ associations remained contentious. 
Under the front-page headline “Veterans in Anger Cry Down Speakers and 
Refuse Hearing,” the Globe reported that a large group of unemployed 
                                                 
66 “Canteen Nest-Egg of War Veterans is Two Millions,” Star, 25 November 1920, 1. 
67 Ralston Commission, Final Report, 142. 
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returned men disrupted an April 1922 veterans meeting. Most of the speakers 
could not make themselves heard over the “hooting and booing” from the 
crowd. Enlisted men explained that they were fed up with the legion’s 
leadership.68 During the raucous meeting, the canteen funds were called into 
question. The crowds called for investigations into the handling of the 
Canadian Patriotic Fund and the accounting of the canteen profits. Some 
called for abolishing all veterans’ organizations because they were controlled 
by officers.69  
Sir Arthur Currie, the former commander of the Canadian Corps, 
criticized Ottawa’s desire for a unanimous consensus on how to distribute 
the canteen money. He rejected the need for unanimity among veterans as 
“useless.” Personally, he felt the money should be spent on education for 
returned men, but regardless of these opinions it was clear to him that the 
government was not proving a capable administrator of the funds.70 Currie 
was skeptical about the use of trustees to administer the funds. “For five 
years” he declared,  
no Government has been able to [decide how] these funds 
should be devoted, and now it is proposed to ‘pass the buck’ to 
a board of trustees in each Province who not only are to 
determine to which the funds shall be devoted, but to create the 
machinery for the funds disposal. 
                                                 
68 This is the Globe’s reference to ‘legion.’ It is unclear from the article which 
organization the paper was referring to, though it could well have been the GAUV in light of 
later references to that association. See “Veterans in Anger Cry Down Speakers and Refuse 
Hearing,” Globe, 11 April 1922, 1 and 14. 
69 “Veterans in Anger Cry Down Speakers and Refuse Hearing,” 1. 
70 “Fund Withdrawals Without Authority, Currie’s Contention,” Globe, 11 July 1924. 
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If no government could decide what to do, Currie concluded that “the task 
will hardly be found easier by a board of trustees.” All the government had 
done was to shift responsibility away from cabinet to the “poor” trustees. 
Currie criticized the use of the canteen funds up to that point, arguing that 
the monies spent should have come out of government coffers, not from the 
fund itself. He considered the withdrawals “without authority or legal right,” 
and openly wondered whether the government would be topping up the 
fund to its original amount.71 
The GWVA was equally skeptical of Ottawa’s intentions. Its members 
echoed Currie’s concerns and were particularly disturbed that officials 
appeared to be looking to the canteen money, rather than the government’s 
own coffers, to pay for commitments made to veterans. For many returned 
men this was outrageous. They viewed the canteen profits as their property 
and it was up to the government to raise additional funds to cover expenses, 
not to raid veterans of their hard won proceeds. As Grant MacNeil explained, 
many in the GWVA suspected that the government was trying to use the 
canteen funds to pay for programs to assist veterans:  
I know that an effort was being made in many instances to 
devote this sum to enterprises which should be properly 
financed by the state. The general opinion of ex-service men is 
that this money should be devoted to enterprises 
supplementary or apart from post-war measures for ex-service 
men.72 
                                                 
71 “Fund Withdrawals Without Authority, Currie’s Contention,” Globe, 11 July 1924. 
72 Special Committee on Pensions, Soldiers’ Insurance and Re-establishment (1922), 148. 
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These were pointed criticisms of the government’s handling of the canteen 
funds but by 1925 they had little effect. Due to a series of scandals, the 
GWVA secretary lost all credibility when it came to the question of canteen 
money.  
MacNeil’s trouble was rooted in the GWVA’s chronic funding 
shortfall. The problem dated back to 1921, when the Meighen government 
decided to bail the association out with a canteen fund advance. The 
association’s meager membership dues could not support its national 
lobbying efforts. Additional federal money was not forthcoming, thanks in 
part to the organization’s criticisms of federal policies regarding veterans. 
Indeed, between 1919 and 1924, the GWVA had become a troublesome critic 
on the issue of the government’s handling of veterans’ issues. The 
organization pushed back against the fight for a bonus campaign but this was 
the exception that proved the rule. By 1924 the GWVA was increasingly an 
organization led by the ‘other-ranks’, bent on populist solutions to the 
grievances of returned men. This interpretation did not sit well with members 
of the Senate or the government. The Liberals nonetheless understood that 
they risked political problems if they openly attacked the GWVA and its 
leadership. By spring, the government seemed to have come up with a 
solution that both addressed concerns with the GWVA and would assist 
returned men. Ottawa would advance the veterans’ association another 
portion of the canteen fund while also disbursing them along the lines 
outlined by the Ralston commission.73  
                                                 
73 Morton, “Resisting the Pension Evil,” 218. 
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The federal government was fed up with the canteen funds. In 1924 the 
debate and proposals put forward had reached the point where MPs were 
sufficiently satisfied that the government’s legislation had the requisite 
support of returned men, at least as “represented by their organizations.” 
This did not mean the GWVA would escape criticism. Chubby Power, the 
future minister of Pensions and National Health, called for the veterans’ 
association to account for the money it had already been advanced. Power 
wanted to know whether the GWVA had used its share of the canteen funds 
to help returned men or, as many suspected, to pay the salaries of its officials. 
According to the Globe, the MP “regretted” that no Minister could account for 
the use of these funds. He also remained critical of the government’s 
oversight of the money, agreeing that it was unclear how much had been lost 
through mismanagement “or worse.”74  
Three days later, on 17 July, the Senate killed the Liberals’ canteen bill, 
denying veterans and a hopeful GWVA any access to the canteen money.75 
Without the expected canteen money, the GWVA was now desperately short 
of cash. It suggested that the government turn to a long forgotten 
Disablement Fund to help the association cover its expenses. The Minister of 
the DSCR, Henri Béland, agreed. According to Desmond Morton, however, 
neither MacNeil nor Béland anticipated the actions of the DSCR’s deputy 
minister, Ernest Scammell. Unbeknownst to his minister, the “dutiful civil 
servant” engineered a “trap” for MacNeil. If the government lent just the 
                                                 
74 “Commons Approves Plan to Disburse Canteen Profits,” Globe, 15 July 1924, 1. 
75 “Canteen Funds Bill Defeated in Senate,” Globe, 18 July 1924, 1 
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GWVA money from the Disablement Fund, then the other veterans’ 
organizations would surely be up in arms. To prevent discord, Scammell 
suggested that the loan be made out to the Dominion Veterans Alliance 
(DVA), a loose organization of the returned soldiers’ associations. Scammell 
realized that the “quarrelsome” DVA would not willingly pass money on to 
the GWVA. MacNeil was also aware of the problem. Scammell’s solution 
doomed MacNeil. The deputy minister suggested that because MacNeil was a 
member of DVA as well, he could personally cash the cheque. Having done 
so, “the trap closed.” Rightly or wrongly, word quickly spread that MacNeil 
was stealing from veterans.76 
When rumours began circulating that a new grant was authorized to 
the DVA, the other veterans’ organizations began to complain. The 
Amputations Association of Canada (AAC) protested to Mackenzie King, 
Arthur Meighen, and Henri Béland that the decision be deferred. It was the 
only organization that represented disabled veterans and it called the 
decision to assist the DVA “not representative.” In place of a loan, they hoped 
the money would be administered by a “responsible and independent” 
board.77 The critique had merit. If the government could portion out a loan to 
the DVA, why not disburse the funds properly? The government was 
sensitive to such rumours. It moved quickly to quell any idea that the DVA 
                                                 
76 Morton “Resisting the Pension Evil,” 218-219. 
77 “Canteen Fund Grant Subject of Protest,” Globe, 26 February 1925, 12. 
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was receiving assistance and Béland offered the house “definite” assurance 
the government was not entertaining a proposed advance.78 
MacNeil was in hot water. In the Senate, Brig.-Gen. W.A. Griesbach 
called for an investigation. The resulting inquiry undermined the GWVA’s 
existing leadership and laid bare its supposed wrongdoing. The association 
claimed that the non-judicial inquiry was “charging” it with misconduct and 
tried to limit the scope of the investigation. MacNeil and others argued that 
the GWVA’s use of funds before 1921—including use of its earlier canteen 
fund loan—need not be scrutinized since their general purpose was “exactly 
in line with the purposes for which the money was voted.”79 The argument 
did not fly. Even if it had, however, it was revealed that between 1 July 1921 
and 31 August 1922 eighty-five per cent of GWVA expenditures used money 
allocated from the canteen fund.80 When published, the inquiry’s report found 
that the GWVA had mismanaged the canteen funds and that it could not 
properly account for their use. It recommended that the remainder of the 
fund be paid out as soon as practicable. The authors of the report further 
argued that the money in the canteen fund belonged to “all ex-solders” of the 
CEF and that it should “only have been expended in whole or in part, in such 
a way as to confer a direct benefit upon all ex-service men.”81 
                                                 
78 “Canteen Funds Plan Satisfies Veterans,” Globe, 27 February 1925, 2. 
79 Senate Committee (1925), 30. 
80 Senate Committee (1925), 43. 
81 Senate Committee (1925), 6. 
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By March 1925, debate was again underway to determine how to 
disburse the fund. The federal government finally acknowledged that there 
would be opposition regardless of what decision it made. The main concern 
was to get the funds out, preferably under the direction of trustees who 
included ex-soldier representation.82 In May, the Bill received a second 
reading in the House of Commons. Béland, prompted by MP Robert Manion, 
revealed that Sir Arthur Currie was now willing to stand as a Chairman of 
the Central Board of Trustees. Veterans’ organizations would nominate the 
second appointment and the third would come from either the Canadian Red 
Cross or Canadian Patriotic Fund. There was still division over the use of 
canteen funds for an adjustment bureau, however, with MPs Manion and J. 
Arthurs both protesting against the decision.83 Despite their concerns the Act 
respecting the disposal of the Canteen Funds became law on 27 June 1925. 
Returned men would finally get the chance to access their contributions to 
the fund.  
Gaining access to the canteen fund profits proved an unexpected 
challenge. In 1918, Canada’s veterans believed that the money would be paid 
out by Christmas. None realized it would take nearly a decade before the 
federal government authorized its disbursement. This failure to distribute 
canteen money added to veterans’ growing sense that too little was done to 
assist them in the war’s aftermath. What few realized was that their struggles 
were far from over. As applicants to the long-awaited provincial canteen 
                                                 
82 “Plan is Explained for Canteen Profits,” Globe, 25 March 1925, 6. 
83 “Canteen Fund Bill Read Second Time,” Globe, 2 May 1925, 2. 
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associations soon learned, securing the assistance they believed themselves 
entitled proved an equally disillusioning experience.
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Chapter 7 
“Right up against it”: The canteen funds and Ontario’s war 
generation 
 
“In connection with your application for assistance from the Ontario 
Canteen Fund please be advised that the provisions of the Canteen 
Fund Act, 1925, do not permit the Fund to be used for the assistance of 
persons who are in receipt of pensions, pay and allowance or War 
Veterans’ Allowance.” 
- Ontario Canteen Fund form letter 
 
Ontario controlled Canada’s largest canteen fund program, which began 
operating in late 1927. The province’s returned soldiers waited nearly a 
decade for their share of the funds, longer than any other veterans in the 
country. When these men finally gained access to the money, however, they 
learned that their trustees had instituted policies denying assistance to 
veterans with pensions as well as to any applicant who was unemployed. 
Such limits were never part of the debate over the distribution of the funds 
and Ontario’s veterans were outraged. For the war generation, the canteen 
funds were a means of last resort, to be used to help shoulder the financial 
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burdens brought on by their war-related deteriorating health. The resulting 
uproar among returned men denied assistance (a situation made worse by 
the onset of the Great Depression) is echoed in the tens of thousands of letters 
that survive in the fund’s case files. They number over 26,000 and 
demonstrate just how unhappy the province’s returned men were in the 
war’s aftermath. The canteen fund issue, combined with their wider 
treatment by the veterans’ bureaucracy and society more generally, added to 
their growing sense of frustration and discontent in postwar Canada.1  
Seven years after the war ended these disappointments were still 
simmering. The postwar struggle had not been easy, but the country’s 
veterans were pleased that the 1925 Canteen Funds Act had finally detailed 
how the country’s canteen profits were to be divided and administered. The 
amount for disbursement reached approximately $2,500,000 and was a 
combination of funds from the British War Office, the proceeds of canteen 
sales in the CEF, Canada’s share of the profits of Britain’s War Office 
Cinematograph Committee, and the Royal Canadian Navy’s allocation from 
the British Admiralty. The money was distributed by the Receiver-General for 
Canada for the “benefit” of ex-soldiers and their dependents.2 In keeping 
with the Ralston Commission’s recommendations, the Act stipulated that the 
                                                 
1. The records are now located at the Archives of Ontario. Their holdings represent 
the surviving portion of the original OCF files and only include the cases of men who 
successfully gained assistance from fund. Many of these contain notices of denial for earlier 
claims, suggesting that the total number of men who applied is in excess of the 26,000 figure.  
2. Act respecting the disposal of the Canteen Funds [Hereafter Canteen Fund Act], 1. See 
Appendix I.  
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money be distributed among between the provinces and territories.3 The 
amount distributed was determined by an equation that considered 
enlistment, discharge, and pension figures.4 Each province and territory 
administered its portion through a board of trustees. These boards were 
appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council of each province (and the 
Governor in Council in the Yukon). The boards comprised three appointees, 
except in Ontario, which was given five appointments because of its 
disproportionate share of the total allocation.  
Table 2. Provincial Distribution of Canteen Funds, 19255 
 
Province 
 
Per cent. 
Alberta 7.8 
British Columbia 10.9 
Manitoba 10.7 
New Brunswick 4.1 
Nova Scotia 5.6 
Ontario 41.2 
Prince Edward Island 0.7 
Quebec 11.6 
Saskatchewan 7.2 
Yukon Territory .3 
 
Data derived from The Canteen Fund Act 
 
                                                 
3. Canteen Fund Act, 3.  
4. Ralston Commission, 148.  
5. Total does not equal 100 due to rounding.  
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The Act placed few restrictions on the use of the funds.6 As a result, 
Ottawa empowered the provincial Lieutenant-Governor (or territorial 
Governor) to regulate them, provided these regulations took into account the 
“wishes” of the fund’s potential users. Once it was decided how to divide the 
money, the board was free to administer its portion of the fund, as well as 
“such other things as may be indicated in the Order in Council.”7 Any 
expenses incurred in the administration of the programs were to be charged 
to the fund. Vacancies on each provincial board could only be filled by the 
Lieutenant-Governor or Governor.  
The one limit imposed by the Act on the trustees was the definition of 
what constituted service in the armed forces. Ottawa stipulated that to be 
eligible for assistance, a veteran had to have served overseas, either in 
England or in France.8 The canteen legislation also provided general 
guidelines to administer the fund. The Act made it clear, however, that 
Ottawa did not want to limit the powers of the provinces. It limited its 
recommendations to a list of three “general principles” governing the 
distribution of the canteen profits: 
A) Any plans formulated should be based on the 
assumption that there will be prospective beneficiaries for 
several years to come; 
 
                                                 
6. QUA, Location Number 2150 [Hereafter Power papers], Box 12, folder 12.E787, 
Power to Owen, 17 November 1937. 
7. Canteen Fund Act, 1925, 3.  
8. Canteen Fund Act, 1925, 1.  
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B) Any use of the fund for relief purposes should be limited 
to the class of case for which no relief is then available from 
governmental sources, and in particular to specially 
meritorious cases; 
C) If the provision of scholarships in schools and 
universities is undertaken for specially promising children of 
ex-members of the forces or of members of the forces who 
have died this should not necessarily be confined to the 
higher grades.9  
With these guidelines in place, Ottawa disbursed the funds. By March 1926 
British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia 
received their allotments. Ontario had yet to form a committee, however. Its 
share of the canteen proceeds were held in trust in the interim.10 
The delayed distribution of the canteen money left many returned men 
disgruntled. One veteran denounced the fate of the canteen funds and the 
resulting “apathy” the delays caused. Men who were facing unemployment 
and war-related health issues needed help and, although the total sum in 
question was significantly reduced, decisions about its use deserved “the 
most careful and serious consideration.”  
Many of our comrades through no fault of their own are objects 
of charity and during the past winter have been forced to seek 
the shelter of police stations. This state of affairs should cease to 
exist among men who were willing to pay the supreme sacrifice 
in trying to make this a more safe and better world for mankind. 
It is to be hoped veterans in the interest of these men will spare 
a few moments of their time, and advise the government that no 
                                                 
9. Canteen Fund Act, 1925, 4.  
10. “Canteen Fund Distribution,” Montreal Gazette, 19 March 1926, 3. 
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action be taken until such time as a consensus of opinion be 
obtained from the veterans as a whole as to the best method of 
disbursing this fund … whatever is decided on in regard to the 
fund should be in the best interests of veterans now in need and 
those who will need care and attention as the years go by.11 
Despite the lengthy delay in distributing the funds, veterans never 
forgot what was owed to them. Interest in the administration of the canteen 
funds was a popular topic of discussion, which packed local halls and 
theatres. Such was the case in Hamilton in March 1926, when several 
hundred veterans turned out to Lyle Theatre to discuss recommendations for 
the fund’s distribution. They gathered because Ontario finally named a 
committee to distribute its share.12 The meeting, however, proved “stormy.” 
Men debated appointments and how the money was going to be distributed. 
They were concerned with healthcare, housing, and education, and laid out 
four uses for the money: funding for the Brant Hospital to be used as a home 
for old soldiers, setting aside hospital beds for ex-service men, assisting 
veterans through low-interest loans to build homes, and establishing 
scholarships.13  
A month earlier, Ontario Premier Howard Ferguson began negotiating 
with representatives of the various veterans’ organizations regarding the use 
of the funds.14 The premier hoped the money would be used for educating 
children and that the appointed trustees would be champions of “integrity, 
                                                 
11. “Veterans ‘Shun’,” Star, 8 April 1925, p.6. 
12. “Committee is Named to Distribute Funds,” Globe, 4 January 1926, 3. 
13. “Blaze Threatens Hamilton Block,” Globe, 8 March 1926. 
14. “Premier and Veterans Discuss Canteen Funds,” Globe, 15 February 1926, 10. 
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ability and sympathy for the soldier movement.”15 To help canvas opinion 
about distribution policies, the province’s Canteen Fund Association sought 
out the views of returned men. It asked whether veterans wanted their share 
of the funds immediately or if they should be expended on relief measures, 
education, or for establishing a provincial memorial home.16 In an effort to 
reach as many men as possible, the association commissioned a poll to 
determine how to split the province’s nearly one million dollars. Ballots were 
printed in the major newspapers, including the Globe, Evening Telegram, Star, 
and the Mail and Empire. Respondents, who had to list their name, address, 
unit, and serial number, were presented with these options.17  
The five trustees appointed were Maj-Gen. Victor Williams, Percy 
Bould (the only enlisted man on the board), Capt. J. Jules Ferry, Capt. W.S. 
Haney, and Lt.-Col. B.O. Hooper. In addition, Maj. Alex C. Lewis, clerk of the 
Ontario Legislature, was selected as Secretary Treasurer. The board 
considered the results of the provincial ballot in conjunction with the 
recommendations of the Ralston report and the directions included in the 
Canteen Fund Act. Ontario’s trustees also devoted considerable study to the 
approaches in other provinces, as well as the United Service Fund of Great 
Britain. They agreed on three priorities: to assist in the education of children, 
to offer medical assistance for ex-service men not in receipt of pension, and to 
                                                 
15. “Radio Places War’s Victims in Touch with Wide World,” Globe, 23 February 1926, 
1. 
16. “Seek Suggestions on Canteen Funds,” Globe, 25 February 1926, 12. 
17. “To Take Vote of Veterans On Use of Canteen Fund,” Globe, 11 March 1926, 12. 
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assist widows and dependents of returned men not in receipt of pension who 
were in need of urgent (primarily medical) help.18  
 
Figure 5. Ontario Canteen Fund Ballot 
After selecting the trustees and deciding on priorities, the board next 
outlined its investment strategy. Ontario’s portion of canteen profits 
amounted to $950,000. This amount had been invested in Ontario Treasury 
Notes at five per cent interest, netting an annual return of $47,000.19 
Additional investments were made to separate trusts and savings accounts, 
but these contributions were considerably smaller. The trustees’ plan also 
shifted a portion of its investment return to the capital fund. This was 
planned “for the next two or three years” so that the capital fund could reach 
                                                 
18. AO, RG 29-165, B408253, Ontario Canteen Fund – Minutes from First Five 
Meetings, 1927-1929, 21 September 1927.  
19. “Ontario to Invest $950,000 Canteen Fund,” Ottawa Citizen, 27 February 1927, 1. 
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one million dollars. As a result, the trustees also agreed to use just over 
$48,000 in the first year. At this time, the capital fund would receive an 
additional $10,000. Another $10,000 was put aside for assisting special cases 
involving children’s education. $7,500 was allocated for the relief of urgent 
cases and an equal amount was earmarked for the relief of widows and 
orphans. The balance of $13,681 was to be used for administration and to 
cover “unforeseen emergencies.”20  
With the OCFs investment strategy ratified by the province, the federal 
Canteen Fund Act now governed the trustees. Its vague stipulations mandated 
that Ontario’s policies had to provide for “prospective beneficiaries for 
several years to come,” that relief must be limited to those ineligible from 
other sources of assistance, and for the provision of scholarships for 
promising children.21 Ontario’s trustees interpreted these guidelines 
according to the needs of the province. In February 1928, the board laid out a 
four-point policy for the administration of the province’s fund. Its first three 
regulations aligned closely to the federal legislation. They were designed to 
help those not in receipt of federal aid, such as pensions. The rules stipulated 
that the OCF could be used for the education of returned soldiers, the relief of 
urgent cases resulting from sickness (provided the ex-service man was not a 
pensioner) and for the relief of widows and orphans of former members of 
the CEF who, again, were ineligible for a pension. The fourth point, however, 
proved to be a major point of contention. It stipulated that no relief would be 
                                                 
20. AO, RG 29-165, B408253, Minutes from First Five Meetings, 2 March 1928.  
21. Canteen Funds Act (1925), “Canteen Committee Ratifies Bond Issue,” Globe, 3 
February 1927, 14. 
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granted for “conditions resulting from unemployment.”22 As the chairman of 
the trustees explained to the board, no relief would be granted for the 
unemployed because such a move would “seriously deplete the fund.” In the 
view of the OCF trustees, unemployment relief remained a matter of 
“municipal responsibility” and the board believed that the OCF should not 
be used to supplement existing government commitments to returned men.23 
By 1928, the provincial canteen funds were operating across Canada. The 
unemployment issue, however, ensured that the process of disbursement 
would remain a matter of contention for veterans. 
In order to receive assistance from the OCF, men (or their dependents) 
had to apply. Each applicant listed their biographical details, employment, 
health, and family histories, military service, and any debts owing. The 
majority of those eligible had enlisted in their late teens and early twenties 
and over sixty-percent of the men who applied were born between 1890 and 
1900, with over ninety-percent born after 1880.24 Applicants could apply 
directly to the OCF from its office at Queen’s Park or by mail. In either case, 
they were encouraged to indicate the reasons for seeking assistance. Many 
men were directed to the fund by means of another veterans’ organization or 
via the Department of Pensions and National Health (DPNH), the federal 
successor to the DSCR.  
                                                 
22. AO, RG 29-165, B408253, Ontario Canteen Fund, Annual Report, 1928.  
23 “General Williams Announces Policy for Canteen Fund,” Globe, 9 March 1928, 1. 
24. See Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Age of Ontario Canteen Fund Users 
 
Veterans applied to the fund as soon as it was operational and the 
numbers increased rapidly. By 1929, total applications reached nearly a 
thousand. Three years later, the number applying increased to over thirteen 
thousand. Applications peaked in 1936, when more than twenty thousand 
men sought assistance from the fund. During this same period, monetary 
payouts totaled slightly more than half a million dollars. In two of the worst 
years of the Depression (1931-32), the payouts reached their zenith. While 
detailed records on the number of applicants were not kept for each year the 
fund operated, the surviving data suggests that the total number of users 
matched the proportion of money expended. Between 1928 and 1932 the 
number of applicants climbed in proportion to disbursements. A similar 
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trend existed between 1934 and 1937, indicating that OCF payouts continued 
to respond to demand.25  
During the first decade of operation, grants to returned men were the 
largest draw on the Fund’s coffers. The OCF paid $422,735 to these veterans. 
Dependents of returned soldiers received $155,292 and grants for education 
totaled $131,363 during the same period.26 Individual payments averaged 
between ten and twenty-five dollars. Some were issued as installments for a 
larger sum to help cover monthly costs; others were one-time grants. A single 
family never received more than $200 – $300 over a lifetime. This limit was 
                                                 
25 See data in Figure 7.  
26 AO, RG 29-165, B408253,  Ontario Canteen Fund – Miscellaneous, “Canteen Fund 
Brief,” n.d.  
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arbitrary, however, and there was no standard for how much a family could 
receive. In the middle of the Depression, for example, the trustees turned one 
widow down after receiving nine grants totaling $171.27 Another was denied 
further assistance after eleven grants, totaling $183,28 whereas a third was 
turned down having received $226.29 Each of these grants totaled over $150, 
but even this was not a reliable benchmark. Other applicants were turned 
down after receiving as little as $125.30 In this latter case, the family was 
informed by the trustees that they had received “more than the amount 
usually granted in one case.”31  
The trustees did not track the actual use of the funds. The surviving 
case files indicate that the majority of grants were issued to alleviate 
healthcare costs. These varied widely, ranging from physical to psychological 
aliments. Many of the men who applied to the fund were living with limbs 
that had been crushed, often resulting from injuries sustained serving in 
military labour units—an important reminder that not all casualties were the 
result of combat. Psychological cases were also present and generally referred 
                                                 
27 AO, AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 1578 [Name withheld under the Freedom of 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 21 December 1931. 
28 AO, AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 1529 [Name withheld under the Freedom of 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act].” 
29 AO, AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 1519 [Name withheld under the Freedom of 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act].” 
30 AO, AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No 1678, [Name withheld under the Freedom of 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 9 May 1939. 
31 AO, AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No 1678, [Name withheld under the Freedom of 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 10 July 1939. 
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to as cases of bad nerves or mental instability.32 Unlike the federal pension 
board, the fund recognized that these were legitimate health issues which 
were often related to the war.33  
Men sought assistance for a variety of reasons, but most did so to cover 
expenses for health care costs or household debts. Families turned to the fund 
for assistance because it was considered the property of all veterans. As one 
dependent explained, the canteen money belonged to “our soldiers.”34 
Herbert O. told the trustees that he preferred to draw on canteen money 
because it was the “property of returned men.” He wanted his “share” 
because he was more comfortable asking for something that belonged to him 
rather than to “ask for Charity.”35 The veterans were, not surprisingly, 
protective of the fund. But when they did find it necessary to apply, they 
expected it to be there for them.  “I have had so much sickness,” William R. 
wrote in his application that he was “almost to the end of my rope.”36  
                                                 
32. See for example AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 1785 [Name withheld under the 
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 7 October 1936; and AO, RG29-65, 
B161739, “File No. 3175, [Name withheld under the Freedom of Information and Protection 
of Privacy Act], 6 November 1933.  
33 Humphries, “War’s Long Shadow.” 
34. AO, RG29-65, B161739, “File No 3506, [Name withheld under the Freedom of 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 10 July 1939. 
35. AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 2139 [Name withheld under the Freedom of 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 20 February 1930. 
36 AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 1473, [Name withheld under the Freedom of 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 24 August 1929. 
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This sense of desperation was common. Many, including Stanley Y., 
considered themselves “right up against it.”37 Samuel G., who applied for aid 
in 1930, was so stressed that he was seriously considering robbing a bank. “I 
am out of work and in a state of extremity,” he declared. He wanted at least 
one hundred dollars to help him overcome his debts, but the OCF trustees 
discovered that Samuel lied on his application for aid. He was in receipt of a 
small pension and he realized that if the board found out, he would be turned 
down. Only “honest” men, he declared, were doomed to be “left behind.” To 
Samuel, the OCF was his last hope. If it could not help him, then he would be 
forced to have to take matters into his own hands: 
I am resolved [I’ll] not walk about in dejection like the countless 
thousand British Empire Subjects are doing because they are to 
cowardly to strike in Armies and strike quick. [I’ll] solve my 
own Problem. But I prefer the honest way if it can be got.38  
What was particularly frustrating for veterans was that they were being 
denied assistance from a fund that profited from their wartime service. These 
men had been wounded overseas and granted a pension in recognition of 
their losses. Now that same pension, which was insufficient to support their 
                                                 
37. AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 1794, [Name withheld under the Freedom of 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 4 March 1937;  Arthur S. used the same 
expression as Stanley Y., telling the OCF “I am right up against it.” See AO, RG29-65, B108762,  
“File No. 1934, [Name withheld under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy 
Act],” 12 January 1930; so too did George S. See AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 2134, 
[Name withheld under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 9 
October 1934. 
38 AO, RG29-65, B161739, “File No. 2944 [Name withheld under the Freedom of 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 4 September 1930. 
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livelihoods, was being used as justification to deny them further assistance 
from a program they considered themselves entitled.  
Ontario’s trustees were sympathetic to the plight of returned men. 
Their concern ensured the fund stayed solvent for decades to come. It was 
their responsibility to ensure that eligible returned men had access to 
assistance throughout their lives. They feared that if they opened the OCF 
coffers to every returned man, they risked depleting the fund for the future. 
The trustees realized that the war generation would likely  “break down 
physically at an age when they should still be in good physical condition.” To 
ensure these men had assistance when they most needed it, the OCF board 
structured disbursement policies so that it could continue to provide for men 
as their health declined, provided, of course, that their illness could 
“truthfully be attributed to some extent to their overseas service.”39  
Federal legislation mandated provincial use of the funds. The scope of 
the Act, however, provided provincial board members with considerable 
flexibility. The federal act only defined the requisite period of the fund’s 
solvency as one decade, rather than the projected lifespan of returned men. 
By overestimating how long the OCF would need to care for returned men, 
the trustees’ attempts to provide assistance for returned soldiers ended up 
denying them the very assistance they needed to combat the effects of the 
Great Depression. 
                                                 
39. “General Williams Announces Policy for Canteen Fund,” Globe, 9 March 1928, 1. 
The Soldiers’ Aid Commission  also recognized the importance of accounting for “the need 
for aid of the disabled soldier ageing prematurely,” and the continuity between the two 
bodies’ positions is likely reflected by the fact that they shared several of the same members. 
See “Discuss Imperial Pensions,” Star, 12 May 1927. 
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For a board so concerned about the long-term solvency of their fund, 
the OCF could not have started operating at a worse time. For many men, 
employment remained seasonal. The fall and winter of 1929 and early 1930, 
for example, placed particular strain on returned men as they struggled to 
find work in an increasingly depressed economy. These years unfortunately 
coincided with the operation of the OCF, placing it under considerable (and 
unexpected) strain. In the face of the Depression, the demand on the canteen 
fund exceeded anything its trustees anticipated.40 None of the planners 
intended the fund to act as a form of relief and the desire to provide long-
term help to returned men compelled the trustees to turn away many who 
applied. The situation was made worse by the policies denying aid to 
pensionable and unemployed men, which caused the OCF board to turn 
down thousands of applications a year.41  
The veterans were furious at being denied assistance. They considered 
themselves deserving of aid, both because of their service and because they 
                                                 
40. AO, RG 29-165, B408253, Soldiers’ Aid Commission Administrative Records, 
Ontario Canteen Fund, Financial Statements (1929-1938), 1930 Annual Report. Similar 
statements were made throughout the decade, evidenced by the following from the 1932 
Annual Report, which stated “The demands on the Fund during the year continued to reflect 
the condition of want throughout the country consequent upon the prevailing lack of 
employment” and that from 1936: “The demands on the resources of the Fund continue to 
show a large increase from year to year.” 
41. A full accounting of the number of rejected applications is not possible because 
only successful applications were kept by the OCF. Many of these files date from the 1960s, 
but they also include rejections dating from the interwar era, indicating that these same men 
who successfully received assistance after the Second World War had also been turned down 
on multiple occasions before 1939. This suggests that the OCF initially kept records for cases 
they did not fund. These unsuccessful records have not survived as part of the SAC material 
at the AO. Establishing how many applications were turned down is also complicated by the 
incomplete recording by the OCF trustees and the lack of documentation about how many 
applications were received/funded in a given year.  
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had paid into the fund while overseas. Ontario’s government faced the brunt 
of the criticisms. James Robinson, a self-described “unemployable pensioner” 
blamed the Ferguson government for the handling of the fund. “What 
authority,” he wondered, did the provincial government have “to hold the 
canteen money of the returned veterans?” Robinson was adamant that the 
funds belonged to “the veterans, not the country.” As far as he was 
concerned, the trustees’ decision to focus only on employed, non-pensioned 
men meant that while those “sick and absolutely unable to work” were 
getting assistance, it resigned poor pensioned families to dire circumstances. 
There were, he explained, veterans with large families who were “on the 
verge of starvation, just eking out an existence from charity.” As far as 
Robinson was concerned, these families were entitled to aid as well, but they 
were unable to receive it because of a shortsighted government.42 
Robinson saved his harshest criticism for the province’s treatment of 
single men. A line of single, unemployed men waiting for charity was 
embarrassing; the fact that they were also veterans who had sacrificed for 
their country was disgraceful. “Go down to the abandoned church on 
Parliament St. any night,” he told the Star. There the paper would find more 
than a hundred homeless men, most of them single ex-soldiers: “They’ll tell 
you a thing or two about how fair the Ferguson government is in distributing 
the canteen fund.” The federal government of Mackenzie King gave the 
canteen money to Ferguson “for distribution.” The premier was failing in his 
responsibility. James Holmes, another veteran, was equally fed up with the 
                                                 
42. “Workless Have Hard Words for Ferguson Government,” Star, 19 September 1930, 
2. 
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province’s handing of the canteen profits. Ferguson was not doing anything 
to help his former comrades. “I have seven children and four of them are sick 
with infantile paralysis,” he noted. Yet the government was not doing “a 
thing for me.”43 “I’m one of the men to whom the government refused to give 
a share of the canteen funds,” John Moss told the Star. When he applied for 
aid, Moss was informed that he was ineligible because the fund was “only 
sharing the money with sick men - and I was only unemployed.” The fact that 
his wife had been ill for six years made no difference. “It didn’t do any good,” 
Moss explained. “I’ve been taking treatments at Christie St. hospital since 
February. It isn’t fair.”44 
Single men felt particularly isolated and ignored. They were often the 
first to go to war, but when they returned, they faced a barrage of “married 
men first” initiatives. As one destitute man wrote, “the single man has no 
claim for relief. … Have not [they] a right to live?” He did not begrudge 
married men, but he felt the focus on families left him, and other men “who 
fought for [their] country,” without a “square deal.”45  
For its part, the OCF made no effort to define its mandate or explain 
who could and could not apply for assistance. According to its early financial 
statements, the OCF’s purpose was broadly defined as providing assistance 
to returned soldiers and their dependents when there was “no other fund 
                                                 
43. “Workless Have Hard Words for Ferguson Government,” 2. 
44. “Workless Have Hard Words for Ferguson Government,” 2. 
45. “Unmarried Veterans,” Star, 15 October 1930, 6. 
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available to furnish such relief.”46 Generally, this restriction meant canteen 
money could not be used for the “assistance of persons who are in receipt of 
pensions, pay and allowance or War Veterans’ Allowance.”47 Yet, this 
interpretation of its mandate was both inconsistent and contradictory. 
William D., for instance, was told that the fund was not available for 
distribution “in a general way.” Instead, it was for “granting assistance to ex-
service men or their dependents in cases of urgent need resulting from 
illness.”48 It makes sense that Gilbert M’s widow received $25 from the fund 
for her doctor’s medical bills.49 At the same time, however, George D. was 
informed that the fund could not be used to pay “either hospital or doctor’s 
accounts.”50  
Pensioners in need of additional assistance were the first to complain 
about these inconsistencies. In 1929, the Globe reported on their anger and 
how the OCF was operating. Pensioned men could not understand why 
Ontario had decided to exclude them. As they pointed out, the boards in both 
Alberta and British Columbia allowed pensioners relief. Why not Ontario? 
G.J. McDonagh, Dominion President of the Canadian Pensioners’ Association, 
                                                 
46. AO, RG29-165, B408253, OCF Financial Statement 1929.  
47.  Wording belongs to an OCF form letter commonly distributed among all case 
files. See for example AO, RG29-65, B108762, File No. 1472 [Name withheld under the 
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act].”  
48. AO, RG29-65, B161739, “File No. 3361, [Name withheld under the Freedom of 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 20 November 1930.  
49 AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 1578, [Name withheld under the Freedom of 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act].” 
50. AO, B161739, “File No. 2909, [Name withheld under the Freedom of Information 
and Protection of Privacy Act],” 20 October 1931. 
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claimed that he could not see “why pensioners should be barred from 
receiving relief or economic assistance from this fund.”51 The fund, after all, 
was not “charity.”52  
By the end of 1929, the criticisms from pensioned men were increasing. 
They were angry that they could not access the very funds they had paid into 
overseas. Many of the most vocal were returned soldiers in receipt of small 
pensions that hardly covered the costs of their hardships. These men found 
themselves in a difficult position. Their disabilities often prevented them 
from working full time but their pensions were insufficient to cover the 
difference in lost wages. Howard H., for instance, was a returned man who 
applied for OCF assistance in August 1930. He had enlisted in 1916 at the age 
of 19.53 He was in receipt of a small disability pension but he had been out of 
work since the previous January. Howard explained to the trustees that he 
was struggling to support his wife and five children, and they had been 
living on “two meals a day.” Their clothes were “pretty shabby” and he 
hoped the fund might help with his family’s “distress.”54 
Howard blamed the war for his present troubles. When he enlisted, he 
was a big man, standing nearly five-foot-ten and weighing roughly two 
                                                 
51. “Disabled Veterans Receiving Pensions are Seeking Relief,” Globe, 18 November 
1929, 15. 
52. “Disabled Veterans Receiving Pensions are Seeking Relief,” 15. 
53. Howard H.’s Attestations Papers.  
54. AO, RG29-65, B161739, “File No. 2873, [Name withheld under the Freedom of 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act].” 
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hundred pounds.55 More than a decade after war’s end however, he weighed 
little more than one hundred and thirty pounds and he considered himself to 
be a “mere shadow” of his former self.  The most difficult part was the strain 
on his family: 
I am turned down with every employer as I shake so much with 
my nerves and it is heart breaking to my wife to see me turned 
back with my dinner bucket in hand not able to land a Job 
Making over old clothes for the children for the past two years 
and no sign of a silver cloud for a good while yet.  
Howard H. assured the OCF that he was a responsible breadwinner and that 
it was his circumstances that had forced him to seek assistance. “[W]e are 
living economical as anybody possibly can,” he explained, but his tax burden 
and medical bills simply exceeded the meager wages he was able to bring 
home. Howard feared that if he did not get help soon, he and his family 
would be forced from their home. He assumed that he was a good candidate 
for canteen assistance because large portions of his debts were related to his 
war service.56 His application, however, was denied because of his pension. 
 Another veteran unhappy at being turned down because of a small 
pension was Ernest R. He was a patient at the Christie Street veterans 
hospital and had already been admitted twice that year “for major 
operations.” As a result, Ernest was not able to work. His son drowned in the 
summer of 1929 and his work dried up. Without employment, and because of 
his time in hospital, he was forced to move. He needed a month’s rent. Ernest 
                                                 
55. Howard H.’s Attestations Papers.  
56. AO, RG29-65, B161739, “File No. 2873, [Name withheld under the Freedom of 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act].” 
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knew his pension made him ineligible for OCF assistance but he wrote to the 
trustees in hopes that the board would be willing to make an exception, 
especially for veteran with a “small pension & so much sickness.” To help his 
case, the veteran even offered to repay the OCF “as soon as I am able” and he 
pointed out that—despite his eligibility for a pension—he was not presently 
receiving one. The trustees took his appeal under advisement, but informed 
him that “much as we may sympathize with your need for assistance, the Act 
under which the Fund is administered does not permit us to assist men who 
are in receipt of a pension.”57 
By the 1930s, the OCF received thousands of applications from 
unemployed men who were denied pensions.58 The letters demonstrated 
their growing sense of futility which translated into a fundamental 
questioning of the value of the war. The strain of the trenches continued to 
affect veterans long after the war ended. “Any man who lived in the filth and 
horrors of active service,” McDonagh explained in an interview with the 
Globe, “did not return to Canada in the same condition in which he left it.” 
Those who had not gone overseas, it was pointed out, and who were of the 
same age and social standing, were not “suffering from this breaking up.” 
The war was the reason for their problems. As a result, it was vitally 
                                                 
57. AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 1874, [Name withheld under the Freedom of 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act].” Multiple pieces of correspondence.  
58. “Relief Immediately from Canteen Fund Urged by Veterans,” Globe, 21 November 
1929. 
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important that these returned men be given access to the fund. Doing so was 
nothing less than a “duty resting on the shoulders of the Canadian people.”59 
McDonagh knew that calling for increased assistance challenged 
prevailing ideas about a man’s responsibility to support himself and his 
family. If every returned man in need of employment could get assistance 
through the OCF, where was his incentive to work? As a result, he carefully 
hedged this call for canteen assistance for pensioned men. McDonagh made it 
clear that he supported the male breadwinner model and that his criticisms 
did not mean that every man was ‘owed’ assistance. Rather, he believed that 
assistance should be given only “where it can be shown, without too much 
humiliation and red tape, that the man has done his part to re-establish 
himself, and is not, in the vernacular, ‘swinging the lead’.”60 
To prevent abuse of the system, McDonagh called for yet another 
conference to sort out the issue. He believed that governments had a 
“responsibility” to repay the debts owed returned men. McDonagh 
considered veterans’ problems far larger than any one government’s 
jurisdiction. Their problems were Canada’s problems and thus a social 
responsibility that all Canadians—their governments included—needed to 
recognize before anything could improve. The goal was to determine how to 
share the burden. “There was a tendency on behalf of provincial and 
municipal governments to shift responsibility for the matter to the feet of the 
federal government. “Surely,” McDonagh figured, “this is the wrong point of 
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view,” especially because it ran counter to the position taken by Canadians 
“during the days of enlistment.”61 
In September 1928, and again in May 1929, the OCF trustees met to 
discuss their controversial decision to refuse assistance to unemployed men 
or veterans in receipt of pensions. Section 10.b of the federal legislation 
mandated that “any use of the fund for relief purposes should be limited to 
the class of case for which no relief is then available from governmental 
sources, and in particular to specially meritorious cases.”62 Men with minor 
pensions argued their meager payments were insufficient and, as a result, 
they believed themselves ‘meritorious cases’. The Ontario board considered 
revising its position but in the end decided to remain firm. “Pensioners,” 
were already “eligible for assistance from the relief fund administered by all 
local representatives of the Department of Pensions and National Health” 
and they were not eligible for two types of aid.63 Moreover, the board argued, 
the OCF’s policy was no different from other sources of assistance, which had 
similar restrictions. The trustees avoided responsibility for its decision by 
pointing to the federal Act, claiming it did not give them “authority” to 
amend the policy because of its provisions under Section 10.b.64 They 
maintained that returned men who were out of work should seek assistance 
from their municipalities. The problem for the OCF was the positions taken in 
                                                 
61. “Relief Immediately from Canteen Fund Urged by Veterans.” 
62 Canteen Fund Act (1925), 4. 
63. AO, RG29-165, B408253, Minutes from First Five Meetings, 28 September 1928.   
64. AO, RG29-165, B408253, Minutes from First Five Meetings, 29 May 1929. 
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other provinces. The boards in Alberta and British Columbia did not interpret 
the vague federal legislation as stringently as Ontario’s and, as OCF 
applicants were aware, in these western provinces men with meager pensions 
were not denied aid.  
By November 1929, two years after the fund started, many returned 
soldiers remained unaware that the program was even operational.65 The 
decision to invest money in place of a direct payout also came under 
criticism. In September 1930, unemployed returned soldiers demonstrated 
their anger at the province for opting to have the money administered by a 
group of trustees. Men who gathered outside the Church and Adelaide 
employment bureau in Toronto told reporters from the Star that they had a 
“definite dislike” of Premier Ferguson, whom they blamed for “unjustly” 
holding and denying access to the canteen funds which were the “property” 
of returned soldiers.66 Similar complaints were made at the fourth annual 
convention of the Ontario Command of the Canadian Legion. The canteen 
funds were debated for over two hours. A.C. Soloman from Windsor took 
issue with the decision to invest the money, claiming that it contradicted the 
“spirit” of the fund:   
There is no sense that I can see in leaving the funds in the bank 
to multiply for posterity. We feel as veterans, that we have done 
enough for posterity on ensuring them some measure of 
                                                 
65. “The Canteen Fund,” Star, 2 November 1929, 6. 
66. “Workless Have Hard Words for Ferguson Government,” Star, 19 September 1930, 
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freedom. If ever there was a time when the burned-out veterans 
need help it is now.67  
Criticisms of the management of canteen money were not limited to 
Ontario. Saskatchewan’s Canteen Fund, for example, faced a financial scandal 
in 1940.  Over $40,000 of the fund’s money was illegally disbursed, leading to 
the creation of a Judicial Commission of Inquiry and a Regina city inquest. 
The former investigated allegations of blackmail, among other charges. The 
latter uncovered that one of the province’s trustees, Capt. A.H. White, 
committed suicide after suspicion of stealing from the canteen fund.68 
Elsewhere on the Prairies criticism of the financial management of the 
province’s canteen fund emerged almost a decade earlier than in 
Saskatchewan.  In 1932, the Alberta Canteen Fund (ACF) was singled out for 
criticism for its decision to invest the funds. During an annual Legion 
convention, a Calgary alderman offered up what the Lethbridge Herald 
dubbed a “verbal broadside” when he demanded that the fund’s trustees 
provide statements of its finances. Veterans were not convinced that the ACF 
was using the canteen money in the best interests of Alberta’s men. When 
asked to provide the information requested, the trustees directed Russell to 
the Alberta government. This rebuff did not sit well and the alderman 
rebuked the ACF board for exceeding their mandate and for misinterpreting 
the federal Canteen Fund Act:  
                                                 
67. “Col. J.K. Mackay Ontario Legion Head,” Globe, 23 August 1930, 22. 
68 See “Hint of Blackmail at Canteen Probe,” Montreal Gazette, 31 January 1940, 2, 
“Story of ‘Loot’ of War Not Black, Sinister One,” The Evening Citizen, 1 December 1950, 18, 
and “Trustee of Fund Died by Cyanide, Inquest Decides,” Saskatoon Star Phoenix, 5 January 
1940, 3, 5.  
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the board admits having invested in different enterprises. The 
Canteen Fund Act gives no authority for investing this money. 
We would like to have a board of trustees who spend the 
money in alleviating the suffering of ex-servicemen. We don’t 
want our money tied up in investments.69 
Such critiques illustrate how debates over the canteen funds shifted 
between war’s end and the onset of the Depression. In 1919, veterans were 
furious that the canteen profits were not distributed among all returned men, 
as a pseudo-replacement for the failed bonus campaign. By the 1930s, former 
soldiers remained unhappy with how the money was being used but they 
were no longer pushing for direct distribution. Instead, their criticisms were 
directed at how the money was being managed and the failure of provincial 
trustees to adequately provide for veterans struggling in the depths of the 
Great Depression.  
For their part, the blanket criticisms of returned men often rested on 
frustration rather than legitimate grievances, reflecting how invested veterans 
were in the promise of the canteen money. Critics often misinterpreted the 
purpose of the fund and there was consistent confusion over the role of the 
federal and provincial governments. They also failed to understand that the 
federal government had transferred its control of the funds to the provinces 
in 1926. Community leaders, for instance, continued to suggest ways for 
Ottawa to use the money long after it had any involvement. In 1932, for 
example, Joseph Fulton was president of the Earl Haig Memorial branch of 
the Canadian Legion. Like many, he considered the funds a fair way to assist 
men who could not find work. Fulton wanted Ottawa to use the canteen 
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money as preliminary payments for unemployment insurance. To him, the 
“Dominion government” should use these resources “on behalf of 
unemployed veterans.”70 Such suggestions were typical of the confusion 
surrounding governmental control of the canteen money, which mistook 
which government administered the money and the limitations that groups 
like the OCF trustees had placed on the fund’s use. The same confusion, 
however was evident within the shifting debate over the state’s responsibility 
for the unemployed.  
 Press coverage of the canteen fund issue subsided once the provinces 
began distributing the money. For its part, the OCF did a poor job at 
explaining its mandate and how to gain access to its assistance.71 This lack of 
press coverage did not go unnoticed. In 1931, a veteran of the First Division, 
CEF wrote the Star wondering when returned men were going to receive an 
updated account of the canteen funds. He wanted a statement indicating how 
much money the province received, the overhead expenses of the board of 
trustees and their salaries, the state of the fund’s principal deposit, accounts 
of any interest earned, and whether either political party had received any 
help from the fund.72 He never received an answer because the OCF annual 
                                                 
70 “Workless Insurance Urged by Veterans,” Star, 6 July 1932, 3.  
71 The OCF was not alone in this problem. It was also an issue for the SAC, which 
shared several personnel with the administrators of the province’s canteen fund board. 
Towards the end of the war the aid commission recognized that it was not adequately 
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hopes that the commission’s work would be “appreciated by the returned soldier and brough 
to the notice of the public.” See AO, RG 29-165, Soldier’s Aid Commission, Minutes of the 
Soldiers Aid Commission, 14 February 1917 and again a similar note from 17 January 1918.   
72 “Canteen Fund,” Star, 22 July 1932, 4. 
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reports were not distributed and they received little to no attention in the 
media.  
To some extent, the OCF board was aware of the communication 
problem. They did not have an easy solution, however. One trustee 
wondered if their troubles might be alleviated if they could secure more 
media coverage. The trustees also recognized that veterans’ organizations 
needed to be more aware of the OCF’s mandate and to stop directing 
ineligible men to the fund.73 
The lack of information about the OCF’s official operations, combined 
with unceasing demand for the canteen money, resulted in a rumour mill that 
only caused further confusion. Three years into the Depression, the fund was 
seriously strained. The trustees reluctantly dipped into the capital fund to 
shore it up, but it was not enough. By 1932 the board recognized that it was 
“expected” that some of the fund’s capital would be required “each year” if 
the OCF wanted to meet the “necessary legitimate expenditures in the way of 
relief and educational assistance.”74 Veterans misunderstood the reduction in 
the OCF account. They assumed these changes were the result of inefficient 
administration at best, and corruption at worst, and many believed that the 
fund had depreciated because of the board’s decision to purchase securities.  
                                                 
73 Correspondence between OCF trustees located in AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 
1794 [Name withheld under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 30 
December 1929. It states in part, that “it is most surprising the number of returned men who 
are under the impression that the Ontario Canteen Fund amounts to the tens of millions of 
dollars, and for that reason should help all and sundry.” 
74 AO, RG 29-165, Soldiers’ Aid Commission administrative records, Ontario 
Canteen Fund, Financial Statements. 1932 Annual Report.   
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The Secretary of the fund, Alex Lewis, vehemently denied these 
charges. “The assertion is quite unfounded,” he told the Star, before pointing 
out that the OCF had been invested in government bonds from its inception. 
“Our reports are available to show how the original sum was invested and its 
disposition since that time.” Where these reports were kept, or how returned 
men could gain access to them, was never made clear. The lack of 
transparency and accountability prevented the OCF from distancing itself 
from its critics.75  
The press only appeared interested in the canteen fund question when 
it related to federal scandals. The Star, for example, tended to combine the 
coverage of the canteen fund issue with pensions and responsibility for 
unemployment generally. The newspaper wanted to highlight the plight of 
returned men during the Depression and it ran corresponding stories 
profiling their struggles. During winter months, the federal ministry of 
pensions and national health provided supplementary relief for pensioners to 
ensure that the destitute had access to medical care. These men were 
identified as ‘Class Two’, and were typically disabled and unemployed. A 
1932 report from the Star highlighted the case of an ex-service man, 
Christopher D. Mann, whose difficulties typified the struggles veterans faced. 
Mann was thirty-six years old and had served with the 159th Battalion. When 
he was evicted from his home after failure to pay rent, he and his family 
sought assistance from the leading veterans assistance sources, including the 
Poppy Fund, which raised money to assist veterans through sales of poppies, 
and the OCF. In each instance he was denied because of his pension. Mann 
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297 
 
 
 
recounted his story for the paper, describing how he was physically fit before 
the war but that upon returning, his legs gave out. He was forced to move to 
Toronto for treatment. “I had to take any kind of a job,” he explained. Soon 
the family was out of money and he was forced to seek out a meager pension. 
Doctors were of little help. Some diagnosed him with neuritis, others with 
sciatica. The crux of the matter, however, was that they refused to attribute 
his troubles to his war service. “The doctors figure my condition is not 
directly attributable to war service,” Mann lamented. What most upset him, 
however, was that his physical state was jeopardizing his position as father 
and breadwinner for his family. “It is not myself,” that he worried about, “but 
the kiddies … when I’m lying in the hospital I’m all right, but I lie in bed 
worrying, not knowing whether the wife or kiddies have enough to eat or 
not.”76  
Mann’s troubles highlight the issue of a veteran’s inability to receive 
credit for war related injuries. One former soldier, writing in the Globe under 
the pseudonym “Fourth Battalion,” criticized the assistance situation. It was 
wrong that pension boards privileged men’s service records, which unfairly 
assisted men who served in ‘safe’ jobs in Canada or overseas. Those who 
served at the ‘sharp end’, faced significantly more risk. Moreover, while men 
behind the lines could easily report medical issues, those at the front did not 
have the same luxury. When they were ill, they received basic treatment and 
then ordered to return to the line, often without a record being kept: “No 
record would be on [the] medical sheet, which was kept at base.” The same 
went for the men at discharge. Having spent years in the front lines, they 
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were only too eager to get home. To avoid being held up for medical reasons 
many indicated that they were “Fine” upon discharge. So many were in a 
hurry to be discharged that doctors would often examine as many as 160 men 
an hour. It was only when they arrived home that the toll of their service was 
evident. “We discover we have heart trouble, chest trouble, and 
nervousness,” Mann recounted. As A1 men they were note eligible for 
treatment. Their only recourse was the pension board. Without a record of 
their injuries, however, they were turned down. 
The solution was to consider men’s service as holistically as possible. If 
returned men could not get access to assistance due to a lack of records, then 
why not expand the documents under consideration? Battalion records, 
including war diaries, were kept extensively during the war. If a man’s record 
was lacking, could his claims not be compared to what his battalion “went 
through during the time [the man was] in it?” What they did in the battalion 
and how long they were there one veteran explained, mattered as much to 
overall victory as a missing form. A man’s service was what mattered and 
“any man who served in a line battalion for a year [was], at the very least, 
entitled to treatment.” This veteran recognized that the repeated 
disappointments men endured meant that “most returned men [had] given 
up any hope of ever receiving justice under the present system and [had 
sunk] into a slough of despondency.”77 
Other returned men laid out even longer lists of grievances. One 
veteran complained of the raw deal men were receiving and wrote off the 
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whole veterans’ assistance system as a “washout.” The fact that men were 
being turned down due to prior illness was particularly galling. Why, he 
asked, were these men accepted at recruitment stations if their disabilities 
were so debilitating? How was it that a man who spent the war on the 
exhibition ground because of poor health received a full pension, while 
holding down a government job, when a wartime amputation case had his 
pension cut twenty percent when the board discovered he held a job with the 
City of Toronto? The veterans’ organizations were of little help. “They pass 
these resolutions every year,” he complained, but “what have they yet 
attained?” The Canteen Funds did not escape his ire. How was it, he 
wondered, that Premier Ferguson gained “control” of the fund? How could 
returned men have a say about the money when it was controlled by so few? 
“If every employer of labor in Toronto had the veterans’ interests at heart and 
employed them … there would not be so many handicapped men seeking 
employment.”78 
The postwar situation of ad hoc financial aid, when combined with the 
physical and emotional trauma, and the economic distress of the 1920s and 
1930s, left returned men “right up against it.”79 Without a reliable income, 
and often facing obstacles and barriers from pension boards, veterans 
increasingly turned to the OCF. The organization found itself swamped with 
applications for assistance and the resulting strain on its finances caused the 
fund to tighten its purse strings. This tightening only increased the desperate 
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plight of veterans, which in turn increased their frustration and 
disillusionment.  
A major point of frustration among Ontario’s veterans was that 
approval for canteen assistance bore no relation to their need. Men or their 
families had to provide doctors’ notes, bills, or other documentation 
supporting their claim for aid. Yet, this material was no guarantee that a 
man’s application would be approved. In John B.’s case, his doctor backed up 
his claim and he wrote to the OCF in support of his patient. “[B.] was 
wounded at Battle of Amiens in back on Aug 8th.” The doctor “treated him 
from time to time for muscular pain …  which has at times rendered him 
unable to work – I have no doubt that there is muscle or sheath ligamentions 
injury here which renders him partially disabled after doing heavy work and 
at seasonal influence.”80 Thanks to his doctor’s intervention, John’s 
application was successful, but later calls for aid were turned down.81 
Archibald M. wrote to the OCF in support of another returned man, 
John W., who had served with the Horse Auxiliary. John was born in 1890 
and enlisted at Kingston, Ontario early in the war. In 1915 he was decorated 
for service.82 While overseas he was “slightly gassed” and, ten years after the 
war ended, he faced a few “minor debts.” John was under medical care. He 
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included a note from his doctor in his application for assistance who 
explained that John had “done his bit” and was more than “worthy of being 
helped [if] at all possible.” Unlike John B., however, one of the OCF’s trustees 
agreed. This trustee made inquiries into the veteran’s worthiness, concluding 
that he was “satisfied” John’s case was genuine and that there existed “an 
urgent need for assistance.” 83 
Such investigations into men’s applications occupied a significant 
amount of the OCF’s attention. The trustees feared that men would try to 
manipulate the system and they expended considerable effort working to 
ensure that only those who met their strict guidelines would be successful in 
their applications. Yet, despite their concerns, carrying out investigations for 
the hundreds of applications received each month was far beyond the board’s 
ability. To help lessen the load, the board turned to the Soldiers’ Aid 
Commission of Ontario and the service bureaus operated by the Ontario 
Command of the Canadian Legion. In the latter’s case, the OCF financed the 
bureau’s work at a cost of approximately ten thousand dollars per year.84 
Between November 1930 and April 1931, the SAC carried out at least 134 
investigations on behalf of the OCF.85 These investigations resulted in 
hundreds of men being  found ineligible for assistance each year.  
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In such cases, the commission and the OCF tried to make 
arrangements for men to obtain assistance from other assistance programs. 
The most common referral the trustees made was for those ineligible for 
canteen funds to seek out a war veteran’s allowance.86 Veterans who had 
commuted pensions were unaware that they could apply for the allowance 
passed after 1930. “I am in receipt of your application for assistance for the 
Ontario Canteen Fund,” wrote a board member to a man applying for 
assistance. As a “former pensioner you are eligible for assistance from the 
Department of Pensions and National Health and should make your 
application to Mr. Anderson at Christie Hospital.”87 Similar referrals were 
also suggested by other veterans’ agencies for men to seek aid from the OCF. 
Such was the case for Percival J., a returned man who, in 1929, found himself 
at the end of his financial rope. Percival had worked for several months and 
was now struggling to support his wife and two children. He was 
corresponding with a DSCR employee in Hamilton who informed him that he 
was unable to help because Percival was not in receipt of a pension. The 
employee did, however, enclose the contact information of the OCF in hopes 
that the fund might be able to assist him.88  
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Returned soldiers and their dependents were appreciative of these 
efforts to secure assistance. In many cases, however, the OCF’s policies 
denying aid to the pensioned and unemployed left men and their families 
even more frustrated because they had not been made aware of these policies 
ahead of time. Even worse, it often seemed to Ontario’s veterans that the 
various agencies were not fully informed about each other’s regulations. In 
some cases, employees at different organizations were clearly confused by the 
details of men’s eligibility for assistance. Officials from the federal DPNH, for 
example, often misdirected unemployed men with medical expenses to the 
canteen fund, despite the fund’s regulations stipulating against such claims. 
The federal department’s employees were under the impression that only 
non-pensioned men were ineligible for medical aid from the fund. 
Accordingly, pension officials advised returned men to apply to the canteen 
fund because it was used “for the relief of those not drawing pension.” As the 
fund’s trustees concluded, this was “to a certain extent true,” but also 
“misleading” because it did not accurately reflect their regulations.89 Such 
errors proved an annoyance to veterans. Indeed, as one OCF board member 
wrote, the problem was so serious that angry men risked disrupting the 
fund’s operation and they became “obstinate and unreasonable to deal 
with.”90 
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Most applicants to the OCF assumed they were entitled to its 
assistance and being turned down was not an easy pill to swallow. Men such 
as Samuel G., who considered his refusal “twisty,” interpreted their denial as 
proof that the fund’s trustees were duplicitous.91 Others were simply “hurt” 
by their denials. What they could not understand was why the fund was 
turning them down in their hour of need. As Herbert O. asked the trustees, 
surely “no man would ask for anything like this when he is working and able 
to keep things going on his wages.”92 Veterans were apt to assume the 
trustees were turning them down for other reasons. William V. believed that 
the trustees were out of touch with the plight of returned men. “You who has 
never known what it is to be hungry and not have anything to eat,” he 
angrily wrote the Board, before closing with a final plea to the trustees. 
William begged them the reconsider their decision. “I would not ask if I was 
not in dire need,” he explained. “I have struggled along all these years. but 
[sic] now I am down and out. so [sic] please [help me] for God’s sake if not 
for mine.”93 
Pleading for help was not easy. The war generation was raised in an 
era when men were supposed to be self-sufficient. Asking for help from the 
canteen fund was a matter of desperation. W.S. wrote the trustees that his 
inability to support his wife and two children cost him “the affection & 
                                                 
91 AO, RG29-65, B161739, “File No. 2944 [Name withheld under the Freedom of 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 4 September 1930.  
92 AO, RG29-65, B108762, “File No. 2139 [Name withheld under the Freedom of 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act],” 20 February 1930 
93 AO, RG29-65, B161739, “File No. 3506, [Name withheld under the Freedom of 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act].” 
305 
 
 
 
respect of my family.”94 Yet, need for aid overcame even the proudest of men. 
They were willing to beg, if need be. As Jason W. wrote the Board, he knew 
the canteen fund was supposed to provide “[a]id where there is sickness in a 
Ex Soldiers[’] Family.” He was a veteran and he needed help. If he had had a 
job, he would not have been asking for assistance: “If I was in Employment it 
stands to reason I would not ask for Aid.”95 This veteran did not want food. 
He was already receiving assistance through his municipality. What he 
needed was assistance for medical bills. “Who, I ask you, can I appeal to 
when there is sickness and the need is very urgent,” he asked the trustees, 
especially when the fund “is for such a purpose for us Ex service men.”  
Although unemployed and sickly myself I have never asked for 
anything for myself like a good soldier I tried to carry on under 
my own steam. But sometimes one must ask for help and when 
it is for sickness well, who can I apply to, But the Canteen 
Fund[,] which I understand does help in Cases of Sickness etc. 
does one have to be at deaths door before help is given we need 
lots of things in the Medicine Line etc need them badly.96 
The challenges this veteran faced were a sad indictment of life in postwar 
Canada and the failure of the canteen fund to meet veterans’ expectations for 
aid.  
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 The repercussions of these failures undermined more than veterans’ 
sense of entitlement. They also forced returned men to question the meaning 
of their service, a reality summed up in the cases of Robert L. and John B. 
Robert was a farmer near Cornwall, Ontario. In 1916, he attested with the 
CEF at age eighteen. He survived the war, married and had four children. In 
1938, Robert wrote to the fund asking for assistance. He was on relief and 
believed his war service entitled him to additional help.97 Like many of 
Ontario’s veterans, he was denied assistance because he was unemployed. 
When Robert received the news, he was furious and penned a blistering letter 
to the trustees. It lambasted the canteen fund for its inequity and bitterly 
questioned the purpose of his war service: 
I thank you very much for what I have resived [sic] from yous 
[sic] since I came back from Over-Seas, As for unemployment 
I’m just working to keep myself from crawling on my knees to 
you people I think I earn’t anything that I ever got. But I do 
notice that just certain class of people can get the Canteen Fund 
that is the ones that went as far as England. I been taking 
Doctor’s medicine for a year and half. The time you get the 
Canteen fund is when your deid [sic] thats’ when we need it 
most.98 
Robert believed strongly that, despite his unemployment, he had worked for 
a living and, as a result, he did not consider his time on relief representative 
of his work ethic. He informed the fund’s trustees that he was not a slacker, 
having “earn’t [sic]” everything he had achieved. Furthermore, Robert was 
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not asking for charity. What he wanted was due recognition for his time 
overseas. This, he explained, was why he had been ill for a year and a half.99  
When men like Robert L. were turned down for canteen assistance 
because they were unemployed, it undermined their belief in the war’s wider 
meaning. These men believed they were entitled to OCF assistance and took 
pride in the fact that they could turn to it in place of government charity. 
Denying them access further entrenched their bitterness and left men 
disillusioned with the postwar peace. John B., for example, was a general 
labourer, born in 1882, who enlisted in late 1915. He served overseas with the 
19th Battalion, CEF, arriving for duty in France in October 1916. He served in 
the field until August 1917, when he was granted ten days leave to Paris. 
While on leave he contracted a mild case of gonorrhea, which kept him in 
hospital until November. Once fit for duty, he returned to his unit. He 
distinguished himself on at least two occasions and was appointed acting 
Corporal in January and then full Corporal in July 1918. He also received the 
Military Medal for his actions in August 1918. Later that month he was 
wounded. According to his service file, John was “blown up by a mine,” 
suffering injuries to his head, his back, and right hip. He was subsequently 
treated for contusions to his back and diagnosed neurasthenic, with particular 
susceptibility to noise. In 1919, he was discharged as unfit for duty with 
“partial loss of function of [the] nervous system” and 183 days for his War 
Service Gratuity.100  
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After the war, John B. held seasonal jobs. In December 1929, he was 
facing serious hardship and applied to the OCF for help. His application 
complained that while his jobs paid enough during the summer, his wages 
were never sufficient “to keep my self in the winter.”101 “I am writing without 
anything to eat, and have no coal to keep my sick wife warm,” he explained 
in his application. John was in debt, partly because of the medical costs he 
faced as a result of wounds sustained overseas. Although he received some 
canteen assistance, he was eventually turned down. John’s family was 
outraged that he was denied assistance. The believed that his war service 
entitled them to help: 
my husband went when the call came and fought bravely for 
his country and I do think they are doing the right thing with 
him, he was a strong healthy man when he enlisted but he has 
not been the same since he came home. I think it is a shame you 
cant help us, we simply cant live this way.102 
John also blamed the war for his plight. “I would not ask you for anything if I 
was as good as before The War,” he wrote the trustees, telling them “I dont 
[sic] think it is up right for me to be paying doctors bills over this great war,” 
and that “I served my King and country, and this is what I get for it.”103 John, 
like so many of his generation, was left disillusioned in the Great War’s 
aftermath. 
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Returned men who applied for OCF assistance had at least a decade’s 
experience of dealing with Canada’s nascent veterans’ system and, however 
grateful they were for its existence, they never felt it worked for their benefit. 
Some older veterans received a war gratuity but that was the extent of the 
state’s general aid for military service. A lesser number were eligible for a 
pension, although the majority of these were often meager, especially in the 
war’s immediate aftermath. By the 1930s, veterans had several options to 
which they could turn, including the War Veteran’s Allowance, provided 
they were old or disabled enough to qualify. For able-bodied men deemed 
employable by this system, however, the only substantive alternative 
remained the canteen fund.  
The applicants to the OCF served as enlisted soldiers and, unlike the 
war’s writers, many were borderline illiterate. These veterans were not happy 
they had to apply for assistance, but they were proud they could turn to the 
fund in place of municipal aid. Nonetheless, applicants felt compelled to 
justify their need. In addition to lengthy explanations that detailed what these 
men required, their letters also explained how they had struggled after war’s 
end. The veterans were clearly affected by their war experience, a situation 
made worse by failing health and the challenge of widespread 
unemployment. These setbacks undermined men’s idealized roles as 
veterans, fathers, and breadwinners—struggles that influenced the meaning 
of the war. 104 Faced with nearly two decades of trial, returned men inevitably 
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questioned their service and sacrifice. The result was a deep sense of 
disillusionment that marked a generation of men.  
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Conclusion 
 
The outbreak of another global conflict in 1939 did not change the fact that 
untold numbers of the war generation believed themselves “psychological 
and physical casualt[ies] of the last war.”1 These men came of age with the 
Great War and believed it was a formative experience. The most influential of 
the generation, including men such as A.Y. Jackson, Will Bird, and Bill 
Deacon, described the conflict as a generational catalyst. It was not just elites 
who identified generationally. Ordinary men, including A.W. Cooke, an 
artillery gunner from Hamilton, also cited the war’s generational influence.2 
So did Matthew MacGowan, a veteran of the 1st Battalion, CEF. He too 
believed in the war’s formative influence. “Our generation” matured because 
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of the conflict, MacGowan explained. The war brought “a definite change in 
everybody, in his mind,” because you grew from a “boy to a man.”3  
P.L. Kingsley was just as adamant that the war shaped his generation. 
He enlisted in August 1914 and served throughout the conflict, seeing action 
at Second Ypres, Festubert, the Somme, Vimy, Passchendaele, and during the 
last Hundred Days. At the age of eighty-five, Kinglsey wrote his memoirs, 
describing them as a “tale of the youth of my generation.”4 While the war that 
these men lived through amounted to a “kaleidoscope of events and 
experiences,” they agreed that the conflict remained a fundamental part of 
their collective identity for the rest of their lives.5  
Yet, as indelible an impression as the Great War left on a generation, 
the conflict was not the only event that shaped them. Its aftermath also left its 
mark. Upon their return home, many struggled in the face of failing health 
and economic hardship, experiences that came to define the war’s meaning in 
the years and decades that followed. This was not what these men signed up 
for when they enlisted; the failure of the peace to meet wartime and pre-war 
expectations was a major disappointment. But Canada’s war generation did 
not give up easily. It fought its ‘second battle’ for years after, advocating both 
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publicly and privately for improved treatment. Although often victorious on 
the battlefield, this peacetime struggle ended in defeat. The bonus campaign, 
better access to healthcare, a less exclusionary pension system, and easier 
access to their canteen funds eluded returned men throughout the 1920s and 
into the 1930s. In time, setback upon setback eroded the generation’s beliefs 
about the war and its sense of purpose.  
Canada’s war generation was further embittered that its governments 
failed to keep their promises made to veterans. The country’s leaders assured 
Canadians that they would support their troops, both during the war and 
after. Despite such claims, few returned men felt that the postwar re-
establishment system was sufficient. Its hallmark programs were the pension 
system and the soldier settlement plan. Neither succeeded. These failures 
were only two of many reasons why veterans felt their future was 
undermined by poor planning and broken promises. While the pension 
question often dominated debate, the failure of the soldier settlement scheme 
represented an even bigger setback because it was the only way federal and 
provincial governments willingly assisted ‘able-bodied’ veterans needing 
postwar employment.  
It was a different story for the wounded. For these men, a series of 
government agencies, including the Military Hospitals Commission and its 
subsequent reincarnation as the DSCR and DPNH (and finally the DVA), 
helped shoulder the war’s burdens. Not so for the so-called able-bodied. If 
they encountered difficulty, then the only option for those unwilling (or 
unable) to turn to municipal aid were the soldiers’ aid commissions and 
provincial canteen funds. Veterans in this position felt rejected and, while it 
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pained many to admit it, the challenges they faced in the 1920s and 1930s left 
the war generation increasingly disenchanted.  
Questions about whether Canadians were disillusioned have been 
largely ignored by historians. Moreover, rather than asking how postwar 
discontent forced the war generation to reconsider the conflict’s meaning, 
studies have instead focused on the veterans’ movement and the war’s social 
memory. While both form part of the Great War’s legacy, without proper 
appreciation of the trials endured after 1918, this picture is incomplete.  
Efforts to publicly commemorate the war were part of its aftermath, but 
they were not the only way Canadians made sense of the conflict. Nor did all 
Canadians believe an idealized history of the Canadian Corps, with its record 
of “co-operation, tolerance, selflessness, and unity,” was the answer to the 
social and economic discord of the 1920s and 1930s.6 At its heart, the war’s 
constructed memory was a debate about how the conflict should be 
remembered, not how its memory informed the present. For the war 
generation, however, commemoration was not an all-encompassing 
explanation of the conflict. These men lived the war firsthand and did not 
need ceremonies to understand its meaning. To the veterans who made up 
the generation’s ranks, the war was a matter of personal experience and it 
could be re-evaluated, especially when postwar life failed to live up to 
wartime ideals.  
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 As a highly literate generation, the question of postwar 
disillusionment became a matter of serious literary debate, particularly in 
Britain and the United States. Within Canada, however, the generation 
published little about its discontent. Nonetheless, some veterans, such as 
George Drew, Robert Manion, and Frank Underhill, did expand on why they 
were disenchanted with the postwar peace. They were disappointed that 
disarmament was failing and that Canada risked sliding into another ‘futile’ 
slaughter. Their critiques reflected deeply personal positions that did not fit 
the public discourse of the war’s memory.  
While few memoirs directly addressed veterans’ economic setbacks, 
concerns over postwar employment began long before the so-called ‘war 
book boom’. In fact, men started to worry about jobs as early as 1917. These 
soldiers, including Frank Oldacre, Edward Malette, and Stanley Bennett 
believed that a secure position was a critical part of the ‘square deal’ they 
hoped for in postwar Canada. Federal and provincial soldier settlement 
programs were designed to address the demand for postwar work, but they 
were never intended to employ all veterans. The failure of Ontario’s 
Kapuskasing colony foreshadowed the wider problems with Canada’s 
settlement schemes and the limitations of state sponsored employment for 
veterans. While Ottawa and the provincial capitals planned for re-
establishing the disabled, the able-bodied were another matter entirely. 
Postwar recession, combined with widespread and prolonged unemployment 
undermined their chance at re-integrating into Canadian society. The 
difficulties these men faced left many veterans feeling ‘right up against it’. As 
the struggle to find work dragged on, they grew increasingly embittered. The 
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record of this discontent is not part of the war’s social memory, but as the 
letters Ontario’s veterans wrote to the province’s canteen fund make clear, 
these men were disillusioned in the war’s aftermath.  
All the applicants to the Ontario Canteen Fund were ‘average’ soldiers, 
a group that remains underrepresented in histories of the conflict’s aftermath. 
Like the war generation more broadly, these men were born in the decade 
and a half before 1900. They came of age with the conflict and never expected 
postwar life would be defined by economic strife. The strains they endured 
after returning home placed a heavy burden on their personal and family 
lives, trials made worse by the precarious state of their physical and 
psychological health. While their correspondence with the OCF trustees did 
not address questions of remembrance or commemoration, the meaning of 
the war was central to their pleas for assistance. These veterans remained 
proud of their service, in part because it entitled them to use the canteen 
fund. Yet, as their appeals to the Fund’s trustees reveal, these men continued 
to re-evaluate belief in the war’s value, especially in reaction to severe 
challenges in the postwar labour market. Far from a memory of purpose, for 
too many of these veterans, the war’s meaning was tainted by dashed hopes.  
The Great War ended in November 1918 but its legacy cast a far longer 
shadow. The worst of its horrors haunted the living for decades and Canada’s 
war generation spent a lifetime trying to understand its impact. For these 
men, the conflict was a central reference point that defined their 
understanding of the tragic events that shaped their lives. While men’s 
experiences between 1914 and 1918 are central to any explanation of the war’s 
meaning, postwar disillusionment remains an equally integral part of this 
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legacy. It was a result not just of war, but of its aftermath and it endured long 
after the guns fell silent. 
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The Canteen Fund Act 
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